UK and Italy could send troops to Lebanon under new plan to verify Hezbollah disarmament

Israel and Lebanon have agreed on a shortlist of four countries that could provide personnel or troops for a new international mechanism tasked with verifying Hezbollah’s disarmament, opening a potentially important new phase in efforts to stabilise southern Lebanon after months of renewed conflict.

Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Indonesia are being considered for the mission following United States-mediated negotiations between Israel and Lebanon in Rome, according to people familiar with the discussions. The mechanism could involve foreign personnel entering Lebanese villages, overseeing implementation of weapons-removal commitments and potentially participating directly in inspections designed to certify that areas have been cleared of Hezbollah arms.

The negotiations remain at an early stage and none of the four shortlisted countries has yet been confirmed as a participant. The United States is expected to play a central role in deciding which countries ultimately join, while the mission’s legal mandate, freedom of movement, rules for inspections and relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces remain unresolved.

The central dispute is already becoming clear. Israel wants verification teams to be able to inspect private homes in southern Lebanese villages where it suspects Hezbollah weapons may be stored. Lebanon’s army has resisted broad house-to-house searches, arguing that warrants would be required and warning that intrusive raids could generate confrontation with local communities and Hezbollah supporters.

The proposed mission is part of a wider June 2026 framework linking Israel’s eventual withdrawal from occupied areas of southern Lebanon to the disarmament of Hezbollah and the expansion of Lebanese state authority across the country. That framework could become one of the most consequential attempts in decades to alter Lebanon’s internal military balance, but its success depends on persuading Hezbollah to relinquish an arsenal that has long operated outside direct state control.

Why are Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Indonesia being considered for a Hezbollah verification mission?

The four countries emerged from United States-mediated discussions in Rome and appear to have been selected partly because they could provide international participation without placing the verification process exclusively under either Israel, the United States or existing United Nations structures.

Reuters reported that Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Indonesia could help design the mechanism, supply personnel or contribute troops capable of observing and potentially participating in inspections. A Lebanese official had previously confirmed that Israel and Lebanon had agreed on a shortlist of possible troop-contributing countries without publicly identifying them.

The composition is notable because the countries come from different political and geographic backgrounds. Britain and Italy are NATO members, Switzerland has a longstanding reputation for neutrality, while Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim-majority country and has previously contributed personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Lebanon.

That combination could give the mechanism broader political credibility inside Lebanon than a force dominated solely by Western countries aligned closely with Israel. At the same time, participation by any of the four governments would require agreement on the mission’s precise mandate, legal protections, security arrangements and ability to operate independently in potentially hostile environments.

Discussions remain preliminary. The Israeli prime minister’s office, Lebanese presidency and several of the governments named had not publicly confirmed participation when Reuters reported the shortlist, while Switzerland also had no immediate comment.

What exactly would foreign troops be expected to inspect inside southern Lebanon?

The proposed mission would focus on determining whether areas designated for Hezbollah disarmament have genuinely been cleared of weapons and military infrastructure.

Under the June framework, the Lebanese Armed Forces are supposed gradually to establish control throughout Lebanon while Hezbollah and other armed organisations relinquish their weapons. The process begins with pilot areas in southern Lebanon where reconstruction and civilian returns are expected to accompany disarmament.

Foreign personnel could inspect villages and certify that weapons are no longer present. The major unresolved issue is whether those inspections would be confined to open areas, tunnels, military facilities and known weapons sites or whether inspectors could enter privately owned houses.

Israel argues that excluding homes would leave a major loophole because weapons could simply be relocated into residential buildings. Lebanese officials have previously said Israel believes Hezbollah stores weapons within civilian properties and therefore considers private-home inspections essential to any credible disarmament process. Hezbollah has disputed Israeli claims that it has been systematically rebuilding its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon.

Lebanon’s military leadership sees the matter differently. Broad house searches could be interpreted in southern communities as the Lebanese state carrying out Israeli demands against its own citizens, potentially undermining the army’s legitimacy and creating confrontation in areas where Hezbollah continues to possess substantial political and social influence.

The question of who has authority to approve searches is therefore not merely procedural. It could determine whether the entire disarmament mechanism remains politically sustainable.

Why could searches of private Lebanese homes become the most dangerous part of the agreement?

Southern Lebanon is not simply a military operating area. It contains towns and villages with civilian populations, local political networks and communities where Hezbollah has been deeply embedded for decades.

Searching private residences requires a different level of authority and community acceptance from clearing abandoned tunnels or confiscating weapons discovered in open terrain. Lebanese security officials have said warrants would be required for individual properties, creating legal and practical constraints on any foreign mission.

The Lebanese army has previously resisted Israeli demands for more intrusive searches partly because commanders fear that systematic raids could provoke civil conflict. In November 2025, Lebanese officials told Reuters that the army believed broad sweeps of valleys, forests and suspected military locations were producing results without forcing confrontations inside private homes.

Those operations had uncovered more than 50 tunnels, more than 50 guided missiles and hundreds of other weapons by that stage, according to Lebanese sources briefed on the campaign. Israel nevertheless argued that Hezbollah could preserve significant capabilities if residential locations remained largely beyond inspection.

Any foreign verification force would inherit that disagreement. If international personnel are prohibited from checking locations Israel considers suspicious, Israel could refuse to accept their findings. If inspectors are given broad authority to enter homes, Lebanese political opposition could undermine the mission from inside the country.

That makes inspection rules one of the most important unresolved elements of the emerging arrangement.

How is Hezbollah disarmament connected to Israel withdrawing troops from southern Lebanon?

The June 2026 framework deliberately ties the two processes together.

Lebanon is expected to establish state control and disarm Hezbollah, while Israel says it will eventually withdraw forces once it is satisfied that Hezbollah no longer poses a military threat from Lebanese territory. Israel currently occupies what it describes as a security zone extending roughly 10 kilometres into southern Lebanon.

Israel has said it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and intends ultimately to redeploy outside Lebanese territory. However, the framework does not require an immediate unconditional withdrawal. Instead, Israeli withdrawal is linked to progress on disarmament and security guarantees.

That sequencing is one of the agreement’s most politically difficult features for Lebanon. Hezbollah and its supporters can argue that surrendering weapons while Israeli troops remain inside the country would remove Lebanon’s deterrent before occupation ends. Israel takes the opposite position, arguing that withdrawing first could allow Hezbollah to rebuild positions close to the border.

The foreign verification mechanism is intended partly to break that deadlock. If mutually acceptable international inspectors can certify that Hezbollah weapons have been removed from particular areas, Israel could theoretically withdraw from corresponding territory without relying exclusively on Lebanese assurances.

Whether the mechanism can build enough trust for that sequencing to work remains uncertain.

Why is Hezbollah resisting a framework that could ultimately remove Israeli troops from Lebanon?

For Hezbollah, disarmament is not simply a tactical concession. Its weapons are central to the movement’s political identity and its claim to operate as a resistance force against Israel.

The organisation has rejected the June framework’s disarmament provisions as resembling surrender. Hezbollah has argued that Lebanon requires an armed deterrent while Israeli forces occupy Lebanese territory and while Israeli air operations continue against targets the Israeli military says are connected with the group.

The movement has been substantially weakened by repeated Israeli attacks and the wider regional conflict involving Iran, its principal external supporter. Reuters reported that the renewed Lebanon war followed Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel after the United States and Israel launched their February 2026 war against Iran. Israel subsequently expanded ground operations and aerial attacks in Lebanon.

Yet military weakness does not automatically translate into political willingness to surrender weapons. Hezbollah retains a major constituency within Lebanon’s Shi’ite community and continues to operate inside Lebanon’s sectarian political system.

The Lebanese government therefore faces a difficult balance. It is attempting to restore the state’s monopoly over armed force without triggering internal conflict against a movement that remains deeply entrenched inside parts of Lebanese society.

That helps explain why Beirut prefers gradual Lebanese army-led disarmament rather than highly visible foreign-led searches that could be portrayed as enforcement on Israel’s behalf.

Why might the proposed force operate outside the existing UNIFIL structure?

Southern Lebanon already contains a large international peacekeeping mission, raising an obvious question about why another foreign mechanism would be required.

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon operates under Security Council Resolution 1701 and works alongside the Lebanese Armed Forces to monitor security conditions in southern Lebanon. The UN says Resolution 1701 requires the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River to be free of armed personnel and weapons other than those belonging to the Lebanese state and UNIFIL.

UNIFIL, however, was not created as an independent force empowered to forcibly disarm Hezbollah. United Nations officials have repeatedly emphasised that the Lebanese state bears primary responsibility for removing unauthorised weapons, while UNIFIL monitors, reports and supports the Lebanese Armed Forces.

The new proposal appears designed to create a more specialised verification arrangement connected directly to the June Israel-Lebanon agreement.

Reuters reported that the United States and Israel are unlikely to support placing the new mechanism under United Nations control. At the same time, some European governments could be uncomfortable with placing it under President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace, leaving negotiators searching for a structure acceptable to all parties.

A Lebanese invitation backed by Israeli acceptance currently appears to be the most likely legal framework for foreign troops to enter the country.

Could the foreign verification mission eventually replace part of UNIFIL’s role?

There is currently no confirmed plan for the proposed verification mission to replace UNIFIL.

The two mechanisms would potentially serve different purposes. UNIFIL has a broad peacekeeping mandate that includes monitoring the cessation of hostilities, supporting Lebanese army deployment and reporting violations of Resolution 1701. The proposed multinational team would appear much more narrowly focused on verifying implementation of Hezbollah disarmament commitments connected to the 2026 framework.

However, overlap could become unavoidable. Both structures would operate in southern Lebanon, both could interact with Lebanese soldiers, and both might encounter unauthorised weapons.

Clear command arrangements would therefore be essential. Foreign troops entering villages would need to know whether they report directly to their national governments, a multinational command, Lebanese authorities or the United States-mediated coordination mechanism.

Rules covering intelligence sharing would also be sensitive. Israel may want verification teams to investigate sites identified through Israeli intelligence, while Lebanon could resist allowing a foreign mission to become a channel through which Israeli intelligence effectively directs operations inside Lebanese territory.

Those questions help explain why negotiators have not yet finalised the mission despite agreeing on potential contributing countries.

What could happen if Israel decides the disarmament process is moving too slowly?

This is the principal security risk surrounding the entire framework.

Israel has repeatedly argued that Hezbollah cannot be permitted to rebuild military infrastructure close to its border. Israeli forces have continued conducting strikes against targets they describe as Hezbollah personnel, weapons facilities or attempts at rearmament. Lebanon has condemned Israeli operations that it says violate Lebanese sovereignty and undermine efforts to stabilise the south.

The June agreement was intended to replace repeated unilateral military action with an internationally supported process linking disarmament, withdrawal and reconstruction.

If Israel concludes that inspections are insufficient or Hezbollah is concealing weapons, it could resume or intensify military operations. If Lebanon believes Israel is using disarmament requirements to postpone withdrawal indefinitely, political support in Beirut for the framework could erode.

A credible verification mechanism therefore has to satisfy opposing demands simultaneously. Israel needs confidence that Hezbollah is genuinely losing military capability, while Lebanon needs confidence that verified progress will produce measurable Israeli withdrawal rather than additional conditions.

Foreign troops would essentially become guarantors of that exchange.

What are the key takeaways from the proposed international force to verify Hezbollah disarmament?

• Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Indonesia have emerged as the four countries being considered for a multinational mechanism that could verify Hezbollah’s disarmament in Lebanon.
• Israel and Lebanon agreed on the shortlist during United States-mediated negotiations, but participation by the four governments has not been finalised and discussions remain at an early stage.
• Foreign personnel could help define the verification process, provide observers or deploy troops capable of participating in inspections of Lebanese villages to confirm that Hezbollah weapons have been removed.
• Israel wants inspections potentially to include private residences, while the Lebanese army has resisted broad house searches because warrants would be required and officials fear they could provoke confrontation with local communities.
• The June Israel-Lebanon framework links Hezbollah’s disarmament and expanded Lebanese army control with an eventual Israeli withdrawal from occupied areas in southern Lebanon.
• Hezbollah rejects full disarmament and argues that its weapons remain necessary while Israeli forces occupy Lebanese territory, making implementation politically much harder than simply locating weapons caches.
• The proposed mission would probably operate separately from UNIFIL, whose existing mandate focuses on monitoring Resolution 1701 and supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces rather than independently carrying out forced disarmament.
• Negotiators still need to determine the mission’s mandate, authority to search private property, freedom of movement, command structure and relationship with the Lebanese army before foreign troops could actually deploy.

Why the private-home dispute could decide whether the Israel-Lebanon framework survives

The significance of the proposed international force is not simply that foreign troops may return to another sensitive part of the Middle East. The real development is that Israel and Lebanon are attempting to create a verification system both sides could use to make one of the most difficult exchanges in their relationship measurable: Hezbollah relinquishes military capability while Israel relinquishes territory.

That requires more than political promises. Israel wants physical evidence that weapons, tunnels and military positions have been dismantled. Lebanon wants evidence that compliance will actually produce Israeli withdrawal, reconstruction and restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. A trusted third-party mission could theoretically provide both.

The danger lies in what inspectors are authorised to do when obvious military sites have been cleared but intelligence suggests weapons remain hidden inside civilian neighbourhoods. Israel considers access to private properties important to preventing concealment. Lebanon’s army fears that systematic residential searches could turn a national disarmament programme into a confrontation with its own population.

That tension makes the mission’s legal rules more important than the identity of the countries providing troops. Britain, Italy, Switzerland and Indonesia could lend international legitimacy, but no combination of foreign governments can eliminate the underlying political problem if Hezbollah rejects disarmament or Lebanese communities refuse intrusive searches.

The proposed mechanism nevertheless represents a significant development because it attempts to connect military withdrawal, weapons verification and reconstruction within one process rather than allowing each issue to become a separate reason for renewed fighting.

The next breakthrough will therefore not necessarily be another diplomatic declaration. It will be agreement on precisely where inspectors can go, what they can search, who authorises those searches and what Israel must do once an area is certified as free of Hezbollah weapons.

If negotiators can solve those questions, the foreign verification force could become the practical machinery behind the June peace framework. If they cannot, the disagreement over a single Lebanese front door may ultimately prove capable of blocking an agreement intended to reshape the security architecture of the entire Israel-Lebanon border.

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