Pakistan brokers Libya unity push as Dbeibah-Haftar power-sharing plan emerges

Pakistan has quietly begun mediating between Libya’s rival eastern and western power centres under an emerging reunification proposal backed by influential regional and international governments, Reuters reported exclusively on July 6, 2026. The initiative could significantly expand Islamabad’s diplomatic role if it succeeds in ending more than a decade of Libyan political division.

A draft Libya Reunification Plan would establish a 36-month transition governed through a new Government of National Consensus and Presidential Council. The proposal under discussion would retain Abdulhamid Dbeibah, who leads the United Nations-recognised Government of National Unity in western Libya, as prime minister while appointing Saddam Haftar, deputy commander of the eastern-based Libyan National Army, as chairman of the Presidential Council.

The plan would also give the eastern faction led by Saddam Haftar’s father, Khalifa Haftar, substantial authority over Libya’s budget. That provision seeks to recognise the eastern camp’s control of major oilfields and infrastructure, but it could become the most controversial element of the proposed settlement because control over public spending and oil revenue has repeatedly driven Libya’s political conflicts.

Pakistani sources said the United States was aware of and involved in Islamabad’s effort, while Saudi Arabia supported the mediation. Qatar and Türkiye, which have close ties with the western Libyan administration, were also reported to have encouraged Pakistan to participate. None of the governments or Libyan parties had publicly confirmed the complete framework when the proposal emerged.

What would Pakistan’s proposed 36-month Libya reunification plan actually change?

The proposed framework would attempt to replace Libya’s competing power structures with an interim arrangement that distributes executive, presidential and financial authority between the principal western and eastern camps. Rather than immediately removing the leaders who currently exercise power, the plan appears designed to bring them into a common structure for a defined three-year period.

Abdulhamid Dbeibah would remain prime minister under the proposal, preserving continuity within the Tripoli-based administration and reducing the risk that western armed groups or state institutions reject the process at its opening stage. Saddam Haftar’s appointment as chairman of the Presidential Council would meanwhile give the eastern camp a senior national position capable of influencing security, appointments and the political transition.

Khalifa Haftar’s faction would receive authority connected with the national budget, reflecting the reality that forces aligned with eastern Libya control several major oil-producing areas and strategic facilities. The arrangement appears intended to give the eastern leadership a guaranteed share of state power rather than asking it to surrender territorial influence in return for uncertain promises of representation.

The structure could reduce incentives for either camp to establish another rival government during the transition. However, overlapping authority may also create disputes if the prime minister, Presidential Council and budget supervisors cannot agree on appointments, security spending or the distribution of development funds.

The proposed 36-month period would need a clearly defined end point. Previous transitional arrangements in Libya have lasted beyond their intended mandates because elections were postponed, constitutional rules remained disputed or political leaders resisted surrendering power.

Why has Libya remained divided between western and eastern power centres since 2014?

Libya’s institutional breakdown followed the 2011 uprising that overthrew Muammar Gaddafi and dismantled a highly centralised political system without producing stable national institutions capable of controlling the country’s armed groups and regional rivalries.

The crisis deepened in 2014 when competing political institutions and military coalitions established rival centres of authority. Tripoli became the base of western governments supported by powerful armed groups, while the eastern House of Representatives and forces associated with Khalifa Haftar built a parallel structure centred around Benghazi and eastern Libya.

The United Nations-backed political process later created the Government of National Unity under Abdulhamid Dbeibah, but the administration did not reunify the country or deliver the national elections originally expected to complete the transition.

Eastern authorities continued controlling substantial territory, military forces and energy infrastructure. Western Libya remained politically fragmented among government bodies and armed groups whose cooperation could shift according to local security and financial interests.

The division has survived because no faction has been able to defeat all of its rivals, while political leaders have retained access to state salaries, oil-financed spending and external support without completing a permanent constitutional settlement.

A successful Pakistani initiative must therefore address more than relations between two prominent families or political leaders. It must create an arrangement accepted by legislatures, municipalities, security forces, armed groups, economic institutions and communities that may not consider either Abdulhamid Dbeibah or the Haftar camp legitimate representatives of the entire country.

Why is Pakistan positioned to communicate with both the Dbeibah and Haftar camps?

Pakistan has developed defence relations with eastern Libya while retaining enough diplomatic distance from the conflict to communicate with the western Government of National Unity. That combination gives Islamabad access that some deeply involved regional governments may not possess.

Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff and Chief of Defence Forces, met Lieutenant General Saddam Khalifa Haftar in Rawalpindi on June 24. The two sides discussed bilateral defence relations, military training, security cooperation and regional developments.

Saddam Haftar subsequently travelled to Washington and met United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The United States Department of State said the discussions addressed Libyan-led efforts to unify the country’s military, political and economic institutions, indicating that Washington was encouraging greater engagement with the eastern leadership.

Pakistan has also explored defence-industrial cooperation with eastern Libyan forces. Earlier reporting identified discussions involving JF-17 fighter aircraft and Super Mushshak training planes, although any transfer would face legal and diplomatic scrutiny because Libya remains subject to a United Nations arms embargo.

At the same time, the western Government of National Unity sought direct engagement with Pakistan, creating an opportunity for Islamabad to present itself as a mediator rather than an exclusive military partner of the eastern camp.

Pakistan’s recent role in communication between the United States and Iran may have strengthened confidence in Islamabad’s ability to maintain discreet channels between adversaries. However, mediation in Libya would require sustained political management extending well beyond arranging meetings between senior officials.

Why are Libya’s oilfields, national budget and public spending central to any political settlement?

Oil provides the financial foundation of the Libyan state. Petroleum exports finance salaries, subsidies, public services, infrastructure and much of the wider economy, making control over oil production and revenue distribution inseparable from political power.

Libya held approximately 41% of Africa’s proved oil reserves at the beginning of 2024, while political disputes and militia activity repeatedly disrupted production and discouraged investment.

Eastern forces control areas containing some of Libya’s largest oilfields and critical export infrastructure, while revenue is generally channelled through national institutions including the National Oil Corporation and Central Bank of Libya. This separation between territorial control and centralised financial management has frequently produced blockades, shutdowns and disputes over spending.

Libya approved its first unified spending framework in more than a decade in April 2026. The 190 billion Libyan dinar agreement allocated funds for salaries, subsidies, development programmes, operational spending and the National Oil Corporation, demonstrating that rival institutions can reach limited financial compromises when incentives align.

The Pakistani proposal would build on that fragile progress by giving the Haftar camp formal budget authority. Supporters may argue that such recognition could reduce eastern incentives to obstruct oil production or create parallel spending systems.

Critics could see the arrangement as institutionalising military influence over civilian finances. Without transparent auditing and agreed limits, budget authority could become a mechanism for patronage, competing security expenditure or unequal distribution between regions.

Any final agreement will need to protect national oil institutions, publish expenditure, define approval procedures and prevent either side from using production shutdowns or salary payments as political leverage.

Can the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Türkiye support the same Libyan formula?

Foreign involvement has repeatedly complicated Libya’s conflict because outside governments developed different military, political and commercial relationships with competing factions.

Türkiye became one of the western government’s most important security partners, while other regional states established close ties with Khalifa Haftar and eastern authorities. The United States, European countries and the United Nations have promoted national unity while also maintaining practical relationships with leaders on both sides.

Pakistan’s reported involvement may offer a mechanism through which those interests can be coordinated without one of Libya’s traditional foreign patrons appearing to impose the settlement.

Saudi support could give the initiative additional Arab political weight. Qatar and Türkiye could reassure western Libyan actors, while United States participation could provide diplomatic pressure, sanctions influence and support for international recognition.

However, governments may agree that Libya should be unified while disagreeing over which leaders, security institutions and commercial partners should dominate the resulting state. Defence contracts, access to ports, reconstruction projects, energy investments and regional influence will remain part of their calculations.

The proposal will gain credibility only if external governments provide consistent messages to their Libyan partners. A settlement is unlikely to survive if one faction believes it can obtain a better outcome by waiting for stronger foreign backing.

How would Pakistan’s initiative interact with the United Nations political roadmap for Libya?

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya has been pursuing a political roadmap intended to create negotiated governance arrangements, unify institutions and establish the conditions required for presidential and legislative elections.

The United Nations Structured Dialogue includes discussions involving governance, security, economic reform and national reconciliation. Its governance work has focused on the mandate, timetable and exit mechanism of an interim government responsible for leading Libya towards elections.

Pakistan’s proposed Government of National Consensus could complement the United Nations process if it provides the political bargain needed to implement those objectives. It could also create a rival negotiating track if the framework is developed primarily by foreign governments and a small group of Libyan leaders without broader national consultation.

The United Nations process emphasises elections as the route towards renewed legitimacy. The emerging Pakistani plan must therefore specify whether elections would occur during the 36-month period, at its conclusion or only after constitutional and security conditions are completed.

Candidate eligibility, electoral laws and the powers of the future president have previously blocked progress. These questions cannot be indefinitely postponed without turning the proposed transition into another open-ended administration.

International recognition may also depend on whether the plan is formally connected with the United Nations roadmap. A settlement negotiated outside that framework could still succeed, but it would need endorsement from Libyan institutions and the United Nations Security Council to achieve broad legitimacy.

What could derail the proposed Dbeibah-Haftar power-sharing arrangement before it begins?

The first risk is disagreement over the distribution of authority. Abdulhamid Dbeibah may accept a Presidential Council chaired by Saddam Haftar only if the prime minister retains meaningful executive power, while the eastern faction may reject a structure that leaves Tripoli controlling ministries and public expenditure.

The second risk is opposition from political institutions and armed groups excluded from negotiations. Libya contains influential actors beyond the two camps named in the draft, and some may use military pressure or institutional obstruction if they believe the agreement threatens their positions.

The third risk concerns succession within the Haftar network. Giving Saddam Haftar a national role may be interpreted as consolidating a family-based transfer of authority rather than creating representative institutions.

The fourth risk is the absence of enforceable security arrangements. A national government cannot function if competing military commands, militias and armed formations continue answering to separate leaders.

The fifth risk is public legitimacy. Libyans have repeatedly been promised temporary governments and elections, only to see transitional leaders remain in office while living standards, infrastructure and accountability deteriorate.

Pakistan may be able to secure an initial compromise, but implementation would require sustained monitoring, transparent milestones and consequences for parties that violate the arrangement.

What developments would show that Pakistan’s Libya mediation is becoming credible?

The first significant indicator would be public confirmation from both Abdulhamid Dbeibah and the eastern leadership that Pakistan is facilitating discussions and that the proposed 36-month framework provides an accepted basis for negotiation.

The second would be formal coordination with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya. Alignment with the United Nations roadmap would reduce the risk of competing peace processes and provide a recognised mechanism for wider Libyan participation.

The third would be agreement on security institutions. A timeline for unifying military command, policing and border management would show that the talks are moving beyond division of political titles.

The fourth would be a detailed financial framework explaining how the national budget, oil revenue and development spending would be controlled. Libya’s recent unified spending agreement provides a starting point, but a political settlement requires stronger auditing and enforcement.

The fifth would be an agreed electoral calendar. A transition without a binding route to elections could preserve the existing political class rather than restore national legitimacy.

Pakistan’s intervention creates a new diplomatic opening because Islamabad has maintained channels with both camps and possesses support from governments capable of influencing the negotiations. The harder question is whether the proposed arrangement can change the incentives that have allowed Libya’s division to survive every previous peace initiative.

What are the key takeaways from Pakistan’s proposed Libya reunification initiative?

• Pakistan has quietly mediated between Libya’s rival eastern and western power centres since late 2025, with Pakistani sources saying the United States and Saudi Arabia support the effort while Qatar and Türkiye encouraged Islamabad’s involvement.
• The draft Libya Reunification Plan would create a 36-month Government of National Consensus and Presidential Council, but the proposal remained under discussion and had not received complete public confirmation from all participating governments and Libyan factions.
• Abdulhamid Dbeibah would remain prime minister under the emerging framework, while Saddam Haftar would chair the Presidential Council and the eastern faction led by Khalifa Haftar would receive substantial authority involving the national budget.
• Pakistan can communicate with both camps because it has developed defence relations with eastern Libyan forces while also receiving outreach from the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity, giving Islamabad an unusual position among potential mediators.
• Oil revenue and public spending will be central to the negotiations because eastern forces control major producing regions, while national institutions manage the revenue used for salaries, subsidies, infrastructure and government operations across Libya.
• Libya’s April 2026 unified spending framework showed that rival institutions can reach financial compromises, but granting the Haftar camp budget authority could also institutionalise military influence unless expenditure is transparent and independently monitored.
• The proposal could complement the United Nations political roadmap if it creates a negotiated interim government leading to elections, but it could weaken that process if decisions are made by foreign governments and elite factions without wider Libyan participation.
• The initiative will become credible only when the parties confirm negotiations publicly, establish security and financial arrangements, coordinate with the United Nations and accept a binding electoral timetable ending the 36-month transition.