Taiwan President Lai Ching-te has used the 68th anniversary of one of the Taiwan Strait’s defining Cold War battles to argue that peace with China can be maintained only through credible military strength, as Taipei prepares for annual defence spending to exceed NT$1 trillion, roughly US$30 billion, in 2027.
Lai spoke on August 23, 2026 in Kinmen, the Taiwanese-controlled island group lying only a few kilometres from the Chinese mainland. The date commemorates the beginning of the 1958 bombardment in which Communist Chinese forces fired hundreds of thousands of artillery shells at Kinmen during a confrontation that drew direct support for Taiwan from the United States.
Lai said Taiwan would not surrender any part of the territory it controls and urged political support for stronger defence spending, while maintaining that Taipei remains open to dialogue with Beijing.
Why does the August 23 Kinmen anniversary remain important to Taiwan?
The 1958 confrontation began when the People’s Republic of China launched heavy artillery attacks against Kinmen and nearby islands controlled by the Republic of China government in Taiwan.
The bombardment lasted for weeks and created fears that the confrontation could escalate into a broader US-China conflict.
Taiwanese forces held the islands with American logistical and military support, and the confrontation eventually settled into a long-running pattern of intermittent shelling rather than a successful Chinese takeover.
For Taiwan, Kinmen therefore symbolises both geographic vulnerability and resistance. The islands are far closer to China than to Taiwan’s main island, making them an unusual frontline territory.
Their history also makes the location politically useful when Taiwanese presidents discuss deterrence and defence preparedness.
What did Lai Ching-te say about Taiwan’s defence strategy?
Lai argued that peace cannot be assumed and must be supported by sufficient defence capability to deter aggression.
Taiwan’s government is planning defence expenditure above NT$1 trillion in 2027 as it increases spending on missiles, drones, air defence, naval capabilities and asymmetric weapons intended to make an invasion or blockade significantly more difficult.
The military budget has become one of the most important domestic political debates in Taiwan because opposition parties question some spending priorities while the government argues that delays could weaken deterrence.
China has intensified military operations around Taiwan over recent years, including aircraft sorties, naval patrols and large-scale exercises.
Beijing considers Taiwan part of China and has not renounced the use of force to bring it under its control. Taiwan’s democratically elected government rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claim and says only Taiwan’s population can decide its future.
Why is Kinmen particularly sensitive in current China-Taiwan tensions?
Kinmen lies immediately off China’s Fujian coast and can be seen from parts of the mainland.
Unlike Taiwan’s main island, the geography means Chinese coast guard, civilian and military activity can affect Kinmen with very little warning.
Recent patrols around the islands have increased pressure on Taiwan’s authorities and created recurring disputes over maritime boundaries and law-enforcement jurisdiction.
Kinmen also has extensive social, commercial and family connections with mainland China, making it simultaneously a military frontline and an important site of cross-strait interaction.
That dual identity is why political messages delivered there are carefully interpreted in both Taipei and Beijing.
Does Lai’s tougher defence message rule out dialogue with China?
No. Lai again indicated that Taiwan remains prepared for dialogue, but his government rejects Beijing’s demand that talks begin from the premise that Taiwan belongs to China.
That produces a diplomatic deadlock. Beijing sees Lai as a separatist figure and has repeatedly criticised his political language, while Taipei argues that accepting China’s sovereignty formula before talks would predetermine the central issue being disputed.
The result is a policy combining deterrence with an open-ended offer of engagement.
That approach also reflects Taiwan’s dependence on international support. Washington is Taiwan’s principal security partner and weapons supplier despite not maintaining formal diplomatic relations with Taipei.
Taiwan must therefore demonstrate both that it is investing substantially in its own defence and that it is not seeking unnecessary military escalation.
Why could Taiwan’s NT$1 trillion defence budget become increasingly important?
The size of the budget is significant not only because it represents additional weapons spending but because the structure of Taiwan’s defence strategy is changing.
Taipei has increasingly prioritised mobile missiles, drones, dispersed command systems, ammunition stockpiles and other capabilities designed to survive an initial attack and impose high costs on a substantially larger Chinese military.
The effectiveness of those investments depends on procurement speed, training, personnel and whether Taiwan can integrate equipment from domestic and foreign suppliers into a resilient defence network.
China’s military spending remains vastly larger, meaning Taiwan cannot compete through scale alone.
Sixty-eight years after artillery shells fell on Kinmen, the strategic argument remains recognisable: Taiwan cannot determine Beijing’s intentions, but it can attempt to influence the cost of military action.
Lai’s August 23 appearance turns that historical memory into a contemporary political case for record defence expenditure, while preserving a diplomatic message that stronger deterrence and dialogue are not necessarily contradictory.
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