Violence, poverty, and power: Ecuador’s voters face grim choices in presidential showdown

Why is Ecuador’s presidential runoff happening amid an economic and security crisis?

Ecuadorians returned to the polls on Sunday in a closely watched presidential runoff election between President Daniel Noboa and his leftist challenger Luisa Gonzalez. This pivotal vote takes place against the backdrop of a spiralling security crisis and a sluggish economy that has failed to recover from years of underinvestment, public unrest, and external shocks. In recent years, Ecuador has seen an unprecedented surge in organized crime, driven in large part by its geographical proximity to Colombia and its increasingly strategic value as a transit hub for cocaine exports.

Noboa, who assumed office after a snap election in 2023, has focused much of his platform on hardline security measures and fiscal conservatism, while Gonzalez, a former ally of ex-president Rafael Correa, has pledged to expand public sector investment and revise Ecuador’s tax and welfare policies. The outcome of this election will determine how the country navigates not only its most severe drug violence in decades, but also broader structural challenges, including income inequality, low private investment, energy instability, and a shrinking middle class.

How did Ecuador become a hub for drug cartels?

Ecuador’s descent into cartel violence is relatively recent, but its origins lie in larger geopolitical and economic developments. As Colombian cocaine production surged over the past decade—spurred by fragmented peace processes with guerrilla groups and the rising global demand for narcotics—criminal syndicates began seeking new and less patrolled exit routes for drug shipments. Ecuador’s ports, especially those in Guayaquil, quickly became prime real estate for traffickers aiming to ship cocaine to lucrative markets in Europe, Asia, and North America.

The country’s dollarized economy made it particularly attractive for laundering drug money. Coupled with weak institutional capacity and under-resourced law enforcement, Ecuador became vulnerable to transnational criminal organizations. The state’s response, marked by inconsistent policing and rising corruption, allowed mafias, local gangs, and foreign cartels to infiltrate logistics chains—often hiding narcotics within legitimate exports such as bananas, cocoa, and shrimp.

By late 2023, Ecuador was witnessing more than one murder an hour in some months. The homicide rate soared to over 46 per 100,000 people—placing it among the most violent countries in Latin America. While Noboa’s emergency security measures helped reduce that figure to approximately 38 per 100,000 in 2024, it remains alarmingly high compared to pre-crisis levels in 2019, when the rate stood at just 6.85.

What is the economic fallout of cartel violence in Ecuador?

The intensifying drug conflict has had profound economic consequences. According to local analysts such as Alberto Acosta Burneo from the Spurrier Group, widespread violence is limiting day-to-day economic activity, with businesses closing earlier and residents afraid to spend time in public places. Consumption has fallen as citizens opt to stay indoors, especially in high-crime urban centres like Guayaquil. Tourist traffic has collapsed, and in historically vibrant spaces like Seminario Park, now patrolled by more iguanas than visitors, vendors report their incomes have halved over three years.

Investment has also taken a sharp downturn. Foreign capital, once drawn to Ecuador’s dollar-based stability, has largely retreated due to deteriorating public security and political unpredictability. This retreat is particularly noticeable in infrastructure and energy sectors. In 2023 and 2024, an underfunded power grid and severe drought conditions led to frequent blackouts, sometimes lasting up to 14 hours per day.

Compounding the issue, Ecuador’s export-oriented sectors—especially banana cultivation, one of the country’s key foreign exchange earners—have become collateral damage in the drug trade. Criminal groups routinely exploit container shipments to smuggle cocaine, prompting costly inspections and export delays. Richard Salazar, head of a banana producers’ association, has repeatedly warned that legitimate agricultural producers are now being “victimized” by the drug trade, facing higher costs and reputational risk in international markets.

How do the candidates differ in their solutions to Ecuador’s challenges?

Sunday’s presidential runoff pits two sharply contrasting visions for the country. President Daniel Noboa, a 37-year-old businessman and heir to a banana empire, represents a pro-market, tough-on-crime approach. He supports expanding international trade agreements, such as ongoing negotiations with Canada, and has prioritised the extractive industries to drive growth. Noboa’s platform continues to emphasise fiscal discipline and has included a controversial hike in value-added tax—from 12% to 15%—to stabilise public finances and fund security operations.

Luisa Gonzalez, in contrast, offers a return to the populist and state-led economic strategies of the Rafael Correa era. Gonzalez served in several ministerial roles during Correa’s presidency, which was marked by high social spending, infrastructure expansion, and increasing authoritarianism in its later years. Gonzalez proposes lowering the VAT rate to stimulate domestic consumption and shifting the tax burden more heavily onto large private companies. She also pledges to reinvest in public services, health care, and education.

Analysts like Christophe Ventura from France’s Institute for International and Strategic Affairs suggest that Gonzalez’s “strategic state” model seeks to restore public confidence by visibly strengthening institutions and reviving stalled infrastructure projects. However, critics argue that this approach may deter private investment further at a time when Ecuador needs capital inflows to create jobs and improve competitiveness.

What role does social inequality play in Ecuador’s instability?

Underlying Ecuador’s economic crisis is a deeper structural problem: entrenched inequality. Nearly one in four Ecuadorians is either unemployed or underemployed, and around a third of the population lives in poverty, according to official data. These conditions have helped fuel the growth of local criminal groups, who offer income and status to disenfranchised youth in marginalized communities.

The state’s inability to provide consistent employment opportunities, coupled with erratic public service delivery, has widened the gap between Ecuador’s urban centres and rural peripheries. This disparity is particularly visible in how different regions experience security threats, with coastal cities like Guayaquil becoming epicentres of violence, while interior towns face economic stagnation and environmental degradation.

Senior citizens and lower-income groups are especially vulnerable. In Guayaquil, where violence has emptied entire commercial districts, elderly residents survive on meagre pensions. Gerardo Ortiz, a retired worker living on $280 a month, remarked that he could only “subsist,” using a rusted bicycle in place of a car. This kind of economic despair, replicated across the country, has left many voters disillusioned about political promises from both ends of the spectrum.

What are the broader implications of Ecuador’s election?

The outcome of Ecuador’s 2025 presidential runoff will resonate far beyond its borders. As international cocaine trafficking routes evolve and cartels adapt to new enforcement measures, Ecuador’s ports, financial networks, and political institutions will remain at the heart of Latin America’s ongoing struggle against organized crime. The winner of this election will face not only the immediate challenges of restoring law and order but also the long-term task of rebuilding an economy in recession and a society fraying under pressure.

Security policy will be closely watched by international allies, particularly the United States and regional neighbours concerned with spillover effects. Meanwhile, multilateral lenders and investors will be evaluating whether Ecuador can present a credible plan for fiscal sustainability, infrastructure rehabilitation, and inclusive growth.

For now, voters remain deeply divided. In interviews conducted in Guayaquil, residents expressed uncertainty and cynicism about the electoral choices before them. Longtime kiosk owner Juan Carlos Pesantes summed up the prevailing mood: “There are no tourists left… and there is no confidence.” His stall, like the city itself, bears witness to a nation searching for stability in a time of fear.

Whether Ecuador chooses continuity under Noboa or a return to progressive state-building under Gonzalez, the next administration will inherit a country in crisis—and little room for error.