ClickFix malware surge: How fake error prompts became a top global cyberattack method in 2025

Why are fake error prompts like ClickFix rising so fast in malware telemetry across all platforms in 2025?

A new malware tactic known as ClickFix has become one of the most rapidly expanding threats in the cybersecurity landscape of 2025. According to the H1 2025 Threat Report published by ESET, ClickFix incidents surged by over 500% compared to the previous six months, making it the second most common attack vector globally after phishing. This single tactic accounted for nearly 8% of all blocked cyberattacks logged across ESET’s global telemetry systems.

ClickFix is defined by its use of fake error messages designed to trick users into copying, pasting, and executing malicious commands in a terminal or command-line interface. Unlike phishing attacks or vulnerability exploits, ClickFix operates by turning the user into the delivery mechanism, bypassing many traditional endpoint protection systems in the process.

The tactic is not limited by operating system boundaries. ESET’s telemetry confirms that ClickFix attacks have successfully targeted Windows, Linux, and macOS platforms alike. This cross-platform compatibility has contributed significantly to its rapid proliferation, making it one of the most consequential user-driven malware vectors seen in recent years.

What technical mechanisms and social engineering tricks allow ClickFix to evade traditional cybersecurity defenses?

ClickFix campaigns typically begin with a highly stylized and persuasive system prompt. These fake messages often resemble operating system-level errors, software configuration notices, or developer tool warnings. The message instructs the user to “fix” the problem by pasting a suggested command into their terminal or command prompt.

The commands usually invoke widely available utilities such as curl, wget, or PowerShell, which are then used to silently download and execute malicious payloads. Because the user initiates the command manually, traditional security software may not flag the activity as suspicious—especially when the command is short, obfuscated, or appears benign on the surface.

ESET researchers note that threat actors increasingly tailor these prompts to mimic known developer platforms or software update workflows. This tactic has been particularly effective in targeting IT personnel and technical users who are accustomed to working within command-line environments. The social engineering angle plays a critical role in the success rate, exploiting a user’s instinct to resolve technical issues quickly.

By weaponizing routine administrative behavior, ClickFix sidesteps many of the controls designed to catch automated malware infections, making it particularly dangerous for enterprise environments where privilege escalation can occur rapidly once initial access is granted.

How does ClickFix compare with historical malware delivery methods like phishing, trojans, or fileless attacks?

ClickFix differs from conventional malware vectors in both execution and detection pathways. Traditional phishing attacks rely on malicious email links or attachments. Trojan malware typically requires the user to install a compromised application. Fileless attacks, which became prominent in the late 2010s, often used PowerShell scripts or registry manipulation to avoid detection.

ClickFix combines the psychological manipulation of phishing with the stealth of fileless attacks but adds an unusual twist: the user is instructed to actively type or paste the infection trigger into their own system. This behavior bypasses many browser-based or email-layer security filters.

Because the malware is not embedded in a document or disguised as a legitimate app, there is often no initial file for antivirus engines to scan. Instead, the attack relies entirely on a user action that mimics legitimate troubleshooting behavior, which further complicates forensic investigations after an incident.

Security experts now view ClickFix as a form of “user-assisted malware delivery” that challenges long-standing assumptions about how malware is spread and what behaviors are deemed suspicious.

What types of malware are commonly delivered through ClickFix campaigns, and what are the consequences for enterprises?

ClickFix is being used as an initial access vector to deploy a variety of malware types, according to ESET’s latest research. The most commonly associated threats include SnakeStealer, a credential-harvesting tool that logs keystrokes, captures screenshots, and steals clipboard content. Other payloads observed include remote access trojans, cryptominers, and ransomware.

In some cases, ClickFix scripts initiate multi-stage infection chains. The first payload establishes a foothold, while subsequent downloads deliver modular toolkits like Cobalt Strike, which can be used for lateral movement and privilege escalation within enterprise networks.

Enterprise systems are particularly vulnerable when administrative users or developers are targeted. A single infected terminal can lead to widespread compromise if automated credential harvesting and remote access tools are deployed undetected.

Because of its dependence on behavioral manipulation rather than software flaws, ClickFix also presents unique challenges for cybersecurity awareness programs. Training efforts must now address social engineering strategies that exploit not only trust in external sources but also internal system messages.

What trends suggest that ClickFix-style attacks could escalate in H2 2025 and beyond?

Several indicators point to sustained growth of ClickFix-style attacks in the second half of 2025. First, the low technical barrier to entry means that even unsophisticated actors can replicate campaigns using publicly available templates and instructions. Second, the cross-platform nature of ClickFix ensures broad applicability across device types and user demographics.

ESET’s data also reveals an increasing frequency of bundled payloads—especially infostealers and ransomware—that capitalize on the initial access gained via ClickFix. This suggests that cybercriminals see long-term value in integrating this method into broader malware-as-a-service (MaaS) offerings.

Institutional cybersecurity teams are beginning to adjust their strategies accordingly. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) platforms are being retrained to flag anomalous user-initiated terminal activity. Meanwhile, threat intelligence analysts are focusing more on behavioral indicators rather than signature-based alerts.

From a market perspective, cybersecurity vendors who can provide behavior-aware, AI-enhanced monitoring tools may see a rise in enterprise demand. This shift in strategy reflects the need to detect intent and sequence—rather than just payload type—in order to combat threats like ClickFix that thrive on user interaction.

What is the broader industry outlook on preventing malware vectors driven by behavioral manipulation like ClickFix?

Industry sentiment indicates that behavioral manipulation is likely to play a larger role in future malware strategies, making defenses more reliant on training, contextual analytics, and zero-trust architecture. Experts argue that detection models must evolve beyond traditional endpoint signatures and begin analyzing command sequences and user session history to identify anomalies.

ClickFix is being viewed as a watershed moment in malware delivery—less for the technical innovation and more for its success in exploiting trust and muscle memory. It demonstrates that the human-computer interface itself can be the most vulnerable layer in the security stack.

If current telemetry trends continue, ClickFix and its variants could become a persistent feature of the malware landscape, much like phishing did over the past decade. The onus will be on security teams to rethink how interactive elements—like terminals and system notifications—are monitored, audited, and restricted.

ESET is expected to release additional telemetry findings later in 2025 that may further refine understanding of how ClickFix evolves and which verticals are most impacted. For now, the message from the research community is clear: assume the user is the vector, and design defenses accordingly.