Sri Lanka sentences former police chief and defence secretary to death over Easter bombings

A Sri Lankan special court sentenced former Inspector General of Police Pujith Jayasundara and former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando to death on July 31, 2026, after finding them criminally responsible for failing to act on advance intelligence before the 2019 Easter Sunday bombings.

The Permanent Trial-at-Bar convicted Pujith Jayasundara and Hemasiri Fernando on multiple charges connected to the coordinated attacks, including criminal dereliction of duty, murder and attempted murder.

The April 21, 2019 bombings struck three Christian churches and three luxury hotels during Easter services and breakfast gatherings. The attacks killed 279 people and injured about 500, making them the deadliest acts of terrorism in Sri Lanka’s recent history.

The verdicts mark a dramatic reversal of a 2022 High Court decision that acquitted both former officials. Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court later ordered a new trial, which began in March 2026 before the special three-judge court.

Pujith Jayasundara and Hemasiri Fernando were accused of failing to take reasonable preventive measures despite receiving intelligence warnings concerning a planned extremist attack. The prosecution argued that their failure to act allowed the suicide bombings to proceed.

Sri Lanka retains capital punishment in law but has not carried out an execution since 1976. Death sentences are therefore generally converted in practice into lengthy or life imprisonment while the moratorium remains in place.

The ruling is likely to become a defining test of how Sri Lanka assigns responsibility for national security failures. It also revives unresolved questions about intelligence coordination, political leadership and whether every person responsible for planning or enabling the attacks has been identified.

Why were Pujith Jayasundara and Hemasiri Fernando sentenced to death on July 31, 2026?

The Permanent Trial-at-Bar found that Pujith Jayasundara and Hemasiri Fernando failed to perform duties attached to two of Sri Lanka’s most senior national security positions before the Easter Sunday attacks.

Pujith Jayasundara was serving as Inspector General of Police, the head of the Sri Lanka Police. Hemasiri Fernando was serving as Secretary to the Ministry of Defence, a position involving responsibility for national defence administration and coordination with security institutions.

The prosecution maintained that both officials received or had access to intelligence warning that an extremist group was planning attacks against churches and other targets. The warnings included details indicating that an attack could occur against Christian religious sites.

The court concluded that the officials did not take adequate steps to prevent the attacks, alert potential targets, strengthen protection around churches or ensure that the intelligence reached every relevant operational unit.

The charges extended beyond ordinary administrative negligence. The court treated the failures as criminal conduct connected to the deaths and injuries caused by the attackers.

The July 31 verdict therefore establishes that senior officials can face the most severe criminal penalty available under Sri Lankan law when a failure to perform security duties contributes to mass casualties.

The ruling does not mean that Pujith Jayasundara or Hemasiri Fernando planned the bombings or shared the attackers’ ideological objectives. Their convictions concern failures to use official authority after warnings were received.

What advance intelligence did Sri Lankan authorities receive before the Easter attacks?

Sri Lankan security authorities received warnings before April 21, 2019, concerning a possible attack by extremists associated with the National Thowheeth Jama’ath network.

Information originating from Indian intelligence identified possible suicide bombers and warned that churches and other prominent locations could be targeted. Additional warnings were reportedly communicated as the date of the attacks approached.

The existence of advance intelligence became one of the most damaging revelations after the bombings. It showed that the attacks were not entirely unexpected and that security institutions possessed information that could have triggered preventive action.

The warnings did not produce a sufficiently coordinated national response. Some officials received information while churches, hotels and many operational police units remained unaware of the threat.

Investigations identified failures in communication between intelligence agencies, police leadership, defence officials and the political executive. The fragmented structure meant that information existed within the government but was not converted into effective protection.

Preventive measures could have included increased security at churches, warnings to religious leaders, surveillance of suspected extremists, detention of identified individuals and checks on properties linked to the network.

The July 31 judgment focuses responsibility on two senior officials who occupied positions capable of directing or coordinating those measures. The ruling treats their failure as a criminal breach rather than an unavoidable intelligence error.

What happened during Sri Lanka’s coordinated Easter Sunday bombings on April 21, 2019?

The attacks began on Easter Sunday as Christian worshippers attended services and hotel guests gathered for breakfast.

Suicide bombers targeted St Anthony’s Shrine in Colombo, St Sebastian’s Church in Negombo and Zion Church in Batticaloa. The churches were crowded with families participating in one of the most important days of the Christian calendar.

Additional bombers attacked the Shangri-La, Cinnamon Grand and Kingsbury hotels in Colombo. The hotels were popular with international visitors, business travellers and Sri Lankan residents.

Further explosions occurred during subsequent police operations. The coordinated nature of the attacks demonstrated planning involving several perpetrators, safe houses, explosives and logistical support.

The bombings killed 279 people and injured approximately 500. Victims included Sri Lankan Christians, hotel employees, families, tourists and foreign nationals from several countries.

The Islamic State group claimed responsibility, while Sri Lankan authorities identified locally based extremist organisations and individuals connected to the operation.

The principal suicide bombers died during the attacks. Separate prosecutions and investigations have continued against people accused of providing assistance, training, financing or logistical support.

Sri Lanka’s Catholic Church has repeatedly argued that the complete truth has not been established and that investigators must examine whether a broader conspiracy or additional organisers existed behind the attackers.

Why were the two former security officials acquitted in 2022 before facing a new trial?

A three-judge High Court bench acquitted Pujith Jayasundara and Hemasiri Fernando in February 2022 after concluding that the prosecution had not established a sufficient case against them.

The acquittal became controversial because commissions, parliamentary investigations and public testimony had documented extensive failures within the security system.

The Attorney General challenged the decision before the Supreme Court. The appeal argued that the High Court had not properly assessed the evidence concerning the defendants’ responsibilities and the warnings received before the attacks.

The Supreme Court ordered the case to be reheard, creating the legal basis for the fresh trial that began in March 2026.

A retrial after acquittal is a major legal development because courts must balance accountability with protections against repeated prosecution. The Supreme Court’s intervention indicated that serious legal or evidentiary issues required reconsideration.

The new Permanent Trial-at-Bar examined the prosecution case again and reached the opposite conclusion. The special court found both former officials guilty and imposed death sentences.

The reversal demonstrates how differently courts can interpret responsibility in complex national security cases. One court viewed the evidence as insufficient, while the later court concluded that the officials’ failures justified convictions for offences linked to hundreds of deaths and injuries.

Any appellate challenge will again require higher courts to examine the relationship between official negligence, legal duty and criminal responsibility for violence committed by third parties.

What does a death sentence mean under Sri Lanka’s continuing execution moratorium?

Sri Lanka retains the death penalty for offences including murder, but the country has not carried out a judicial execution since 1976.

Courts continue imposing death sentences even though the state does not implement them. Prisoners sentenced to death remain in custody, and their punishment may effectively operate as life imprisonment.

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake supports maintaining the moratorium. No current policy has been announced to resume executions.

The legal sentence remains significant despite the absence of executions. A death sentence represents the most severe judgment available to a Sri Lankan criminal court and carries different legal and custodial consequences from an ordinary prison term.

The defendants can pursue further legal remedies through Sri Lanka’s appellate system. The final status of the convictions may therefore remain unresolved while appeals are considered.

The moratorium also places the case within a wider debate about capital punishment. Supporters may view the sentences as proportionate to the scale of the Easter bombings, while opponents argue that accountability can be achieved through life imprisonment without restoring executions.

The immediate consequence is that Pujith Jayasundara and Hemasiri Fernando face imprisonment under death sentences. The verdict does not indicate that Sri Lanka is preparing to carry out executions against them.

Why does the verdict create a major precedent for national security accountability?

Senior officials are frequently removed, transferred or criticised after intelligence failures, but criminal convictions for failing to prevent an attack are less common.

The July 31 judgment treats official inaction as part of the causal chain that allowed the Easter bombings to occur. That approach places a heavier legal obligation on leaders who receive credible information about an imminent threat.

The precedent could influence how future Sri Lankan officials handle intelligence. Police, defence and intelligence leaders may become more likely to circulate warnings widely and document every decision when information indicates a possible attack.

Greater caution could strengthen public safety, but it could also lead to excessive alerts or preventive action based on incomplete information. Security institutions must distinguish credible intelligence from unverified threats while avoiding paralysis.

The case also raises questions about the division of responsibility between professional officials and elected political leaders. Sri Lanka’s security system in 2019 involved the president, prime minister, defence administration, intelligence agencies and police command.

Convicting two officials does not necessarily resolve failures elsewhere in that structure. The public will continue asking who received warnings, who attended security meetings and who had authority to order preventive action.

The verdict therefore provides individual accountability while leaving the broader institutional history open to further examination.

How has President Anura Kumara Dissanayake approached the unresolved Easter bombing cases?

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake was elected in 2024 after campaigning on governance reform, accountability and action against corruption and abuse of power.

Anura Kumara Dissanayake has pledged to pursue people responsible for wrongdoing connected to the Easter bombings and other major national controversies.

The 2026 retrial proceeded under the current administration, although the judiciary and prosecutors operate through their own constitutional and legal authorities.

Families of victims and church leaders have demanded a complete investigation rather than punishment limited to officials accused of negligence. Their concerns include the planning network, intelligence failures and possible political interference.

The government must therefore separate judicial accountability from political claims. Court convictions address charges supported by evidence presented during a particular trial, but they do not automatically answer every allegation surrounding the attacks.

Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s administration will be judged on whether investigations continue independently and whether relevant reports and evidence are made available through lawful processes.

The president’s support for the execution moratorium means the July 31 sentences are unlikely to result in executions. That position does not prevent the government from supporting strict imprisonment and continued prosecution of other suspects.

What questions remain unanswered after the convictions of the former security chiefs?

The verdict establishes that the court found Pujith Jayasundara and Hemasiri Fernando criminally responsible for failing to prevent the attacks. It does not establish that every planner, financier or facilitator has been identified.

Investigators must continue examining how the attackers obtained explosives, maintained safe houses, communicated and prepared several coordinated suicide bombings without being stopped.

Questions also remain about why earlier investigations into extremist activity did not prevent the network from expanding. Some suspects had attracted attention before 2019, but enforcement action did not dismantle the organisation.

The flow of intelligence within the government remains another central issue. Authorities must determine precisely where warnings stopped, why church leaders were not alerted and whether institutional rivalries affected communication.

Sri Lanka’s Catholic leadership has continued pressing for disclosure of information that may point to a wider conspiracy. Those concerns require evidence-based investigation rather than dismissal or political exploitation.

Separate trials involving alleged associates of the bombers are continuing. Their outcomes may provide additional information about financing, recruitment and operational support.

The July 31 sentences are therefore a major milestone rather than the final resolution of the Easter bombings. The long-term test is whether Sri Lanka can establish a complete and credible record of how the attacks became possible.

What are the key takeaways from Sri Lanka’s Easter bombing death sentences?

• Sri Lanka’s Permanent Trial-at-Bar sentenced former Inspector General of Police Pujith Jayasundara and former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando to death on July 31, 2026, over failures connected to the Easter bombings.
• The special court convicted the two former officials on multiple charges, including failing to act on advance intelligence warnings, criminal dereliction of duty, murder and attempted murder.
• The April 21, 2019 suicide bombings targeted three Christian churches and three luxury hotels, killing 279 people and injuring about 500 in Sri Lanka’s deadliest recent terrorist attack.
• Pujith Jayasundara and Hemasiri Fernando were acquitted by a three-judge High Court bench in 2022, but the Supreme Court later ordered the case to be reheard and a fresh trial began in March 2026.
• Intelligence warnings concerning planned attacks against churches and other locations were available before Easter Sunday, but the information did not produce coordinated preventive action or adequate protection at the targeted sites.
• Sri Lanka has retained the death penalty in law while observing a de facto moratorium on executions since 1976, meaning the sentences are unlikely to be implemented while the current policy remains unchanged.
• President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has pledged accountability over the Easter bombing failures while supporting continuation of Sri Lanka’s moratorium on judicial executions.
• The convictions establish major individual accountability but do not resolve continuing questions about the wider extremist network, intelligence coordination, political responsibility and allegations that additional organisers remain unidentified.