UK faces criticism over $20m Myanmar ISP investment tied to surveillance

Why Is the UK Government Facing Scrutiny Over a Myanmar ISP Investment?

The UK government is under mounting pressure after revelations that it continues to support a Myanmar-based internet provider accused of enabling surveillance by the military junta. As first reported by The Times on May 24, British International Investment (BII)—the UK government’s development finance institution—has maintained a $20 million equity stake in Frontiir, Myanmar’s largest private internet service provider, despite ongoing concerns about the company’s alleged role in facilitating state monitoring of online activity.

Investigative findings from Finance Uncovered and Myanmar Now have raised red flags over the company’s deployment of Chinese-made deep packet inspection (DPI) technology reportedly sourced from Geedge Networks, a supplier known for manufacturing government-grade surveillance tools. The equipment is said to allow the interception, monitoring, and filtration of internet traffic, potentially enabling Myanmar’s military authorities to conduct covert surveillance on dissidents, journalists, and civil society actors.

What Is Frontiir Accused of, and How Has It Responded?

The heart of the controversy lies in allegations that Frontiir’s network architecture includes surveillance-grade DPI systems installed after the 2021 military coup. According to whistleblower documents and independent technical reviews cited in the Myanmar Now report, these systems were integrated to comply with Myanmar’s cybersecurity unit requirements under the State Administration Council—the military’s ruling junta.

The surveillance tools reportedly allow full traffic decryption, keyword tracking, and automated URL filtering. Experts say such capabilities are often weaponised in authoritarian regimes to suppress dissent. The software also enables content blocking and metadata collection across IP ranges and encrypted communications.

In response, Frontiir has publicly denied any involvement in facilitating government surveillance. A spokesperson for the company stated it “does not possess the expertise, infrastructure, or operational mandate to conduct traffic interception or decryption,” and added that “Frontiir’s mission remains to provide affordable digital access to underserved communities.”

What Has the UK Government Said About Its Involvement?

British International Investment, wholly owned by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), confirmed its $20 million investment in Frontiir remains active. The agency stated it was aware of the allegations but asserted that it had received “satisfactory assurances” from the company that its infrastructure is not being used for surveillance purposes by the junta.

A spokesperson for BII told The Times that its goal is to enable equitable internet access in emerging markets and that divesting could “risk transferring control of Frontiir into less accountable or opaque hands.” The institution added that ongoing monitoring mechanisms are in place to ensure the company’s compliance with international human rights standards, and said that pulling out now could result in unintended consequences for over a million Frontiir users who rely on the service for education, communication, and commerce.

What Is the Historical Context Behind This Controversy?

The allegations come more than four years after Myanmar’s military seized control of the government in a coup on 1 February 2021, displacing the democratically elected National League for Democracy (NLD) and launching a sweeping crackdown on civil liberties. In the immediate aftermath, internet access became a flashpoint of repression, with the junta imposing nightly shutdowns, banning VPNs, and throttling mobile services.

The UK government publicly condemned the coup and imposed sanctions on several Myanmar military leaders. However, its indirect economic footprint in Myanmar through development investments has come under renewed scrutiny, particularly after BII disclosures revealed ongoing financial links to entities with potential dual-use technology.

Human rights organisations including Amnesty International and Burma Campaign UK have repeatedly called on the UK to conduct a full audit of its overseas development investments, especially in contexts where digital infrastructure could be exploited for authoritarian ends.

How Are International Watchdogs and Lawmakers Reacting?

The news has sparked backlash from both domestic lawmakers and international watchdogs. In Parliament, several members of the Foreign Affairs Committee are reportedly preparing to call for a formal inquiry into BII’s due diligence process. MP Layla Moran, foreign affairs spokesperson for the Liberal Democrats, described the revelation as “deeply disturbing” and urged the Foreign Office to “immediately review any public investments with surveillance risks in authoritarian regimes.”

In a joint statement, Reporters Without Borders and Human Rights Watch urged the UK government to place conditions on any further disbursement of funds to Frontiir, demanding full transparency over its hardware procurement and data-handling practices. They also criticised the perceived contradiction in UK foreign policy: publicly denouncing the Myanmar junta while simultaneously supporting digital infrastructure potentially exploited by the regime.

What Are the Ethical and Strategic Dilemmas for the UK?

This episode underscores a growing tension within international development finance—balancing the objective of expanding connectivity in low-income markets with the risk that such infrastructure may be repurposed for authoritarian surveillance. Unlike humanitarian aid, development capital often supports privately operated ventures where shareholder control can be limited, especially in countries with fragile rule-of-law protections.

Supporters of the BII investment argue that Frontiir remains one of the few providers offering low-cost internet access to remote areas of Myanmar, including educational zones and displaced communities. Critics, however, point to the inherent risk in providing technology infrastructure without airtight guarantees of its ethical use.

There is also the geopolitical overlay of China’s digital export strategy, often dubbed the “Digital Silk Road,” which has made surveillance-enabling hardware more accessible to authoritarian governments. In this case, Frontiir’s use of Geedge Networks equipment reflects a broader concern about China’s growing influence over Myanmar’s communications systems—and by extension, the capacity for repression.

What Happens Next?

The Foreign Office has yet to release a formal public statement in response to mounting calls for accountability, but internal reviews are said to be underway. BII has also pledged to publish a third-party audit of its Myanmar operations later in the year.

If further evidence emerges linking Frontiir directly to military-led surveillance campaigns, the UK government could face not only reputational damage but also legal scrutiny under international human rights statutes. At the same time, a hasty withdrawal from Frontiir could leave the country’s digital ecosystem even more vulnerable to state capture or monopolisation by military-aligned firms.

With elections in Myanmar postponed indefinitely and the junta tightening control over the flow of information, the role of digital infrastructure—and the entities that finance it—has never been more politically sensitive. For the UK, the dilemma lies in navigating the thin line between digital development and complicity.