Congo-Rwanda conflict enters The Hague as Kinshasa seeks reparations and accountability

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has opened a new international legal front against Rwanda, asking the International Court of Justice to hold Kigali responsible for more than three decades of alleged violence, displacement and human rights abuses in eastern Congo.

The Democratic Republic of Congo filed the case on June 26, 2026, accusing Rwanda of violating international conventions covering genocide, torture, racial discrimination and discrimination against women. The Congolese application alleges that civilians have endured massacres, extrajudicial killings, sexual violence, forced displacement and ethnic and gender-based discrimination since the 1990s.

Kinshasa wants the International Court of Justice to declare Rwanda internationally responsible, order Rwanda to halt the alleged conduct, require guarantees that the actions will not be repeated and award reparations to the Democratic Republic of Congo and affected civilians. The court has confirmed the institution of proceedings but has not determined whether it has jurisdiction to hear the substance of the case.

Rwanda did not immediately issue a detailed public response to the new filing. The Rwandan government has consistently denied directing the March 23 Movement, commonly known as M23, and maintains that Rwanda’s security concerns arise from armed groups operating inside eastern Congo, particularly forces linked to perpetrators of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

The filing comes only two days after representatives of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda met mediators in London and renewed commitments to de-escalate fighting. It also follows new United States sanctions against a Rwanda-based gold refinery and associated businesses accused of helping move Congolese gold from M23-controlled territory into Rwanda.

What is the Democratic Republic of Congo accusing Rwanda of doing in eastern Congo?

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s case seeks to treat the violence in eastern Congo not simply as a series of disconnected rebel conflicts, but as a prolonged pattern for which another state can be held legally responsible.

Kinshasa has linked Rwanda to several armed movements that have operated in eastern Congo since the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The latest and most militarily powerful is M23, which expanded its control dramatically during offensives in 2025 and captured Goma and Bukavu, the capitals of North Kivu and South Kivu provinces.

United Nations experts and several Western governments have documented what they describe as direct military, logistical and command support from the Rwanda Defence Force to M23. Rwanda rejects those conclusions and argues that the conflict cannot be understood without addressing the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, an armed group established by Rwandan Hutu extremists who fled into Congo after the genocide.

The Democratic Republic of Congo’s legal strategy appears designed to move the dispute beyond competing political statements. Kinshasa is asking judges in The Hague to assess whether Rwanda’s alleged support for armed groups and military operations creates responsibility under international treaties binding both states.

The allegations cover conduct attributed to different armed organisations over several decades, including massacres, torture, sexual violence, displacement and discrimination. Proving that individual abuses occurred would not automatically establish Rwanda’s responsibility. The Democratic Republic of Congo would also need to demonstrate a legally sufficient connection between Rwanda and the forces accused of committing them.

Why could jurisdiction become the biggest obstacle facing Congo’s new ICJ case?

The International Court of Justice resolves disputes between states, but its authority depends on states having accepted jurisdiction through treaties, declarations or specific agreements. A serious allegation alone does not automatically give the court power to decide a case.

The Democratic Republic of Congo has attempted twice before to bring Rwanda before the International Court of Justice. Congolese authorities withdrew an earlier proceeding in 2001. A second application, filed in 2002, was dismissed in 2006 after the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims presented.

In the 2006 judgment, the court found that Rwanda had not accepted certain treaty provisions relied upon by the Democratic Republic of Congo, had entered reservations to others or that required procedural conditions had not been satisfied. The judges therefore did not issue a ruling on whether Rwanda was responsible for the underlying alleged abuses.

The new application invokes several international conventions rather than relying on a single legal route. That approach may be intended to provide alternative jurisdictional foundations if Rwanda challenges the court’s authority under individual treaties.

Rwanda can raise preliminary objections arguing that the court lacks jurisdiction or that the case is inadmissible. The International Court of Justice may address those objections before any full examination of the evidence concerning M23, Rwandan troops or alleged atrocities.

A final judgment would be binding on the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda and would not be subject to appeal. However, the case could take years, particularly if jurisdictional objections, written submissions and extensive evidence concerning several decades of conflict must be examined.

How does the M23 offensive connect the new legal case with Congo’s current war?

M23 is central to the new case because its recent military expansion transformed a long-running regional conflict into a direct confrontation over territory, state authority and mineral supply chains.

M23 emerged from an earlier Congolese rebel movement and first gained international attention during its seizure of Goma in 2012. The group later withdrew after regional and international pressure, but resumed major operations in 2021.

The movement’s most significant advances occurred during 2025, when M23 captured Goma, Bukavu and large areas of North Kivu and South Kivu. Those gains gave the group control over strategic roads, border crossings, population centres and mining areas.

Rwanda denies commanding M23 and says Congolese authorities have failed to remove armed groups threatening Rwanda. Kinshasa maintains that the scale, organisation and equipment of the M23 offensive would not have been possible without direct Rwandan involvement.

The dispute therefore involves two connected security claims. The Democratic Republic of Congo says Rwanda is violating Congolese sovereignty and using M23 to control territory and resources. Rwanda says the Democratic Republic of Congo has tolerated or cooperated with forces linked to the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda.

The International Court of Justice case will not replace military or political negotiations with M23, which is not a state and cannot be a party to the proceeding. The court would instead consider Rwanda’s alleged responsibility for conduct connected to the conflict.

That distinction also means a judgment against Rwanda would not by itself disarm M23, restore Congolese administration or resolve disputes involving the many other armed groups operating in eastern Congo.

Why did Congo file the case while peace negotiations with Rwanda were still continuing?

The timing demonstrates that Kinshasa is pursuing diplomacy and legal accountability at the same time rather than treating them as mutually exclusive strategies.

Representatives of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda met in London on June 24, 2026, for the sixth meeting of the Joint Oversight Committee supervising their peace agreement. The United States, Qatar, Togo and the African Union Commission also participated.

The committee expressed serious concern about escalating fighting, civilian harm from drone strikes, the deepening humanitarian emergency and an Ebola outbreak in eastern Congo. Both governments committed to de-escalation, ceasefire implementation, verification measures and continued negotiations between the Democratic Republic of Congo and M23 through the Doha process.

The parties also discussed the Democratic Republic of Congo’s operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and Rwanda’s disengagement of forces and lifting of what Kigali describes as defensive measures.

The joint statement asked both countries to avoid hostile rhetoric and political actions that could complicate the Washington peace framework, including actions in international forums. Kinshasa filed the International Court of Justice case two days later, indicating that the Democratic Republic of Congo does not consider the legal proceeding incompatible with the peace process.

The parallel tracks create potential tension. Rwanda could interpret the case as an escalation designed to assign blame while negotiations remain active. The Democratic Republic of Congo can argue that accountability is necessary because previous agreements have repeatedly failed to stop fighting or produce a verified withdrawal of forces.

The peace process itself has several layers. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington on June 27, 2025. Presidents Félix Tshisekedi and Paul Kagame later endorsed the wider Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity in December 2025. Qatar has separately facilitated negotiations between the Congolese government and M23.

How have gold, coltan and conflict minerals become part of the Congo-Rwanda dispute?

Eastern Congo contains valuable deposits of gold, coltan and other minerals used in jewellery, electronics, aerospace systems, batteries and industrial supply chains. Control of mining areas and trade routes provides armed groups with money, taxation opportunities and political influence.

On June 25, 2026, the United States Department of the Treasury sanctioned Gasabo Gold Refinery, its chairman, its general manager and associated Rwandan mining companies. The United States alleged that the network worked with M23 and Rwandan government forces to transport and refine gold removed from M23-controlled areas in South Kivu.

The United States Department of the Treasury said at least 60 kilograms of gold, worth millions of dollars, was moved from eastern Congo to Gasabo Gold Refinery during early 2026. The sanctions freeze property under United States jurisdiction and generally prohibit United States persons from conducting transactions involving the designated network.

The United States has also sanctioned the Rwanda Defence Force over alleged direct support for M23. Rwanda has rejected accusations that it is exploiting Congolese minerals through the rebellion.

The mineral issue matters because it connects local violence to international markets. Gold and other minerals can be mixed, refined and exported in ways that obscure their original source, making it difficult for purchasers to determine whether revenues benefited armed groups.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is likely to use evidence concerning mineral movements to support its argument that Rwanda’s alleged involvement is strategic and economically connected rather than limited to defensive border operations. Rwanda is likely to maintain that such accusations misrepresent regional trade and ignore Kigali’s stated security concerns.

Could an ICJ ruling deliver reparations or end Rwanda’s alleged support for M23?

The Democratic Republic of Congo has requested reparations for the state and civilian victims, but financial compensation would require several legal findings before it could become realistic.

The court would first need jurisdiction. Kinshasa would then need to prove violations of the treaties cited, demonstrate that relevant conduct can be attributed to Rwanda and establish the losses caused by those violations.

If the Democratic Republic of Congo succeeds, judges could order Rwanda to cease unlawful conduct, provide assurances of non-repetition and compensate proven damage. The court may determine compensation itself or direct the parties to negotiate an amount.

A judgment would carry considerable diplomatic and reputational weight. It could influence sanctions, aid relationships, military cooperation and investment decisions involving Rwanda. It could also strengthen demands for greater scrutiny of minerals exported through the region.

However, the International Court of Justice does not command troops or directly enforce ceasefires. Implementation depends primarily on compliance by the states concerned, sustained diplomatic pressure and the wider United Nations system.

The case is therefore unlikely to produce a quick end to the fighting. Its immediate importance lies in creating a formal legal record and forcing both governments to present evidence and treaty arguments before an international court.

For the Democratic Republic of Congo, the proceeding is also an attempt to redefine the conflict. Kinshasa wants the international debate to focus not only on M23 as a rebel group, but on whether Rwanda bears state responsibility for the movement’s conduct and for a wider history of intervention in eastern Congo.

What are the key takeaways from Congo’s International Court of Justice case against Rwanda?

• The Democratic Republic of Congo filed proceedings against Rwanda at the International Court of Justice on June 26, 2026, alleging responsibility for more than three decades of violence and human rights abuses in eastern Congo.
• Kinshasa accuses Rwanda of violating conventions covering genocide, torture, racial discrimination and discrimination against women through alleged support for armed groups and military activity inside Congolese territory.
• The Democratic Republic of Congo wants the court to order an end to the alleged conduct, require guarantees of non-repetition and award reparations to the Congolese state and affected civilian victims.
• The International Court of Justice has confirmed that proceedings were instituted, but it has not determined whether it possesses jurisdiction, an issue that caused an earlier Congolese case against Rwanda to fail in 2006.
• Rwanda denies backing M23 and says its security policies respond to armed groups linked to perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, particularly the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda operating in eastern Congo.
• The filing came two days after the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda renewed ceasefire and de-escalation commitments during a London meeting involving the United States, Qatar, Togo and the African Union Commission.
• New United States sanctions against Gasabo Gold Refinery allege that Congolese gold was transported from M23-controlled areas into Rwanda, connecting the military conflict with international mineral supply chains.
• Even if the Democratic Republic of Congo eventually wins the case, an International Court of Justice judgment would not automatically disarm M23 or restore Congolese control, making diplomacy and security arrangements essential.