Myanmar moves to restart China-backed Myitsone Dam despite Kachin opposition

Myanmar’s military-backed government is preparing to restart the long-suspended Myitsone Dam in northern Kachin State, reviving one of the country’s most controversial infrastructure projects after President Min Aung Hlaing strengthened relations with China.

The government aims to complete the hydropower project within approximately eight years, while construction could begin shortly after an official announcement, according to a Reuters report published on Wednesday, July 1, 2026. The report cited officials and sources familiar with recent discussions led by Kachin State chief minister Khet Htein Nan.

The original $3.6 billion project was suspended in 2011 after rare nationwide opposition over displacement, environmental damage, earthquake risks and an agreement that would have exported approximately 90 percent of its electricity to China. The proposed 6-gigawatt dam would be built at the confluence of the Mali and Nmai rivers, where the Ayeyarwady River begins.

Reviving Myitsone could help Myanmar address severe electricity shortages, but it would also deepen the military-backed government’s dependence on Beijing while reopening a political dispute that once united ethnic Kachin communities, environmental organisations and democracy campaigners.

The project’s actual cost could now be far higher than its original estimate. Applying recent Asian hydropower construction costs to the planned 6-gigawatt capacity suggests that Myitsone could require approximately $11.5 billion, although no revised official budget, financing agreement or electricity-sharing arrangement has been disclosed.

What has Myanmar’s government said about restarting the Myitsone Dam project?

Myanmar has not yet issued a complete public construction order, revised contract or final timetable for Myitsone. However, recent statements by officials indicate that the government has moved beyond simply reviewing the project and is preparing for its resumption.

Khet Htein Nan reportedly told private meetings in Myitkyina that the project should become a historic achievement and could be completed within around eight years. A member of the Kachin State parliament said work would begin shortly and that an official announcement was expected.

Myanmar presidential office spokesperson Khaing Khaing Soe confirmed that Myitsone was discussed during Min Aung Hlaing’s June visit to China. She said the government was assessing the benefits against concerns involving flooding, displacement and environmental damage.

The spokesperson argued that the project could provide more than half of the approximately 10 gigawatts of electricity Myanmar requires. That comparison presents Myitsone as a potential answer to a national power deficit rather than solely as an export project serving China.

However, the government has not clarified how much electricity would remain in Myanmar under a revived agreement. Reuters reported that it could not establish whether the original plan to export about 90 percent of the power to China had been renegotiated.

That unanswered question is central to the project’s legitimacy. A dam carrying enormous local environmental and social costs would face continued opposition if most of its electricity and economic value still flowed across the Chinese border.

Why did Myanmar suspend the China-backed Myitsone Dam in September 2011?

Construction began in 2009 under an agreement involving China Power Investment Corporation, Myanmar’s electricity authorities and local conglomerate Asia World.

The project quickly generated opposition because of its scale, location and unequal distribution of benefits. Its reservoir would inundate a vast area of Kachin State, affecting villages, agricultural land, forests, religious sites and culturally important landscapes.

Opposition intensified because Myitsone would stand at the birthplace of the Ayeyarwady, Myanmar’s most important river and a powerful symbol of national history and identity. Communities downstream were concerned about changes to water flows, fisheries, sediment movement and agricultural systems.

Former President Thein Sein suspended the dam on September 30, 2011, saying his government was responding to the wishes of the population. The decision was remarkable because Myanmar was only beginning a limited political opening after decades of direct military rule.

The suspension became a symbol of public influence over state policy. It also created a major diplomatic problem with China, which had already committed resources and expected Myanmar to protect the commercial rights of its companies.

Successive Myanmar governments avoided making a final decision. Cancelling the project could have exposed the country to compensation demands and damaged relations with China, while restarting it risked nationwide opposition.

The project consequently remained suspended rather than formally terminated. That unresolved legal and commercial status allowed Beijing to continue pressing for either construction, renegotiation or compensation.

Why is Min Aung Hlaing reviving Myitsone after becoming Myanmar’s president?

Min Aung Hlaing became president in April 2026 following elections held under military control and rejected by many opposition groups and Western governments. The transition gave civilian titles and institutions to a political system that remains dominated by the armed forces.

His government faces a civil war, international sanctions, weak foreign investment, damaged infrastructure and chronic electricity shortages. China is one of the few governments capable of providing the investment, diplomatic backing and large-scale infrastructure support Myanmar urgently needs.

Min Aung Hlaing visited China in June and met senior Chinese leaders as part of a wider effort to rebuild Myanmar’s external relationships. Myitsone was among the subjects discussed during the visit.

Restarting the dam could serve several objectives. It could secure Chinese financing, strengthen political support from Beijing, provide electricity and demonstrate that the new government can revive major infrastructure after years of war and economic decline.

The decision may also be intended to settle one of the longest-running disputes in China-Myanmar relations. Beijing has repeatedly sought a solution since the 2011 suspension and views protection of Chinese investments as an important measure of Myanmar’s reliability.

Myanmar’s weakened negotiating position changes the balance that existed in 2011. The current government has fewer Western partners, less access to international capital and a greater need for Chinese diplomatic protection.

That dependence could make it more difficult for Myanmar to demand a substantially different ownership, financing or electricity-sharing model, even though officials are presenting the project as a solution to domestic power shortages.

How would the Myitsone Dam affect Kachin communities and the Ayeyarwady River?

The project would create a large reservoir in an area inhabited by ethnic Kachin communities. Earlier preparatory work displaced residents from villages around the proposed site, and opponents argue that many affected families have never received adequate compensation or secure replacement livelihoods.

Forty-nine civil society groups and Kachin residents issued a joint statement on May 5 opposing any attempt to resume the dam. They said the project contradicted public wishes and would threaten lives, homes, property, water resources and ecosystems.

The groups demanded permanent cancellation rather than further consultation. Their position reflects deep distrust of a decision-making process controlled by military-backed authorities while independent political activity remains heavily restricted.

Environmental concerns include the loss of forests and habitats, changes in river sediment and disruption of fisheries. Altering flows at the beginning of the Ayeyarwady could produce consequences downstream, although the precise scale would depend on the final engineering design and operating regime.

The Ayeyarwady supports agriculture, transport, fishing and livelihoods across much of Myanmar. Opponents therefore argue that Myitsone cannot be assessed only as a local Kachin State project.

The government says it is considering the negative effects and that improved Chinese technology could reduce environmental and structural risks. No new environmental and social impact assessment has yet been published for independent review.

Without a transparent assessment, communities cannot determine whether the proposed design has changed, how flood risks would be managed, which settlements would be displaced or how compensation would be calculated.

Why has Myanmar’s earthquake risk become a central argument against Myitsone?

Myanmar is located in a seismically active region, and earthquakes have repeatedly caused major casualties and infrastructure damage.

Concern intensified after a magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck central Myanmar in March 2025, killing thousands of people and damaging buildings, roads and public infrastructure. The disaster demonstrated the vulnerability of construction standards and emergency-response systems.

Khet Htein Nan reportedly told a June meeting that China could use modern technology to address earthquake and environmental risks. That reassurance has not satisfied opponents who want detailed geological studies and independently reviewed engineering evidence.

Large dams are designed to withstand substantial seismic forces, but earthquake safety depends on the location, foundation geology, construction quality, maintenance and accuracy of the underlying hazard assessment.

The consequences of a major structural failure would extend beyond the dam site. Downstream communities could face sudden flooding, damaged transport links and the loss of essential economic infrastructure.

The project’s long suspension creates another technical issue. Authorities must determine what preparatory work remains usable after approximately 15 years and whether designs, materials and geological assessments completed before 2011 still meet current standards.

A credible restart would therefore require more than an assurance that technology has improved. It would need updated seismic modelling, public emergency plans, independent inspections and disclosure of how the design responds to worst-case scenarios.

Can the Myitsone Dam realistically solve Myanmar’s electricity shortages?

Myanmar’s electricity crisis is severe. Years of conflict, fuel shortages, weak investment and damage to transmission systems have produced frequent power cuts affecting households, factories, hospitals and businesses.

A 6-gigawatt power station would represent an enormous addition to Myanmar’s generating capacity. If a substantial proportion of the output remained in the country, Myitsone could improve industrial supply and reduce some dependence on expensive imported fuels.

Generation capacity alone would not solve the problem. Myanmar would also need high-voltage transmission lines, substations, stable regional grids and secure access for maintenance teams.

Civil-war conditions complicate every part of that system. Power infrastructure can be damaged, seized, disrupted or located in areas where government technicians cannot operate safely.

Hydropower output also varies with rainfall and reservoir management. A country relying heavily on large dams can remain vulnerable during dry periods unless it develops a more balanced electricity system.

The commercial structure will be decisive. If the revived agreement continues to prioritise exports to China, Myanmar may receive revenue and a limited power allocation without gaining the full domestic benefit implied by the project’s 6-gigawatt headline capacity.

The government must therefore publish how power would be divided, what price Myanmar consumers would pay and who would fund the transmission infrastructure needed to deliver electricity beyond Kachin State.

Why could the Myitsone revival intensify Myanmar’s civil-war tensions?

Kachin State has experienced decades of conflict involving the Myanmar military and the Kachin Independence Army. The nationwide civil war that followed the February 2021 coup has further fragmented territorial control and expanded armed resistance.

A large infrastructure project requires secure roads, construction camps, transport routes and transmission corridors. Establishing those areas could increase military deployments or produce further confrontation with armed groups and local communities.

The military-backed government controls Myitkyina and the immediate project area, but wider Kachin State remains affected by fighting and contested authority. Construction could become a strategic objective for both government forces and their opponents.

China has relations with Myanmar’s central authorities and maintains contacts with ethnic armed organisations near its border. Beijing may use those channels to reduce threats to Chinese personnel and investments.

However, Chinese pressure for stability does not guarantee local acceptance. A project associated with the military government could become a political symbol and a target for resistance even if China offers community programmes or compensation.

The government-supported public meetings cited by Myitsone proponents are also unlikely to settle the issue. Opposition groups argue that meaningful consent cannot be established while political repression, armed conflict and restrictions on independent organising continue.

Restarting construction without a broader settlement could therefore transform an electricity project into another conflict driver.

What does Myitsone reveal about China’s growing leverage over post-coup Myanmar?

China has approached Myanmar’s crisis pragmatically. It wants border stability, protection for investments, reduced criminal activity and continued progress on infrastructure linking southwestern China with the Indian Ocean.

Myanmar is important to Beijing because pipelines, roads, rail proposals and ports could provide strategic access that does not depend entirely on maritime routes through the Strait of Malacca.

The Myitsone Dam is different from many other projects because it has become a test of political influence. Its suspension was a public rejection of a Chinese-backed agreement negotiated under Myanmar’s previous military system.

Securing its revival would demonstrate that Beijing can recover a stalled strategic investment after years of resistance. It could also encourage progress on other Chinese projects delayed by conflict, public opposition or financing problems.

For Min Aung Hlaing, closer ties with China can provide international recognition at a time when much of the West continues to isolate Myanmar’s leadership. His June visit to Beijing and the subsequent push on Myitsone point towards a more transactional relationship built around infrastructure, political support and security.

The relationship is not entirely one-sided. China remains concerned about instability, cross-border crime and the possibility that fighting could endanger its investments. Myanmar’s leaders can use those concerns to seek financial or diplomatic concessions.

Yet the country’s isolation has reduced its alternatives. A government with access to several competing international investors could negotiate more aggressively. Myanmar’s current leadership is increasingly dependent on a small group of partners led by China and Russia.

Could the Myitsone project still be redesigned instead of revived in its original form?

A complete redesign could offer a possible compromise, but the government has not released one.

Options could include reducing the dam’s size, changing the reservoir footprint, modifying ownership, increasing Myanmar’s electricity allocation or replacing Myitsone with smaller projects elsewhere in the upper Ayeyarwady basin.

China and Myanmar could also renegotiate the commercial agreement so that more electricity serves domestic users and a larger share of revenue reaches Kachin communities.

Such changes would not automatically resolve opposition. Many Kachin organisations object to any large dam at the confluence because of its cultural importance and environmental sensitivity.

The project’s economics may also have changed. Construction costs have increased, Myanmar carries greater political risk and lenders would need to account for conflict, sanctions and possible attacks on infrastructure.

A revived dam estimated at approximately $11.5 billion would be far more difficult to justify than the original $3.6 billion proposal. The government would need to show that expected electricity revenue and domestic benefits exceed the financing, security and environmental costs.

The absence of a published revised agreement means it is still unclear whether Myanmar is planning a substantially different project or simply attempting to reactivate the original arrangement with updated technology.

What are the key takeaways from Myanmar’s proposed Myitsone Dam restart?

• Myanmar’s military-backed government plans to restart the China-supported Myitsone Dam in Kachin State and aims to complete it within approximately eight years, according to officials and sources cited in a July 1 Reuters report.
• The original $3.6 billion hydropower project was suspended by former President Thein Sein in September 2011 after nationwide opposition involving displacement, environmental damage and the planned export of most electricity to China.
• Myitsone would have approximately 6 gigawatts of generation capacity, which officials say could cover more than half of Myanmar’s estimated 10-gigawatt electricity requirement if a substantial share of power remains available domestically.
• The government has not disclosed whether the original arrangement to export around 90 percent of the electricity to China has been changed, leaving the project’s core distribution of benefits unresolved.
• Applying recent regional hydropower costs suggests the project could now require approximately $11.5 billion, although no revised budget, financing plan or final construction contract has been published.
• Forty-nine civil society organisations and Kachin residents have demanded permanent cancellation, arguing that the project threatens communities, ecosystems, water resources and the culturally important source of the Ayeyarwady River.
• Earthquake risk has become more prominent following Myanmar’s devastating March 2025 earthquake, but authorities have not released an updated seismic assessment or independently reviewed engineering design.
• Reviving Myitsone would strengthen China’s economic and political influence in Myanmar while risking further local resistance and conflict around a project associated with the military-backed government.