Hungary moves to remove President Tamás Sulyok as Péter Magyar launches anti-graft overhaul

Hungarian Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced on June 22, 2026, that his government will seek the removal of President Tamás Sulyok through a constitutional amendment as part of a sweeping effort to dismantle institutions inherited from Viktor Orbán’s 16-year rule. Magyar also unveiled plans to amend 47 laws, create a National Asset Protection and Recovery Office and begin a broader constitutional review involving public consultations and a national referendum.

The initiative, named Operation Purgatory by the government, is intended to investigate suspected misuse of public money during the past two decades and recover assets believed to have been improperly transferred or acquired. Magyar told parliament that corruption had cost Hungary the equivalent of between 8 percent and 10 percent of gross domestic product in recent years, although that estimate has not been independently established through completed investigations or court judgments.

Sulyok has rejected accusations that he served the political interests of Orbán and says he acted as an institutional check within Hungary’s constitutional system. Former governing party Fidesz has condemned Magyar’s proposals as politically motivated and an attempt to use a parliamentary supermajority to remove officials associated with the previous administration.

The reforms could accelerate Hungary’s reconciliation with the European Union and improve access to funding previously frozen over corruption and rule-of-law concerns. They also create a difficult democratic test for Magyar, who must demonstrate that dismantling Orbán-era structures will restore independent institutions rather than replace them with a new system controlled by the current government.

Why does Péter Magyar want Hungary’s president removed through a constitutional amendment?

Magyar has accused Sulyok of failing to defend Hungary’s constitutional institutions while Orbán and Fidesz reshaped the courts, media, universities and public administration. The prime minister argues that Sulyok remained silent when independent institutions were weakened and is therefore not suitable to supervise Hungary’s democratic transition.

Sulyok was chosen as president by the Fidesz-controlled parliament in 2024. Although the Hungarian presidency is largely ceremonial, the office has the authority to sign legislation, return bills to parliament and refer legislation to the Constitutional Court for review.

Those powers could allow Sulyok to delay or challenge elements of Magyar’s reform programme. The Tisza Party government had previously called on the president to resign voluntarily, but Sulyok refused and defended his record as politically neutral.

Magyar has now chosen constitutional amendment rather than the existing impeachment process. Parliament would elect a replacement president for a term of no more than five years if the amendment is adopted and Sulyok is removed.

The move is politically significant because Hungary’s constitution normally protects the presidency from direct removal over political disagreement. Rewriting those protections for a particular office-holder may allow the government to clear an institutional obstacle, but it could also establish a precedent enabling future parliamentary majorities to remove presidents they consider politically inconvenient.

What does Operation Purgatory propose to change across Hungary’s political system?

Magyar said the government will amend 47 laws to establish the legal foundations of a National Asset Protection and Recovery Office. The new body would investigate suspected misuse of public assets over approximately 20 years and seek to recover money or property where wrongdoing can be proven.

The office is expected to examine public procurement, state contracts, government-supported foundations, asset transfers and business arrangements linked to politically exposed figures. Its effectiveness will depend on access to financial records, independence from ministers and prosecutors, and the ability to pursue assets transferred outside Hungary.

Magyar also announced a 12-year limit on the total time a person can serve as a member of parliament. The proposal is designed to reduce permanent political careers and prevent the long-term concentration of influence within party and parliamentary structures.

The government plans to introduce a maximum age of 70 for judges serving on the Constitutional Court. The rule would force the retirement of some officials appointed during the Orbán era, including Péter Polt, a former chief prosecutor who later became the court’s presiding judge.

Another proposal would allow two-thirds of judges to initiate the removal of the heads of the Kúria, Hungary’s supreme court, and the National Judicial Office. Any removal would still require approval from two-thirds of parliament, creating both a judicial and political threshold.

Could Hungary’s new asset-recovery office reclaim money lost during the Orbán era?

Recovering misused public money is more difficult than identifying politically connected contracts. Investigators must establish that specific assets resulted from corruption, fraud, abuse of office or another legally defined offence and must prove that case through an independent judicial process.

Money may have passed through companies, investment funds, trusts, family members or foreign jurisdictions. Asset recovery can therefore require years of forensic accounting, international cooperation and litigation before property is returned to the state.

Magyar’s government will also need to distinguish poor policy, excessive pricing and political favouritism from criminal conduct. A contract that delivered weak value for taxpayers may deserve investigation or cancellation without necessarily proving that every participant committed a crime.

The prime minister’s claim that corruption cost Hungary between 8 percent and 10 percent of annual economic output provides a powerful political message, but the new office will need evidence-based calculations. Inflated or poorly documented recovery targets could undermine public confidence and allow Fidesz to portray the process as political revenge.

Hungary’s Integrity Authority has already developed systems to monitor transactions and identify risks involving European Union and domestic funding. The new government must decide whether the proposed office will complement that institution, absorb some of its responsibilities or create overlapping agencies competing for authority.

Why are Viktor Orbán’s former allies describing Magyar’s reforms as political retaliation?

Fidesz lawmaker Gergely Gulyás described Magyar’s parliamentary speech as slanderous and appalling. The former governing party argues that the new administration is presenting association with Orbán as evidence of misconduct before courts have examined individual allegations.

Fidesz is also likely to challenge the use of constitutional amendments to remove Sulyok and reshape the judiciary. Orbán’s critics made similar objections when Fidesz used its own two-thirds parliamentary majority to rewrite Hungary’s constitution and appoint loyalists to institutions with long terms.

This creates an uncomfortable parallel for Magyar. His government says extraordinary reforms are necessary because the previous system was deliberately designed to survive a change of government and obstruct democratic accountability.

Opponents argue that the same logic can justify almost unlimited intervention by a new majority. Removing officials, changing judicial retirement rules and redesigning institutions can restore independence when safeguards are genuine, but they can also become mechanisms for replacing one party’s appointees with another’s.

The legitimacy of the reforms will therefore depend on transparent procedures, judicial review and the absence of predetermined criminal outcomes. Officials associated with Fidesz must remain entitled to due process even when the political system that appointed them is being dismantled.

How could the constitutional overhaul reshape Hungary after Viktor Orbán’s defeat?

Magyar said a comprehensive constitutional review will begin in the autumn, involving public consultations before a proposed new constitution is submitted to a referendum. He has argued that Hungary must rebuild checks and balances rather than make minor amendments to the framework created under Orbán.

Orbán and Fidesz used repeated constitutional amendments to centralise authority and entrench policy preferences in areas including taxation, family policy, courts and elections. Long terms for institutional leaders meant that Fidesz-linked officials could retain influence even after the party lost office.

Magyar’s Tisza Party won a two-thirds parliamentary majority in the April 2026 election, giving the government enough votes to amend the constitution without Fidesz support. The election ended Orbán’s 16-year period as prime minister and created the strongest mandate for institutional change since Hungary’s transition from communist rule.

A referendum could provide stronger democratic legitimacy than amendments approved exclusively by parliament. However, public participation will be meaningful only when citizens receive sufficient time, balanced information and a clear explanation of how the new system would distribute power.

The final constitution will be judged by whether it protects independent institutions even when they oppose Magyar. A framework designed only to dismantle Fidesz influence would be less durable than one establishing rules that constrain every future government.

Could the reforms unlock more European Union funding and repair relations with Brussels?

The European Union froze substantial Hungarian funding during Orbán’s government because of concerns involving corruption, public procurement, conflicts of interest and judicial independence. The dispute became one of the most serious rule-of-law conflicts between Brussels and a member state.

Magyar has moved quickly to reverse that isolation by cooperating with European institutions, strengthening anti-corruption safeguards and committing Hungary to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has said recent reforms allowed approximately €16.4 billion in previously frozen funding to be unlocked.

Some funds and technical conditions remain subject to continued assessment. The European Commission will expect Hungary to demonstrate that reforms are implemented in practice rather than adopted temporarily to secure payments.

An effective asset-recovery office could improve confidence if it operates independently and cooperates with European investigators. Politically directed prosecutions or weak judicial safeguards could create new concerns, even when the stated objective is fighting corruption.

Access to European money is economically important because Hungary needs investment in infrastructure, energy, digitalisation and regional development. Restored funding could support growth, but it will also increase the responsibility of the new government to demonstrate that future contracts are competitive and transparent.

What does Hungary’s corruption ranking reveal about the scale of Magyar’s challenge?

Hungary scored 40 out of 100 in Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index and ranked 84th among 182 countries. That position placed Hungary among the weakest-performing European Union members and reflected continuing concern about public procurement, political influence and institutional accountability.

The index measures perceptions of public-sector corruption rather than proving individual offences. It is therefore useful for comparing institutional confidence, but it cannot identify how much money was stolen or who should face prosecution.

Improving Hungary’s score will require more than prosecuting former officials. Businesses and citizens must see consistent enforcement, competitive tenders, transparent ownership records and courts capable of ruling against the government.

Civil society and independent journalism will also be important. Anti-corruption agencies cannot identify every conflict of interest without investigative reporters, whistleblowers and organisations able to examine state decisions without political retaliation.

Magyar’s challenge is to create a system that prevents corruption rather than relying on periodic campaigns after governments change. Asset recovery may address past conduct, while procurement reform and independent oversight determine whether similar systems can reappear.

Could removing Orbán-era judges weaken the judicial independence Magyar says he wants to restore?

Changing the retirement age for Constitutional Court judges would remove officials appointed under Fidesz, including figures whom the new government considers obstacles to reform. Supporters argue that Orbán used long appointments to preserve political influence beyond his term and that democratic renewal requires correcting those arrangements.

The danger is that changing retirement rules after a government takes power may appear to target particular judges. Courts cannot be independent when their tenure depends on whether the current political majority approves of their previous decisions or associations.

Magyar can reduce this concern by applying clear, general rules prospectively and using transparent appointment procedures for replacements. Candidates should face professional evaluation and public scrutiny rather than being selected primarily for loyalty to Tisza.

The proposal allowing judges themselves to initiate the removal of senior judicial leaders creates an internal accountability mechanism. Requiring support from two-thirds of judges and two-thirds of parliament establishes a high threshold, although critics may still question parliament’s role in judicial personnel decisions.

European institutions will examine whether the reforms strengthen impartial adjudication or allow the government to restructure courts quickly. Hungary’s ability to retain unlocked funding may depend partly on demonstrating that judicial changes are consistent with European rule-of-law standards.

What happens next as Hungary begins its post-Orbán institutional reset?

The government must first introduce the 47 legislative amendments and the constitutional proposal concerning Sulyok. Parliament’s two-thirds Tisza majority gives Magyar the votes required for adoption, but committee hearings and legal review will determine how quickly the package proceeds.

Sulyok could continue resisting and may refer legislation to the Constitutional Court. His office has previously sought external legal analysis, including from the Venice Commission, over the government’s attempt to remove him.

The National Asset Protection and Recovery Office will require leadership, investigative powers, staffing and safeguards against ministerial interference. Its first cases will be closely watched for evidence that selection is based on financial risk and documented suspicion rather than party affiliation.

The autumn constitutional consultation will become the wider test of Magyar’s democratic intentions. Opposition parties, judges, civil society groups, legal experts and citizens will need a genuine opportunity to influence the proposed text.

Operation Purgatory may deliver rapid and popular action against institutions associated with Orbán. Its long-term success will depend on whether Hungary emerges with stronger checks and balances rather than another political order built around the power of a single parliamentary supermajority.

What are the key takeaways from Péter Magyar’s Hungarian anti-corruption overhaul?

• Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced on June 22, 2026, that Hungary will pursue a constitutional amendment removing President Tamás Sulyok after the president refused the government’s repeated requests to resign voluntarily.
• The government plans to amend 47 laws and establish a National Asset Protection and Recovery Office to investigate suspected misuse of public money and recover assets connected to potentially unlawful transactions over the past two decades.
• Magyar has named the reform programme Operation Purgatory and claims corruption cost Hungary between 8 percent and 10 percent of gross domestic product, although that estimate requires independent evidentiary support.
• The government also proposes a 12-year term limit for lawmakers, a retirement age of 70 for Constitutional Court judges and new procedures allowing judges to initiate the removal of senior judicial leaders.
• Fidesz says the reforms are politically motivated and risk using Tisza’s two-thirds parliamentary majority to purge Orbán-era officials before courts determine whether individuals committed criminal or administrative wrongdoing.
• European Union funding previously frozen over corruption and rule-of-law concerns is being restored as Hungary adopts reforms, with European Commission officials citing approximately €16.4 billion unlocked following recent progress.
• Hungary’s 40 out of 100 score in Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index demonstrates the depth of the institutional challenge, but the index does not prove allegations against individual officials or businesses.
• Magyar’s democratic credibility will depend on whether the new constitution and anti-corruption institutions constrain his own government as effectively as they dismantle the structures and appointments inherited from Viktor Orbán.