Why LIV Golf is laying off most staff after more than $5bn of Saudi backing

LIV Golf is eliminating the majority of its workforce as it prepares to operate without the financial backing of Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, triggering the most significant restructuring since the breakaway professional golf league launched in 2022. The organisation confirmed that many employees working under what it calls “LIV 1.0” will see their employment end during the first week of September as management reduces operating costs and attempts to secure funding for a smaller, investor-backed “LIV 2.0.”

The precise number of layoffs has not been disclosed by LIV Golf. Reuters reported that the organisation employed more than 300 people globally, while separate reporting from The Telegraph, republished by Yahoo Sports, estimated that as much as 90% of the workforce could be eliminated. The 90% figure has not been confirmed by LIV Golf and should therefore be treated as a reported estimate rather than an official company headcount reduction.

The cuts follow the conclusion of LIV Golf’s 2026 season and the scheduled end of financial backing from the Public Investment Fund, which has invested more than $5 billion since the league was created. LIV Golf has signed a non-binding term sheet with a new lead investor that management says could finance operations in 2027, but the transaction has not yet been completed.

That combination makes the workforce reduction considerably more consequential than a conventional seasonal sports layoff. LIV Golf is effectively shrinking the organisation before knowing exactly how much capital its next ownership model will provide, how many employees can eventually be rehired and whether its dramatically altered operating structure can sustain a global professional golf league.

How many LIV Golf employees are losing their jobs as the league restructures?

LIV Golf has confirmed only that the majority of its employees are affected. Reuters reported that the league has a global workforce of more than 300 people and that employees had already been warned in the United States and United Kingdom that staffing reductions could occur.

If a workforce of slightly more than 300 were reduced by a simple majority, at least around 150 positions would disappear. If the separately reported estimate of cuts reaching 90% proves accurate, the number could approach 270 employees or more.

The distinction matters because LIV Golf has not provided an official percentage. Reporting from The Telegraph said the organisation employs approximately 300 people through its New York and London offices and could retain only a skeleton workforce, but that estimate comes from sources rather than a company disclosure.

Employees were not entirely surprised by the existence of a restructuring. LIV Golf had already provided notification of potential reductions during July, including through processes required under United States workforce-notification rules. What appears to have been more striking was the eventual scale of the cuts as the league moved toward the end of the Saudi-backed phase of its development.

LIV Golf said it remains optimistic that some employees could return if LIV 2.0 proceeds successfully. That creates an unusual employment situation in which workers are being released because the existing operating structure is ending, while management simultaneously leaves open the possibility that a future version of the league could recruit some of them again.

Why is Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund ending its LIV Golf backing?

The workforce cuts are directly connected with the end of the Public Investment Fund’s existing financial commitment. The Saudi sovereign wealth fund invested more than $5 billion into LIV Golf after the league launched in 2022, providing the financial capacity for enormous player-signing packages, tournament purses and global operations that allowed LIV to challenge the established professional golf system.

That funding commitment reaches its conclusion after the 2026 season. Reuters reported earlier in August that Public Investment Fund support no longer aligned with the fund’s strategic goals, forcing LIV Golf to develop an ownership and financing model that can survive without relying on effectively open-ended Saudi backing.

The consequences are now becoming visible across the organisation. LIV Golf ended its 2026 schedule in Indianapolis, cancelled its planned season-ending team championship in Michigan and is restructuring around a smaller operation for 2027. The workforce reductions are therefore one component of a wider economic reset rather than an isolated attempt to improve administrative efficiency.

For five years, LIV Golf’s strategic question was whether extraordinary financial investment could establish a permanent competitor to the PGA Tour. The next phase reverses that question: can the audience, players, media rights, sponsors and team franchises created with more than $5 billion of backing support a business that must increasingly operate within conventional financial constraints?

What is LIV 2.0 and how different could the new league become?

LIV Golf is using “LIV 2.0” to describe the restructured league it hopes to launch from 2027. The organisation says it has an agreement in place with a lead investor that has been signed by the investor and approved by LIV Golf’s board, although the transaction itself remains unfinished.

Chief Executive Officer Scott O’Neil has said the new investor is expected to carry and fund the organisation through its next phase. The company has not publicly identified the investor or disclosed the proposed investment amount, and LIV Golf has also said more than a dozen parties have expressed interest in becoming minority investors.

The ownership model is also expected to change materially. LIV Golf has said players would become majority equity holders, shifting the league away from a structure primarily financed by the Public Investment Fund toward one in which golfers themselves have more direct economic ownership of the competition.

The tournament footprint is expected to shrink as well. Reuters reported that the future format would involve a condensed 10-event schedule, with five tournaments in the United States and five internationally. That would represent a substantially leaner calendar and should reduce some event-production, travel and operating costs.

A smaller schedule combined with a much smaller workforce indicates that LIV Golf is not simply replacing one investor with another while leaving the organisation unchanged. Management appears to be rebuilding the league around a lower fixed-cost base before determining how aggressively it can expand again.

Why is the new LIV Golf investor deal still a major risk for employees?

The central risk is that the agreement with the lead investor is not yet a completed financing transaction.

Reuters described the arrangement as a non-binding term sheet that could fund the league in 2027. LIV Golf has separately said an agreement has been signed by the investor and approved by its board, with a final transaction previously targeted for September. Until closing occurs and capital is committed under definitive agreements, employees, players and vendors cannot treat the financing as guaranteed.

That explains why LIV Golf is reducing staffing before the future structure is fully financed. Maintaining a workforce of more than 300 people while waiting for an unfinished transaction would require substantial liquidity, particularly when the league is simultaneously responsible for tournaments, player agreements, television production and other operating expenses.

The restructuring therefore reduces financial exposure during the transition.

It also transfers risk onto employees. Workers who helped establish the original league lose their roles immediately, while any future opportunity to return depends on whether LIV 2.0 closes its financing, defines its organisational requirements and decides which capabilities need to be rebuilt.

The sequence shows how differently LIV Golf must now operate. Under Public Investment Fund backing, management could build infrastructure ahead of commercial sustainability. Under an external investment model, staffing increasingly needs to correspond with available capital and measurable future revenue.

Has LIV Golf generated enough commercial value to survive without Saudi funding?

LIV Golf has undoubtedly created assets that did not exist when it launched. It has recruited globally recognised players, built team identities, attracted substantial live audiences at selected events and established international tournaments capable of generating meaningful fan interest.

The Adelaide event, for example, attracted more than 115,000 spectators and became what LIV Golf described as the most attended golf event in Australian history. Such attendance provides evidence that the league can create demand in markets where traditional professional golf schedules offer fewer premium events.

The harder issue is whether that popularity produces sufficient recurring revenue to support the cost structure.

Historical reporting has indicated that LIV Golf accumulated losses exceeding $1 billion during its early years. Those losses were sustainable while the Public Investment Fund was willing to provide billions of dollars in backing, but an independent investor will normally require a credible route to profitability.

That is why cutting the workforce can be economically necessary even if the league survives.

A new investor is unlikely to value the organisation according to how much the Public Investment Fund previously spent. The relevant question is how much revenue LIV Golf can generate from broadcasting, sponsorship, ticketing, hospitality, team ownership and other commercial channels relative to the future costs of players, tournaments and staff.

The workforce cuts suggest the answer requires a substantially leaner cost base than LIV Golf maintained during its first five seasons.

Could star-player contracts become an even bigger issue after the layoffs?

Player commitments remain one of the largest strategic variables surrounding LIV 2.0.

The league was built by offering enormous financial incentives to leading golfers, including Jon Rahm, Bryson DeChambeau and other established names. Those players supply much of the audience value that a new investor would be purchasing, meaning retaining them could be critical to completing and protecting the future financing model.

At the same time, expensive player agreements make profitability more difficult.

Several golfers face decisions about whether to remain with the organisation as existing contractual arrangements evolve. Ian Poulter, for example, publicly acknowledged uncertainty about his future after the 2026 season while expressing hope that LIV 2.0 proceeds.

The workforce reductions make that contrast particularly stark.

LIV Golf is removing most employees partly to create a cost structure that can survive under new ownership, while its commercial value still depends heavily on retaining a collection of expensive elite athletes.

A successful restructuring therefore requires more than administrative cuts. LIV Golf needs a player-compensation structure that future investors consider economically sustainable.

Why does Scott O’Neil’s leadership now face its biggest test?

O’Neil is essentially managing two organisations simultaneously: winding down LIV 1.0 while attempting to finance and design LIV 2.0.

He must complete the investor transaction, retain sufficient player support, build a smaller staff, establish a 2027 schedule and convince sponsors and commercial partners that the league will continue. Each task influences the others.

An investor may hesitate without player commitments. Players may hesitate without confirmed financing. Employees cannot be rehired without clarity on the operating model, while commercial partners need confidence that events will actually take place.

That circular dependency makes speed important.

O’Neil announced earlier in August that LIV Golf had secured a lead investor and indicated that the transaction could be completed in September. The mass workforce reduction now increases the importance of meeting that timetable because the organisation will soon be operating with dramatically less corporate capacity.

The management challenge is therefore not simply securing capital. It is preserving enough organisational continuity to restart the league after dismantling much of the structure that operated it.

Are the LIV Golf layoffs evidence that the original business model failed?

The layoffs clearly demonstrate that the original cost structure cannot continue without Public Investment Fund financing.

That is not exactly the same as proving LIV Golf itself has no viable future.

The original model prioritised disruption, player acquisition and rapid global visibility rather than near-term profitability. More than $5 billion of Saudi funding allowed the league to enter professional golf at extraordinary speed and force existing organisations to respond to a competitor that otherwise would have taken many years to build.

The problem is that the same model created an organisation dependent on a single extraordinarily deep-pocketed financial sponsor.

When that backing ends, commercial sustainability becomes unavoidable.

The majority workforce reduction is therefore the clearest evidence yet that LIV Golf cannot simply continue operating as it did from 2022 through 2026.

What remains unresolved is whether enough valuable infrastructure was created during those expensive years to support a smaller business.

Can LIV Golf rebuild after cutting most of the people who operated the league?

That may become the defining workforce question of LIV 2.0.

Reducing headcount sharply gives management an immediate way to lower fixed costs during the financing transition. It also removes institutional knowledge across tournament operations, marketing, communications, sponsorship, logistics, technology and other functions required to stage global sporting events.

LIV Golf says it hopes many employees may eventually return if the next version moves forward.

Rehiring, however, is not automatic. Employees who lose positions in September may take other jobs, and a future LIV Golf organisation may decide it needs different skills or significantly fewer people even after financing closes.

That creates a difficult trade-off.

The organisation needs to become lean enough to attract financially disciplined investors while retaining enough operating capability to deliver a global sports product capable of producing revenue.

The next several weeks should reveal whether management has found that balance.

If the lead-investor transaction closes, star players commit to the redesigned league and a credible 2027 calendar emerges, the layoffs could eventually be interpreted as a painful transition from a subsidy-driven startup model toward a more sustainable sports business.

If financing does not close, the workforce reductions may instead prove to be the beginning of a much more fundamental contraction.

For employees, the immediate reality is already clear. The league that employed them under LIV 1.0 is effectively being dismantled.

For Scott O’Neil and prospective investors, the harder task starts now: proving that after more than $5 billion of Saudi backing and the departure of most of the workforce, there is still enough commercial value inside LIV Golf to build a viable second version.