Nike is leaving an elite Wall Street club on Monday, and the $35 share price explains why

Nike Inc. (NYSE: NKE) will be removed from the S&P 100 before U.S. trading begins on Monday, September 21, ending a run of nearly 18 years in an index designed to represent some of America’s largest and most established companies. S&P Dow Jones Indices confirmed that Palo Alto Networks will replace Nike as part of its September quarterly rebalance, while Nike will remain in the much broader S&P 500. The change does not alter Nike’s operations or stock-market listing, but its timing has turned what would normally be a technical index adjustment into a highly visible symbol of the company’s prolonged loss of market value.

Nike shares closed at $35.51 on September 18, down 2.34% for the session after touching $35.50, the bottom of their current 52-week range. The stock was trading above $76 as recently as October 2025 and has lost roughly four-fifths of its market value from the peak reached about five years ago, according to Reuters. Nike’s shrinking valuation and unusually low share price have now also prompted questions among analysts and investors about whether it can indefinitely retain its separate membership in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, although no Dow removal has been announced.

The index story arrives at an awkward moment for Chief Executive Officer Elliott Hill’s attempt to rebuild Nike. The company generated $46.4 billion of revenue in fiscal 2026, essentially flat on a reported basis and down 2% on a currency-neutral basis, while net income fell 3% to $3.1 billion. North America showed improvement, but Greater China revenue fell 11% for the year and 12% in the fourth quarter, reinforcing concerns that Nike’s problems are no longer confined to clearing excess inventory or reversing an earlier direct-to-consumer strategy.

Adding to the competitive symbolism, French football star Kylian Mbappé has ended his long relationship with Nike and signed with Swiss sportswear challenger On Holding as On prepares to enter football footwear. Reuters reported on September 18 that the arrangement includes cash and equity components, while former France international Thierry Henry has joined On as director of football. Nike still owns formidable sporting relationships worldwide, but losing one of football’s most recognisable athletes just as it exits the S&P 100 underlines how competitors are increasingly attacking areas once regarded as Nike territory.

Why is Nike being removed from the S&P 100 even though it remains inside the S&P 500?

The distinction between the S&P 100 and S&P 500 is important because some coverage of the rebalance can easily create the impression that Nike is being ejected from the main U.S. stock-market benchmark. It is not. S&P Dow Jones Indices has confirmed that Nike remains an S&P 500 constituent, while the September 21 change applies specifically to the smaller S&P 100 index containing a more concentrated collection of major companies.

S&P Dow Jones Indices said the quarterly changes are intended to make its indices more representative of their respective market-capitalisation ranges. Nike is being removed alongside Simon Property Group, Colgate-Palmolive and Honeywell Aerospace, while Dell Technologies, Palo Alto Networks, Arista Networks and Sandisk enter the S&P 100. The composition change therefore also illustrates the extraordinary shift in American equity-market leadership toward technology companies.

For Nike, however, the context makes the deletion harder to dismiss as an ordinary reshuffle. Reuters reported that analysts connect the S&P 100 removal to the company’s roughly 80% decline in market value over the previous five years, a period marked by weaker innovation, slowing sales and intensifying competition. A sportswear company that once carried a market capitalisation above $250 billion has fallen to a valuation of roughly $50 billion to $55 billion, dramatically changing its relative position among U.S. large-cap companies.

The direct mechanical consequences of leaving the S&P 100 are more modest than the headline might suggest because far less money tracks the S&P 100 than the S&P 500. The strategic symbolism is considerably larger. Nike remains one of the world’s most recognisable consumer brands, but market indices respond to equity value rather than cultural recognition, and the gap between those two forms of prominence has widened sharply.

How did Nike reach a $35 share price when annual revenue is still above $46 billion?

Nike’s situation demonstrates why revenue size alone does not determine equity value. Fiscal 2026 revenue of $46.4 billion was slightly higher on a reported basis than the previous year, yet investors have increasingly questioned the quality, geographic mix and profitability of that revenue. Currency-neutral sales declined 2%, Nike Direct revenue fell 8% on the same basis, and annual digital revenue fell sharply enough to remain a major drag on the company’s direct business.

The fourth quarter exposed the split particularly clearly. Wholesale revenue increased 4% on a reported basis to $6.6 billion, while Nike Direct revenue declined 7% to $4.1 billion. Nike Brand Digital revenue fell 12%, while revenue from Nike-owned stores declined 7%, supporting management’s effort to rebuild wholesale relationships after the company’s earlier strategy placed considerably greater emphasis on selling directly to consumers.

That earlier strategic shift had initially promised higher margins and stronger ownership of consumer relationships, but it also reduced Nike’s presence with important wholesale partners at precisely the time rivals were becoming more aggressive. Hill’s turnaround has consequently required the company to repair retailer relationships, reduce dependence on ageing lifestyle franchises and rebuild its product pipeline around sport and performance.

The challenge is that turnaround spending and product development take time while competitors continue moving. Nike is not attempting to recover in an empty marketplace. On Holding, Deckers Brands’ Hoka, Adidas, New Balance, ASICS and specialist performance labels have all competed for consumers who once defaulted much more readily to Nike when shopping for running, lifestyle or sports footwear.

Why does Nike’s Greater China decline remain one of the hardest problems in Elliott Hill’s turnaround?

Greater China is perhaps the clearest example of why Nike’s recovery cannot be measured entirely through improvements in North America. Fiscal 2026 Nike Brand revenue in Greater China fell 11% to approximately $5.85 billion on a reported basis and 13% on a currency-neutral basis. During the fourth quarter alone, Greater China revenue declined 12% as reported and 17% on a currency-neutral basis.

Footwear was particularly weak. Full-year Greater China footwear revenue declined 13% to about $4.19 billion and was down 15% excluding currency effects. Fourth-quarter footwear revenue fell 13% as reported and 17% currency-neutral, while equipment and apparel also contracted.

This matters because China was once one of Nike’s most attractive growth engines. Local rivals have strengthened their products, marketing and cultural relevance, while consumers have become increasingly comfortable purchasing from domestic sportswear companies. Restoring growth therefore requires more than discounting old sneakers or increasing advertising. Nike needs products that persuade Chinese consumers that the brand once again deserves premium positioning against both international and domestic alternatives.

Reuters reported after Nike’s June results that management expected revenue pressure to continue through the first half of fiscal 2027 and that the company was still dealing with elevated inventories and uneven recovery across the business. North America was performing better, but China, Converse and sections of Nike’s sportswear portfolio remained earlier in the turnaround process.

Does Kylian Mbappé moving from Nike to On reveal a bigger competitive shift in sportswear?

An athlete changing sponsors does not by itself determine the future of a company generating tens of billions of dollars in annual sales. Mbappé’s move is nevertheless strategically interesting because of where he is going. On was built primarily around running and later expanded into tennis, but it is now using one of global football’s biggest names as part of its entry into a category historically dominated by Nike, Adidas and Puma.

Reuters reported that On plans to release its first football boots in 2027 and that the Mbappé transaction includes both cash and equity. Thierry Henry’s appointment as director of football adds another layer of credibility as the Swiss company tries to construct a football business rather than merely attach a celebrity name to an advertising campaign.

Nike continues to possess enormous sporting assets and long-term contracts, including its relationship with the French national team. The company therefore remains a dominant competitor rather than a displaced incumbent. What has changed is the willingness and financial ability of challengers to contest athletes, specialised categories and consumer attention that would previously have been exceptionally difficult to prise away from Nike.

Reuters also noted that Nike has lost Spanish star Lamine Yamal to Adidas and the English Premier League match-ball contract to Puma, even as the company has secured other important football relationships. Each individual change has limited financial significance relative to Nike’s overall business, but collectively they illustrate a much more competitive sports-marketing environment.

For Hill, that raises the cost of rebuilding cultural momentum. Nike has to improve products while simultaneously defending athletes, wholesale relationships, digital engagement and shelf space. Its enormous scale remains an advantage, but scale can become less useful when smaller competitors are able to concentrate spending on the exact categories where consumer preferences are changing fastest.

Could Nike really lose its Dow Jones Industrial Average membership after the S&P 100 exit?

There has been no announcement that Nike will be removed from the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and the two indices operate differently. S&P 100 membership changes occur through scheduled index rebalancing, while Dow changes are made by an averages committee without a fixed timetable. Any claim that Nike is definitely leaving the Dow would therefore go beyond the available facts.

The reason the question is receiving attention is Nike’s share price. Unlike the market-capitalisation-weighted S&P 500, the Dow is price weighted, meaning a company with a lower nominal share price has less influence on the index. Reuters reported that at around $36 Nike represented only about 0.4% of the Dow, making it the smallest-weighted component.

Nike joined the Dow in 2013. Reuters calculated that its shares had gained only about 5% from that entry through mid-September 2026, dramatically lagging the wider market over the same period. The combination of low index weight, collapsing market value and the imminent S&P 100 removal has therefore encouraged analysts to examine whether Nike still fits the profile the Dow committee wants to represent.

For investors, however, the more important issue is not the index label itself. Losing another prestigious index membership would create an additional reputational blow and potentially some forced selling from index-linked portfolios, but it would not fix or worsen Nike’s underlying product strategy. Sustainable share-price recovery ultimately depends on revenue quality, margins, innovation and consumer demand.

What does Nike’s $35.51 share price reveal about investor sentiment before October earnings?

Nike finished September 18 at $35.51 after falling 2.34%, with more than 52 million shares changing hands according to market data. The session low of $35.50 also marked the bottom of its current 52-week trading range, compared with a 52-week high of $76.97.

That represents a severe loss of investor confidence despite the company’s continuing scale, cash generation and brand recognition. Nike ended fiscal 2026 with approximately $9 billion in cash, equivalents and short-term investments, returned around $2.5 billion to shareholders during the year and subsequently maintained a quarterly dividend of $0.41 per share. The balance sheet therefore does not resemble a distressed retailer fighting for survival.

Instead, the valuation reflects uncertainty about the earnings power of the business after several years of strategic disruption. Fiscal 2026 net income was $3.1 billion, down 3%, while diluted earnings per share fell to $2.10. The fourth quarter produced a sharp earnings increase, but it benefited significantly from the expected recovery of U.S. tariff costs, including a $986 million benefit that added about 900 basis points to quarterly gross margin.

Investors will receive another major checkpoint when Nike reports fiscal 2027 first-quarter results on October 1. The company has already scheduled its earnings call for that date, making the coming report particularly important because investors will be looking for evidence that improved North American performance can broaden into a more durable recovery.

The central questions will be familiar but increasingly urgent: whether wholesale growth remains positive, whether digital declines moderate, whether Greater China shows any sign of stabilisation, and whether newer performance products are generating enough demand to reduce dependence on older footwear franchises.

Why Nike’s S&P 100 exit matters more as a turnaround scorecard than as an index event

The S&P 100 removal should not be mistaken for a verdict on whether Nike can recover. Index committees respond to market circumstances, while consumer companies can regain relevance when products, distribution and execution improve. Nike still controls one of the most valuable brands in global sport, generates more than $46 billion in annual revenue and has substantial resources available to invest in athletes, innovation and marketing.

What makes the September 21 change significant is that it turns years of gradual deterioration into a simple, highly visible milestone. Nike entered the S&P 100 when its valuation and growth profile placed it comfortably among America’s corporate elite. Eighteen years later, technology companies are replacing Nike and several other consumer or traditional-economy constituents as equity-market leadership changes.

That does not mean sportswear has suddenly become an unattractive industry. On’s willingness to invest in Mbappé and enter football suggests almost the opposite. Challenger brands see enough growth and consumer interest in performance footwear to spend aggressively for market share. The problem for Nike is that more of that growth is now contested.

Hill’s turnaround therefore has a much clearer benchmark than whether Nike remains inside one particular stock index. Nike must prove that it can make consumers excited about new products again, restore profitable growth in China, rebuild wholesale distribution without sacrificing digital economics and convert its immense sporting presence into stronger sales.

The September rebalance merely provides the scoreboard. Nike’s business performance will determine whether the company eventually climbs back up it.