Inside Operation Rising Lion: How Israeli intelligence neutralized Iranian defenses

In the early hours of June 13, 2025, Israel launched one of its most complex and far-reaching military operations against Iran—Operation Rising Lion—striking more than 100 military and nuclear sites across the country. While the scale and speed of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) assault stunned observers, what proved equally significant was how thoroughly Iran’s air defense systems failed to respond.

According to multiple reports and defense briefings, Iran’s radar networks, surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and communication lines were crippled in the hours leading up to the airstrike, allowing Israeli F-35s and other advanced aircraft to fly in and out with minimal resistance. The operation marked the culmination of a hybrid warfare strategy that included cyberattacks, electronic jamming, sabotage, and long-standing human intelligence operations spearheaded by Mossad.

The result: a surgical air campaign that not only inflicted devastating losses on Iran’s military infrastructure but also demonstrated a new frontier in intelligence-led warfare.

What new intelligence methods did Israel deploy to neutralize Iranian air defenses before strikes?

Israeli defense sources and regional intelligence briefings suggest that the IAF’s operational success was made possible by a coordinated pre-strike cyber and EW (electronic warfare) campaign. These included sophisticated jamming operations against Iranian early warning radars and command-and-control nodes.

According to European and Israeli defense analysts, including sources cited by the Jerusalem Post and Haaretz, Unit 8200—Israel’s elite signals intelligence corps—likely played a central role. Electronic warfare units reportedly disrupted radar arrays across central Iran, targeting Iranian Khordad-15 missile defense systems and disabling communications between the IRGC’s regional command centers.

Cybersecurity firms such as Check Point and SocRadar reported anomalous malware signatures in Iranian airspace monitoring systems just hours before the strike. While these claims remain unverified, similar tactics were observed in prior Israeli operations, such as the 2009–2010 Stuxnet attacks.

How did Mossad infiltrate Iran to plant drone bases and sabotage equipment?

Months before the airstrikes, multiple reports suggest Mossad had ramped up covert operations across Iran. Iranian news outlets, along with the Washington Post and Times of Israel, detailed how Israeli agents had smuggled small drones and explosives disguised as equipment parts into Iran using vehicles operated by local collaborators.

One notable revelation came from Iranian state media itself, which reported the discovery of a clandestine drone base near Tehran believed to have been used to relay targeting data to Israel in real time. The drones, allegedly launched from civilian areas, are thought to have provided last-mile reconnaissance for precision strikes.

This type of embedded sabotage marks a departure from previous Israeli efforts focused solely on assassinations or facility bombings. Instead, the latest operations reflect an evolution toward full-spectrum hybrid warfare, combining surveillance, intelligence gathering, and kinetic attack coordination.

Why did Iran’s air defenses fail catastrophically during Operation Rising Lion’s initial wave?

Iran’s air defense systems, which include a mix of Russian-made Bavar-373 platforms, the older S-200/S-300 systems, and domestically developed Khordad-series launchers, appeared to go dark during the first wave of Israeli attacks. Iranian military officials, speaking through state-run agencies, admitted to a “temporary loss of radar coordination” across three provinces.

Satellite imagery analyzed by open-source intelligence groups like ISW and Planet Labs showed multiple IRGC SAM batteries remained stationary and unresponsive even as Israeli jets conducted bombing runs over high-value sites like Natanz and Parchin.

Defense analysts attribute this breakdown to a combination of cyber infiltration, jamming of radar signals, and possibly the destruction of internal communication nodes by embedded saboteurs. Iran’s failure to detect or respond to the F-35 squadrons until the second wave suggests that its systems were not merely overpowered—but pre-disabled.

What role did Israel’s air force and special forces play in executing the multi-domain strike sequence?

The IAF reportedly deployed over 200 aircraft, including F-15Is, F-16Is, and fifth-generation F-35 stealth fighters, launched from bases in the Negev Desert and mid-sea air tankers in the Eastern Mediterranean. Each strike unit was supported by electronic warfare aircraft and drone squadrons for real-time ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).

What set this mission apart was its integration with ground and cyber components. Saboteurs operating in Iran are believed to have detonated signal jammers and decoy flares at select radar installations moments before the jets entered Iranian airspace.

In addition, Israeli special forces—possibly Sayeret Matkal or Shayetet 13—were rumored to have carried out forward-position reconnaissance in Iraq or Kurdistan to map Iranian air corridors and electronic surveillance blind spots. While Israel has not officially confirmed these reports, military analysts point to similar tactics used during past long-range raids like the 2007 strike on Syria’s Deir ez-Zor nuclear facility.

How has this operation transformed Israel’s doctrine on hybrid intelligence-led warfare, and what do defense institutions think?

Operation Rising Lion may represent a formal pivot in Israel’s deterrence doctrine—from targeted kinetic actions to multi-layered hybrid warfare. Experts from the Begin-Sadat Center and INSS suggest the operation was not merely reactive, but part of a deliberate strategy to degrade Iran’s retaliatory capabilities in advance, thus limiting the potential for prolonged conflict.

Institutional commentary in Israeli media reflects a consensus that Mossad and Unit 8200 now operate as integral extensions of the IDF’s operational command, not as separate intelligence entities. This doctrine—sometimes called “synchronized deterrence”—seeks to create temporary but total operational superiority in hostile territory, long enough to achieve strategic goals without prolonged engagement.

Could Operation Rising Lion reshape global counter-proliferation tactics and deterrence strategies worldwide?

The sheer precision and coordination of the Israeli operation have drawn comparisons to Olympic Games, the joint US-Israeli cyber operation that introduced the Stuxnet virus into Iranian centrifuges more than a decade ago. However, unlike cyber-only attacks, Rising Lion employed a multi-domain integration of cyber, air, electronic, and human assets.

This hybrid model may become a template for future counter-proliferation missions. Nations such as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom are already reassessing how to integrate SIGINT and EW operations more directly with military strike capabilities, especially in potential future scenarios involving North Korea or Pakistan.

Defense institutions from NATO and Japan have reportedly requested briefings from Israeli counterparts, focusing on the operation’s ability to neutralize integrated air defense systems (IADS) without open war declarations.

What are the long-term risks and lessons from this operation?

In my analysis, Operation Rising Lion marks a turning point in both Israeli military doctrine and global intelligence strategy. The operation temporarily set back Iran’s nuclear capability and sent a clear message of deterrence. However, the intelligence victory also carries strategic risks: Iran is likely to overhaul its cybersecurity architecture and will now seek retaliation in cyber and covert domains.

Furthermore, the operation has likely reduced Tehran’s trust in any diplomatic process involving Israel or the United States, even if indirectly. Future negotiations on nuclear oversight, sanctions relief, or regional de-escalation may now be harder to broker without neutral third-party mediation.