Philippines warns China could exploit Trump’s cuts to U.S.–South Korea military exercises

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro has warned that China could interpret Donald Trump’s decision to scale back U.S.–South Korean military exercises as an opportunity to reassert itself across the Indo-Pacific, even though Washington has separately assured Manila that American defence commitments to the Philippines remain unchanged. Speaking to Reuters at the Seoul Defense Dialogue on September 7, Teodoro said there had been no reduction in U.S.–Philippine military activity and that cooperation between the two treaty allies continued to expand.

Trump ordered the Pentagon in August to substantially reduce exercises with South Korea, describing the drills as expensive and unnecessarily hostile toward North Korea while also criticising Seoul for declining to participate directly in U.S. military action involving Iran. The annual Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise nevertheless began as scheduled, involving about 18,000 South Korean personnel, although the president’s intervention revived long-running questions about how consistently Washington intends to maintain its traditional military posture in Northeast Asia.

For the Philippines, the concern is not that U.S. forces are currently withdrawing from Philippine cooperation but that Chinese planners could interpret changes elsewhere as evidence of weakening American resolve. Manila has responded by deepening its U.S. alliance while simultaneously building defence arrangements with Canada, New Zealand, France, Britain and South Korea, a strategy Teodoro says is increasingly driven by shared concerns over Chinese behaviour.

Why does Manila care about reductions in military exercises between Washington and Seoul?

The Philippines and South Korea face different immediate security challenges, but both depend heavily on the credibility of American treaty commitments. If Washington scales down activity with one longstanding ally, officials elsewhere naturally examine whether the decision reflects a narrow tactical adjustment or a broader willingness to reduce military commitments across Asia.

Teodoro told Reuters that China could move quickly to exploit perceived gaps, particularly if Beijing concludes that American political appetite for sustained regional deterrence is weakening. He stressed, however, that Philippine officials had received definite assurances from Washington and saw no indication that changes involving South Korea would affect the 1951 U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.

The psychological dimension is important because deterrence depends partly on perception. A military alliance can remain legally unchanged while adversaries test whether political leaders are still willing to bear the costs of enforcing it during a crisis.

What did Donald Trump actually change about U.S.–South Korea exercises?

Trump instructed the Pentagon on August 16 to substantially reduce joint military exercises with South Korea. He argued that the drills were costly and sent an inappropriate hostile signal toward North Korea, while also linking his dissatisfaction to Seoul’s reluctance to join U.S. operations concerning Iran.

The administration did not immediately specify exactly which exercise components would be cancelled, reduced or shifted. In recent years, some U.S.–South Korean training has already moved from large live-fire activity toward computer simulations covering missile attacks, cyber operations and command coordination.

North Korea has long denounced the exercises as rehearsals for invasion, while Washington and Seoul describe them as defensive training necessary to maintain readiness. Trump’s decision therefore raises a familiar trade-off between creating diplomatic space with Pyongyang and preserving the visible military activity that reassures allies.

Why does Teodoro say U.S.–Philippine military cooperation is moving in the opposite direction?

Manila has expanded access, exercises and interoperability with the United States under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., particularly as confrontations with China have intensified in the South China Sea. The alliance rests on the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and is supplemented by the Visiting Forces Agreement and Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which provide legal and operational frameworks for joint training and U.S. access to Philippine facilities.

Teodoro said there had been no reduction in bilateral or multilateral activities involving the Philippines. That distinction is central to Manila’s message because it wants Beijing to understand that the Korea decision should not be interpreted as evidence of reduced American commitment in Southeast Asia.

The Philippines has also increasingly hosted larger exercises and sought modern surveillance, anti-ship, air-defence and maritime capabilities. These investments are designed to make the alliance operationally credible rather than dependent solely on treaty language.

Why is the Philippines building security partnerships beyond the United States?

Diversification reduces the risk of relying on a single partner and allows Manila to build a broader network of states with interests in freedom of navigation and Indo-Pacific stability. Teodoro said the Philippines had concluded arrangements with Canada and New Zealand, signed a visiting-forces agreement with France and was negotiating a similar pact with Britain.

Canada and the Philippines elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership in July, with both governments highlighting expanding defence and security cooperation. The Philippines and New Zealand have similarly been working to implement a status-of-visiting-forces agreement and deepen maritime and logistical cooperation.

These arrangements do not create an Asian equivalent of NATO, but they increase the number of militaries able to train, operate and share logistics with Philippine forces. Teodoro argued that common concern over China could gradually produce a more interconnected regional security network.

Why is Manila accusing China of influence operations as well as maritime pressure?

Teodoro told Reuters that China was taking advantage of democratic openness and free media to spread narratives favourable to Beijing, and he said the Philippines was pursuing stronger legislation addressing espionage and foreign influence. China had not immediately responded to Reuters’ request for comment on his allegations.

The accusation broadens Manila’s security concerns beyond coast-guard confrontations and naval deployments. Governments increasingly treat information campaigns, political influence, cyber activity and economic pressure as connected tools that can shape domestic decision-making without conventional military force.

Legislation in this area can itself become politically sensitive because governments must distinguish covert foreign interference from lawful speech, journalism and political disagreement. The Philippines therefore faces the challenge of strengthening counterintelligence without creating overly broad powers that undermine the democratic openness Teodoro says foreign actors are exploiting.

Why is the Philippines cautious about joint oil and gas development with China?

President Marcos has recently indicated that there is progress toward possible discussions with Beijing on joint oil and gas exploration. Teodoro nevertheless told Reuters he doubted that economic cooperation could be separated cleanly from unresolved sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea.

The difficulty is jurisdiction. Energy projects require agreement on licensing, revenue, legal authority and ownership of resources, but Manila and Beijing have overlapping claims in waters where the Philippines insists its rights are supported by international maritime law and the 2016 arbitration ruling that rejected key elements of China’s expansive claims.

A commercial arrangement can therefore become politically explosive if either side believes the agreement implicitly concedes sovereignty. Teodoro’s caution suggests Philippine security officials remain wary of economic deals that could weaken Manila’s legal position even if both governments want access to new energy supplies.

What does South Korea contribute to the Philippines’ military modernisation?

South Korea has become one of the Philippines’ most important defence suppliers, delivering FA-50 light combat aircraft, frigates and other equipment as Manila upgrades forces historically oriented more toward internal security than territorial defence. Teodoro was in Seoul partly to deepen this industrial and strategic relationship.

The Philippines is interested in additional technologies and industrial cooperation, but Teodoro played down the prospect of an imminent submarine acquisition. He said the submarine programme remained under review because Manila still needed to define mission requirements and invest in the expensive infrastructure necessary to operate and maintain such vessels.

That caution reflects the difference between purchasing an advanced platform and sustaining it operationally. Submarines require specialised bases, maintenance facilities, trained crews and command structures that can consume substantial defence resources for decades.

What are the key takeaways from Gilberto Teodoro’s warning about China and U.S. military posture?

• Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro says China could exploit perceived regional gaps created by Donald Trump’s decision to reduce U.S.–South Korean military exercises.
• Manila says it has received firm assurances from Washington that U.S. commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines remain unchanged.
• Teodoro says U.S.–Philippine exercises and wider defence cooperation have not been reduced and continue to expand.
• The Philippines is simultaneously strengthening defence relationships with Canada, New Zealand, France, Britain and South Korea as part of a broader diversification strategy.
• Manila is pursuing stronger laws against espionage and foreign influence after Teodoro accused China of exploiting democratic institutions and media space, allegations Beijing had not immediately answered.
• Teodoro remains cautious about joint oil and gas development with China because he believes economic projects cannot easily be insulated from unresolved South China Sea sovereignty disputes.
• South Korea remains a major Philippine arms supplier, but Teodoro says Manila’s long-discussed submarine programme is still under review and remains some distance from implementation.

Is Asia moving toward a more networked defence system because of concerns about China?

The emerging pattern increasingly resembles a web of overlapping security partnerships rather than a single formal alliance structure. The Philippines remains anchored to its American treaty, but it is deliberately building agreements that allow more countries to train with its forces, share logistics and contribute to maritime security.

China is not the only factor behind every agreement, and countries such as Canada, France, New Zealand and South Korea have their own economic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia. Teodoro’s comments nevertheless make clear that Manila sees Chinese military, maritime and influence activity as the principal force accelerating this network.

Trump’s decision on Korea therefore matters beyond the Korean Peninsula because allies continuously interpret American actions in one theatre as signals about reliability elsewhere. Washington may regard scaled-back exercises with Seoul as a tactical attempt to reopen diplomacy with North Korea, while Manila worries Beijing could read the same decision as an opportunity.

That tension will remain central to Indo-Pacific strategy: the United States wants flexibility to negotiate with individual rivals, but its allies need those negotiations to occur without weakening the collective perception that American security commitments remain credible.