Ukraine officials return Polish honours as World War Two dispute strains critical alliance

Ukraine’s presidential chief of staff Kyrylo Budanov said on June 20, 2026, that he would return a Polish state decoration after Polish President Karol Nawrocki revoked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state honour. The retaliatory move has transformed a long-running historical disagreement into a direct diplomatic dispute between two countries whose security, trade and reconstruction interests remain closely connected.

Karol Nawrocki announced the revocation on June 19 after Volodymyr Zelenskyy approved the naming of a Ukrainian Special Operations Forces unit in honour of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army is remembered in Ukraine for resisting Soviet domination, but the organisation is associated in Poland with the mass killing of Polish civilians in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia during World War Two.

Kyrylo Budanov said he would relinquish the Golden Officer’s Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland that he received in 2025. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha also criticised the Polish decision, while Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk urged both governments to lower tensions and avoid a dispute that could benefit Russia.

The row has erupted shortly before the Ukraine Recovery Conference scheduled for June 25 and June 26 in Gdańsk. Poland and Ukraine are co-hosting the event to attract international support and private investment for Ukrainian energy systems, critical infrastructure, logistics and reconstruction.

What triggered Poland’s decision to revoke Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s highest state honour?

The immediate trigger was a decree signed by Volodymyr Zelenskyy on May 26, 2026, granting an honorary designation connected to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army to a unit of Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces.

The decree named the Separate Special Operations Center North after the Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Ukraine presented the decision as recognition of the country’s military history and the contribution of earlier independence movements that resisted control from Moscow.

The designation generated opposition across Poland’s political spectrum because of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s role in violence against ethnic Poles during World War Two. Polish officials, historians and victims’ organisations regard the Volhynia and Eastern Galicia massacres as a deliberate campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Karol Nawrocki initially called for a review of whether Volodymyr Zelenskyy should retain the Order of the White Eagle. Karol Nawrocki proceeded with the revocation after Ukraine did not reverse the military unit’s designation.

The Order of the White Eagle was awarded to Volodymyr Zelenskyy in April 2023 by then Polish President Andrzej Duda. The honour recognised Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s defence of Ukraine, contribution to European security and role in strengthening relations between Poland and Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Karol Nawrocki has maintained that revoking the award does not represent a withdrawal of Polish support for the Ukrainian people or a change in Poland’s national security strategy. However, removing the country’s highest decoration from a serving allied president carries diplomatic consequences that extend beyond a disagreement over historical remembrance.

The measure publicly withdraws a symbol of trust that Poland granted at the height of wartime solidarity. It also places the Polish presidency and the Ukrainian government in a dispute over who has the authority to define the historical figures and movements commemorated by Ukraine’s armed forces.

Why did Kyrylo Budanov respond by returning his Polish state decoration?

Kyrylo Budanov presented the return of the Golden Officer’s Cross as a protest against Poland’s treatment of Volodymyr Zelenskyy and as a defence of Ukraine’s right to interpret its own independence struggle.

Kyrylo Budanov argued indirectly that difficult chapters in the shared history of Poland and Ukraine should encourage serious historical reflection rather than become instruments of contemporary political pressure. Kyrylo Budanov also warned that an escalating dispute between Warsaw and Kyiv would serve Russian interests.

The response carries additional weight because Kyrylo Budanov is not only a senior political official. Kyrylo Budanov previously led Ukraine’s military intelligence service and now oversees the Office of the President of Ukraine during a period of continued war, international negotiations and defence cooperation.

Returning the decoration is therefore more than a personal gesture. It signals that Kyiv views the Polish action against Volodymyr Zelenskyy as an institutional challenge rather than an isolated decision concerning ceremonial protocol.

Andrii Sybiha similarly described Karol Nawrocki’s action as a strategic error. The Ukrainian position is that foreign governments should not dictate how Ukraine commemorates organisations that fought for Ukrainian independence, even when those organisations remain deeply controversial in neighbouring countries.

Poland’s position is that commemoration cannot separate the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s anti-Soviet campaign from the killing of Polish civilians. For many Polish families, the historical dispute concerns unacknowledged victims, incomplete exhumations and unresolved demands for accountability.

The competing responses reveal why symbolic gestures are escalating so quickly. Ukraine interprets the unit designation through the history of resistance to Moscow. Poland interprets the same designation through the history of civilian massacres.

Neither government can easily retreat without appearing to abandon a central national narrative.

Why does the Ukrainian Insurgent Army remain such a divisive issue between Poland and Ukraine?

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army operated during and after World War Two and pursued an independent Ukrainian state. The organisation fought Soviet forces and, at different stages, also fought Nazi German forces and Polish formations.

Supporters in Ukraine regard the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as part of a broader national liberation movement that resisted Soviet rule. That interpretation has gained greater political relevance since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and launched its full-scale invasion in 2022.

Poland’s historical memory focuses heavily on the Ukrainian Insurgent Army’s involvement in the killing of Polish civilians between 1943 and 1945. Poland estimates that approximately 100,000 Poles were killed by Ukrainian nationalist formations in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia.

Thousands of Ukrainians were also killed in reprisal attacks carried out by Polish groups. Ukraine has argued that the period should be understood as a complex interethnic conflict involving violence against both communities, while Poland’s parliament formally classified the massacres of Poles as genocide in 2016.

The disagreement is not limited to terminology. Poland has repeatedly sought access to sites in Ukraine where Polish victims are believed to be buried, along with permission for exhumations, identification and dignified reburial.

Ukraine and Poland had recently made progress on historical dialogue and the exhumation of victims. The dispute over the Special Operations Forces unit now risks weakening that process.

Historical reconciliation requires both countries to acknowledge that a movement can occupy different places in different national memories. An organisation remembered for resisting one form of occupation can also be responsible for violence against civilians.

The political difficulty is that wartime governments frequently elevate historical symbols to strengthen national identity. Ukraine’s need to mobilise resistance against Russia has increased the importance of anti-Moscow movements, while Poland’s domestic politics has increased pressure to defend the memory of Polish victims.

How could the dispute affect Poland’s military and logistical support for Ukraine?

Poland remains one of Ukraine’s most strategically important neighbours. Polish territory has served as a principal route for military equipment, humanitarian supplies, commercial goods and international officials travelling to Ukraine.

Poland has also hosted a large Ukrainian refugee population and supported European Union and NATO measures intended to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia.

Karol Nawrocki stated that the honours dispute does not change the strategic direction of Polish security policy. Poland’s interest in preventing a Russian victory remains independent of its disagreement with Ukraine over the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

However, bilateral cooperation depends on public and political support. Polish attitudes towards Ukraine have become more complicated because of refugee pressures, agricultural import disputes, spending concerns and unresolved historical grievances.

A highly visible conflict between the two presidents could make it harder for Polish leaders to defend additional military, financial or political assistance. Opposition groups may use the dispute to argue that Ukraine disregards Polish historical sensitivities despite receiving extensive support.

Ukraine also risks weakening one of its strongest advocates inside the European Union and NATO. Poland has often pressed Western partners to provide more weapons, strengthen sanctions and maintain a firm position towards Russia.

Donald Tusk’s intervention reflects concern that the dispute could damage interests shared by both countries. Donald Tusk has warned that conflict between Poland and Ukraine benefits Russia because it divides countries supporting Kyiv.

The Polish government and the Polish presidency do not always follow the same political approach. Donald Tusk and Karol Nawrocki represent competing domestic political camps, adding another layer to the diplomatic crisis.

Ukraine may therefore attempt to preserve cooperation with Donald Tusk’s government while disputing Karol Nawrocki’s decision. That approach could protect practical coordination but risk drawing Ukraine deeper into Poland’s internal political rivalry.

Why is the timing sensitive before the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Gdańsk?

The Ukraine Recovery Conference will take place in Gdańsk on June 25 and June 26, only days after the dispute over the Order of the White Eagle intensified.

Poland and Ukraine are co-hosting the conference, which is intended to mobilise international investment and government support for Ukraine’s recovery. The programme focuses particularly on energy infrastructure, critical facilities, transport, logistics and Ukrainian businesses.

A successful conference requires Poland and Ukraine to project coordination, institutional stability and a shared economic strategy. The public exchange over state honours creates a competing narrative of political division.

International investors considering projects in Ukraine will evaluate security risks, regulatory conditions, financing mechanisms and the strength of cross-border partnerships. Poland is likely to play a major role in construction supply chains, transport corridors, energy connections and European market access.

Diplomatic tension does not automatically prevent commercial agreements. It can, however, distract officials, complicate bilateral announcements and create uncertainty about the durability of political cooperation.

The Gdańsk conference also carries symbolic importance. Poland is presenting itself as a gateway for Ukraine’s reconstruction and integration with the European economy. Ukraine is seeking to demonstrate that rebuilding can proceed even while Russian attacks continue.

A dispute involving the Polish president and Ukraine’s president could overshadow those goals unless both governments separate historical disagreements from practical cooperation.

Donald Tusk’s call for restraint is therefore connected to immediate economic and diplomatic interests. Poland benefits from a central role in Ukraine’s reconstruction, while Ukraine needs Polish infrastructure, political support and access to investors.

Could the dispute weaken Ukraine’s wider European diplomatic position?

Ukraine’s European partners have generally supported continued military and financial assistance, but governments face rising domestic pressure over budgets, refugees, agriculture and the duration of the war.

A dispute with Poland gives critics of Ukraine an additional argument that bilateral grievances are not being treated with sufficient sensitivity. Similar historical and minority issues exist in Ukraine’s relations with other Central and Eastern European countries.

Ukraine must balance national historical policy with the need to maintain coalitions. The decision to honour the Ukrainian Insurgent Army may strengthen domestic narratives of resistance, but it carries predictable diplomatic costs in Poland.

Poland also faces a strategic choice. Sustained confrontation may satisfy domestic demands for recognition of historical crimes, but weakening Ukraine could increase the security threat facing Poland itself.

Russia has repeatedly attempted to exploit disagreements involving history, refugees, borders and agricultural trade. A deepening Poland-Ukraine dispute would support Moscow’s effort to weaken political unity among Ukraine’s backers.

This does not mean Poland should suppress historical concerns because Russia might benefit. It means both countries must prevent legitimate historical disputes from undermining present-day security cooperation.

The European Union may encourage dialogue because Poland is central to European policy on Ukraine, sanctions, defence spending and eastern-border security. However, historical reconciliation cannot be imposed quickly through European institutions.

The most effective diplomatic response would involve a structured process addressing military commemorations, exhumations, archives, education and public memorials. Without such a process, each new symbolic decision can reactivate the same unresolved conflict.

What remains uncertain as Warsaw and Kyiv try to contain the diplomatic damage?

The first uncertainty is whether Volodymyr Zelenskyy will directly respond to the revocation of the Order of the White Eagle. Ukraine’s initial response has come primarily through Kyrylo Budanov, Andrii Sybiha and other officials.

The second is whether additional Ukrainian officials will return Polish decorations. A coordinated return of honours would transform the dispute into a broader diplomatic protest.

The third is whether Karol Nawrocki will seek further measures related to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army designation. The Polish president could continue public pressure for the unit name to be reversed or connect the issue to wider historical negotiations.

The fourth is whether the dispute affects the Ukraine Recovery Conference. The attendance of senior officials, the tone of bilateral meetings and the prominence of the controversy during the Gdańsk event will indicate whether practical cooperation remains insulated from political tensions.

The fifth is whether exhumation and reconciliation work continues. Progress on identifying and reburying Polish victims could provide a route towards de-escalation, while suspension of those efforts would deepen mistrust.

The sixth is the response of Polish public opinion. If the revocation receives broad support, Donald Tusk may have limited room to distance the government from Karol Nawrocki’s position.

The dispute is unlikely to end Poland’s strategic support for Ukraine immediately. Geography, Russian military power and shared security interests create strong incentives for continued cooperation.

The greater risk is gradual erosion. Repeated disputes over history, grain, refugees and political recognition could reduce the trust needed for long-term defence, reconstruction and European integration.

What are the key takeaways from the Poland-Ukraine dispute over state honours?

• Kyrylo Budanov said on June 20, 2026, that he would return the Golden Officer’s Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland after Poland revoked Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s highest state honour.
• Polish President Karol Nawrocki revoked Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Order of the White Eagle on June 19 after Ukraine named a Special Operations Forces unit after the Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.
• Volodymyr Zelenskyy received the Order of the White Eagle from then Polish President Andrzej Duda in April 2023 for strengthening bilateral relations and supporting security, peace and human rights in Europe.
• Poland associates the Ukrainian Insurgent Army with the killing of approximately 100,000 Polish civilians in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, while many Ukrainians remember the organisation primarily for resistance against Soviet domination.
• Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha criticised the Polish decision, while Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk urged restraint because an escalating dispute between Warsaw and Kyiv could strengthen Russia’s strategic position.
• The dispute has intensified days before Poland and Ukraine co-host the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Gdańsk on June 25 and June 26 to mobilise reconstruction investment and international support.
• Poland remains a critical logistics, military and commercial partner for Ukraine, meaning a prolonged political dispute could weaken public support for assistance even if formal security policy remains unchanged.
• De-escalation will depend on whether both governments protect practical cooperation while establishing a credible process for military commemorations, historical research, victim exhumations and the competing national memories of World War Two.