Secret China training of Russian troops raises new questions over Beijing’s Ukraine role

China’s armed forces secretly trained about 200 Russian military personnel in 2025 under an arrangement approved at senior levels of the Russian defence establishment, raising new questions about Beijing’s stated neutrality in the war in Ukraine, according to an exclusive Reuters report.

Documents and European intelligence assessments disclosed on Wednesday, July 1, 2026, indicated that Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov authorised the programme through an internal decision issued in August 2025. Russian military delegations subsequently attended courses at People’s Liberation Army facilities in China, including training relevant to drones, electronic warfare, explosives, mine clearance, air defence and radiological, chemical and biological protection.

At least four senior Russian and Chinese officers were involved in the wider programme, while a Russian general led the visiting delegation. Some Russian personnel who received training in China were later assessed by European intelligence services to have participated in combat operations in Ukraine, including in Russian-occupied Crimea and the Zaporizhzhia region.

China has rejected the allegations as unfounded and continues to describe its position on Ukraine as objective and impartial. Russia’s Defence Ministry and China’s Defence Ministry did not issue detailed public responses to the latest disclosures, while a senior Russian lawmaker dismissed the reported programme as implausible.

The available material does not show that Chinese troops entered Ukraine, that Chinese instructors operated on the battlefield or that China provided offensive chemical or biological weapons training. The significance lies in evidence of direct, organised military instruction for Russian personnel during an active war, rather than proof of Chinese combat participation.

What do the documents reveal about the secret China training programme for Russian troops?

The programme was based on a bilingual Russian-Chinese agreement signed in Beijing on July 2, 2025. The arrangement provided for approximately 200 Russian personnel to attend courses at military facilities in China and for hundreds of Chinese personnel to receive training at locations in Russia.

The agreement prohibited media coverage and required both sides not to inform third parties. That secrecy distinguished the programme from the large military exercises that Russia and China frequently announce publicly as evidence of their strategic partnership.

A classified Russian report referred directly to a decision by Andrei Belousov authorising the Russian delegation’s participation. The presence of a ministerial-level decision suggests that the programme was not an informal exchange organised by local commanders or individual military academies.

Russian personnel attended courses in Beijing, Nanjing, Zhengzhou, Shijiazhuang, Yibin, Bengbu and other locations. The instruction reportedly combined classroom education, simulation, equipment demonstrations and practical training.

Internal Russian reports described Chinese facilities as technologically advanced and praised the quality of simulators, equipment and theoretical instruction. The same reports also noted that Chinese instructors lacked recent combat experience, reflecting the different strengths that each military brought to the exchange.

Russia has accumulated extensive battlefield experience since beginning its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. China possesses a larger industrial and technological base in areas such as commercial drones, electronic systems and simulation, but the People’s Liberation Army has not fought a major war for decades.

The programme therefore appears to have offered reciprocal value. Russia could obtain access to Chinese technology and training infrastructure, while China could study lessons from Russian operations in Ukraine through personnel with direct battlefield knowledge.

Why does high-level approval make the Russia-China military training more consequential?

Russia and China have conducted joint military exercises for years, including naval drills, bomber patrols and large manoeuvres involving land and air forces. Those activities have generally been public and presented as normal cooperation between strategic partners.

The newly disclosed training was different because it was concealed, connected to operational needs emerging from the Ukraine war and attended by personnel who could transfer knowledge directly into Russian combat units.

Senior officers participated in the programme or its administration, while Russian documentation recorded the names, ranks, affiliations and security clearances of personnel attending the courses. This level of organisation indicates an institutional programme rather than occasional exchanges between military schools.

High-level approval also matters for China’s political responsibility. Beijing has maintained that it is not a party to the conflict and has repeatedly criticised Western governments for accusing China of supporting Russia without sufficient evidence.

Training Russian military personnel while those forces are engaged in Ukraine does not make China a formal combatant. It does, however, narrow the gap between general defence cooperation and direct assistance that can improve Russia’s operational effectiveness.

The programme could also establish infrastructure for future exchanges. Instructors trained in China can pass knowledge through Russian units, while returning Chinese personnel can incorporate Russian battlefield experience into People’s Liberation Army doctrine and training.

This creates consequences extending beyond Ukraine. China could apply lessons involving drones, electronic warfare, mines, air defence and urban combat to its own regional planning, including contingencies involving Taiwan or other high-intensity conflicts.

What military skills did Russian personnel reportedly learn at Chinese facilities?

Drone warfare formed a major part of the reported programme. Russian personnel received instruction involving first-person-view drones, flight simulators and the use of unmanned aircraft to identify targets for mortar teams.

Small drones have transformed the Ukraine battlefield. They are used for surveillance, artillery correction, direct attacks, mine deployment, supply delivery and the pursuit of individual soldiers and vehicles.

Training also covered counter-drone systems, including electronic rifles designed to interfere with drone signals and devices capable of projecting nets towards low-flying aircraft. These methods are particularly relevant as both Russia and Ukraine develop drones that are increasingly resistant to electronic interference.

Electronic warfare was another area included in the agreement. Russian and Ukrainian forces use electronic systems to detect communications, disrupt navigation, interfere with control links and protect positions from remotely operated weapons.

Other courses covered combined-arms operations, armoured infantry, army aviation, explosives, mine construction, demining and the removal of unexploded or improvised devices. These are standard military disciplines, but each has direct application to the conditions confronting Russian units in Ukraine.

A three-week course in Beijing addressed radiological, chemical and biological protection. Russian personnel were shown a model nuclear reactor and received instruction involving chemical reconnaissance, radiation reconnaissance and the protection of ventilation systems against contamination.

The existence of that course does not demonstrate preparation to use prohibited chemical or biological weapons. Military forces routinely train to detect contamination and protect personnel against nuclear, biological or chemical hazards. No public evidence has established that the programme involved offensive development or deployment of such weapons.

Did Russian soldiers trained in China later participate directly in the Ukraine war?

European intelligence agencies assessed that some Russian personnel who trained in China subsequently served in combat operations connected to Ukraine.

The identified personnel reportedly ranged from junior sergeant to lieutenant colonel. Some were assessed to have operated with drones in Russian-occupied Crimea and Zaporizhzhia, while other participants were military instructors capable of passing knowledge to larger numbers of Russian troops.

The complete scale of battlefield deployment has not been independently established. The available evidence supports the presence of particular personnel in the training programme, but public reporting has not verified the later combat role of every participant.

This distinction is important because the military effect depends not only on the original group of approximately 200 personnel. If many participants were instructors, the practical reach of the programme could be considerably larger as techniques were incorporated into Russian training cycles.

It also remains unclear whether the courses produced measurable changes in Russian battlefield performance. Ukraine’s front line is shaped by many factors, including troop numbers, artillery supply, drone production, intelligence, air power and the ability of units to adapt quickly.

The disclosures show a connection between Chinese military training and personnel later associated with the war. They do not establish that any single Russian offensive, attack or battlefield gain resulted from instruction provided in China.

How does the covert programme challenge China’s claim of neutrality in Ukraine?

China has sought to occupy several positions simultaneously since Russia invaded Ukraine. Beijing has maintained close political and commercial relations with Moscow, criticised Western sanctions, expanded purchases of Russian energy and presented itself as a potential peace mediator.

China has also stated that it does not provide lethal weapons to either party and has denied directing companies to support Russia’s war effort. Beijing argues that trade with Russia is lawful and that Western governments apply a double standard when criticising Chinese commerce.

Direct military instruction creates a more difficult category than ordinary trade. Training troops in disciplines relevant to an active conflict can improve their capabilities even when no weapon is transferred.

The secret nature of the arrangement also weakens the argument that the courses were routine educational exchanges unrelated to Ukraine. The prohibition on media coverage and notification of third parties suggests that both sides understood the political sensitivity.

China can maintain that military cooperation with Russia does not alter its diplomatic position and that the programme was not directed against another country. Beijing may also argue that Western governments train foreign militaries without becoming parties to every conflict involving those forces.

European governments are likely to focus on the timing and operational connection. Personnel were trained during Russia’s invasion, some courses addressed capabilities central to the Ukraine battlefield and some trainees were later assessed to have joined combat operations.

The disagreement is therefore not likely to be resolved through competing declarations of neutrality. It will depend on how governments define material support and whether training is treated as assistance to Russia’s military campaign.

Why is the European Union reassessing its economic relationship with China?

European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas said in June that the European Union had verified through its own channels that Chinese military training of Russian personnel had occurred.

The European Union is assessing the implications while confronting a larger strategic dilemma. China is one of Europe’s most important trading partners and remains central to supply chains involving electronics, machinery, renewable energy equipment, chemicals and consumer goods.

At the same time, European governments view Russia as their principal immediate security threat. Cooperation that improves Russia’s ability to sustain the war creates pressure for a stronger European response, even when that response carries economic costs.

The European Union has already sanctioned Chinese companies accused of supplying drones, military equipment, industrial inputs or other support to Russia. Measures adopted in June included Chinese companies accused of contributing to the Russian military-industrial complex.

The training disclosure could encourage broader action involving travel bans, asset freezes, export restrictions and closer screening of military-related academic or corporate exchanges.

European officials must nevertheless decide whether to target specific officers and entities or treat the programme as evidence of a wider Chinese state policy. The second approach would carry much larger diplomatic and economic consequences.

A limited sanctions response may be easier to agree among the European Union’s 27 members. A broader confrontation with Beijing would be more difficult because member states have different levels of trade dependence and different assessments of China as a security threat.

Could the programme lead to new sanctions or restrictions against China?

The most immediate response could involve sanctions against organisations, officers or military institutions connected to the training programme.

European authorities could also tighten controls on dual-use goods that can support drone production, electronic warfare, navigation, communications and advanced manufacturing. Existing controls already cover many sensitive components, but enforcement remains difficult when goods move through intermediaries or civilian supply chains.

Governments may increase scrutiny of Chinese companies linked to Russian defence manufacturers and expand information sharing between customs, intelligence and financial authorities.

The programme may also influence European Union debates over economic security. European policymakers increasingly view trade, technology, investment and infrastructure through the same security lens previously applied mainly to weapons and military alliances.

China could retaliate against new measures through trade restrictions, investigations into European companies or diplomatic pressure. That risk helps explain why European officials are proceeding cautiously despite describing China as an increasingly important enabler of Russia’s war economy.

Sanctions would also face an evidentiary challenge. Governments may possess classified intelligence that cannot be disclosed publicly without revealing sources or methods. Measures based on undisclosed information can be politically difficult to defend and may face legal challenges.

Does the secret training mean China and Russia are becoming a formal military alliance?

Russia and China describe their relationship as a comprehensive strategic partnership rather than a formal military alliance. They do not have a treaty requiring either country to defend the other if attacked.

The covert training shows deeper operational cooperation, but it does not by itself create an alliance comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Both countries retain reasons to avoid a binding alliance. China benefits from maintaining economic links with Europe and other markets, while Russia values strategic flexibility and does not want to become entirely dependent on Beijing.

Their military relationship is nevertheless becoming more integrated. Joint exercises, bomber patrols, naval operations, defence technology, training and political coordination have expanded as relations between both countries and the West have deteriorated.

The reciprocal nature of the 2025 agreement is especially important. Russian forces trained in China, while Chinese personnel were expected to receive instruction in Russia. That structure suggests a two-way exchange of capabilities rather than one-sided assistance.

Russia can offer China access to battlefield experience that the People’s Liberation Army lacks. China can offer Russia technology, manufacturing capacity and training systems that may be difficult for Moscow to obtain under Western sanctions.

The relationship may therefore remain below the legal threshold of an alliance while becoming more consequential in operational military terms.

What are the key takeaways from the secret China training of Russian military personnel?

• Classified Russian military documents and European intelligence assessments indicate that China secretly trained approximately 200 Russian military personnel during 2025 under an agreement approved at senior levels of Russia’s defence establishment.
• The programme covered drones, electronic warfare, army aviation, armoured infantry, mines, explosives, air defence and radiological, chemical and biological protection at several People’s Liberation Army facilities across China.
• An internal Russian document referred to an August 2025 decision by Defence Minister Andrei Belousov, indicating that the programme was officially authorised rather than organised informally by individual officers or academies.
• European intelligence agencies assessed that some Russian personnel trained in China later participated in combat operations connected to Ukraine, although the later role of every participant has not been independently established.
• China rejected the allegations as unfounded and continues to describe its position on Ukraine as objective and impartial, while Russian and Chinese defence authorities have not provided detailed public explanations of the programme.
• No public evidence shows that Chinese forces entered Ukraine, that Chinese instructors operated on the battlefield or that the radiological, chemical and biological course involved offensive use of prohibited weapons.
• The European Union has confirmed the training through its own channels and is considering the implications while already sanctioning Chinese companies accused of supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex.
• The disclosures do not create a formal Russia-China military alliance, but they demonstrate increasingly operational cooperation in which China provides technology and instruction while Russia offers recent battlefield experience.