Iran’s protest crackdown escalates as government invokes ‘enemy of God’ charge carrying death penalty

Iran’s Attorney General Mohammad Movahedi Azad declared on January 10 that protesters participating in ongoing demonstrations, along with individuals providing any form of support to them, could be prosecuted as “enemies of God,” a designation under Iranian law that carries the death penalty. The statement, broadcast on state television, came as nationwide demonstrations entered their second week amid a near-total internet blackout.

The charge of “moharebeh,” or “waging war against God,” is codified under Iran’s Islamic Penal Code, specifically Articles 186, 190, and 191. These provisions allow courts to issue capital punishment, amputation, or internal exile for those accused of armed opposition to the Islamic Republic, even if they have not directly engaged in violent activity. Iranian law further permits judicial discretion in applying these penalties, making the designation both legally expansive and politically charged.

The announcement follows the sharp escalation of unrest that began in late December 2025. Initially sparked by economic grievances including inflation, currency devaluation, and rising living costs, the protests have evolved into broader expressions of political dissent across nearly all provinces. According to the U.S.-based Human Rights Activists News Agency, at least 116 people have died and over 2,600 have been detained since the protests began on December 28.

How are Iran’s legal institutions responding to the protests?

Mohammad Movahedi Azad’s statement marked the most severe legal threat issued since the unrest began. It was closely followed by public warnings from Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, who pledged “maximum” punishments for demonstrators. Parallel messaging from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and senior military officials reaffirmed that protecting the Islamic Republic’s system is a “red line,” underscoring a full-spectrum state response that includes legal, military, and ideological instruments.

While previous waves of unrest, such as the 2022–2023 protests following the death of Mahsa Amini, prompted mass detentions and internet disruptions, the current escalation includes the explicit use of the moharebeh designation at the earliest stages of nationwide mobilization. The invocation of this charge suggests a hardline stance from judicial authorities and aligns with prior efforts to deter protest participation through the use of exemplary punishments.

State media have emphasized the number of security force casualties and alleged that some protesters were armed. Authorities claim that dozens of individuals have been arrested for planning or participating in acts of violence, while framing the broader protests as “foreign-influenced” attempts at sabotage.

What has been the public and international response to the crackdown?

In several cities including Tehran, Mashhad, Tabriz, and Qom, footage has surfaced of large crowds chanting slogans against Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Residents in the capital’s Sa’adat Abad district reportedly banged pots and honked car horns in defiance of the restrictions. Despite the internet blackout, protest organization has continued through local networks, indicating persistent popular dissent.

Ayatollah Khamenei responded publicly for the first time since the protests began by denouncing demonstrators as “vandals” and “saboteurs,” accusing foreign enemies of orchestrating the unrest. His statement echoed a long-standing narrative that views anti-government protests as externally engineered threats to national stability.

Internationally, United States President Donald Trump condemned the Iranian government’s threats, warning against the use of lethal force on peaceful protesters. He stated that Iran’s leadership appeared to be “in big trouble” as demonstrations gained momentum. U.S. officials have reiterated their support for Iranian citizens’ rights to peaceful assembly but have stopped short of specifying what forms of support, if any, might be offered.

Human rights organizations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have sharply criticized Iran’s escalation. Amnesty said the use of moharebeh charges and internet shutdowns may be intended to suppress evidence of state violence. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has previously flagged similar charges as violating international due process standards.

How does the moharebeh charge function in practice, and what are the historical precedents?

Under Iranian law, moharebeh is typically used against individuals accused of violent opposition to the state, often during politically sensitive periods. Article 186 of Iran’s Islamic Penal Code allows the state to charge any person affiliated with an armed group opposing the regime—even if that individual has not committed a violent act themselves. The provision has been used in past cases involving Kurdish separatists, alleged members of banned political groups, and prior rounds of protest-related arrests.

Article 190 outlines four potential punishments: execution, hanging, amputation of the right hand and left foot, or internal exile. Article 191 gives judges latitude in determining which punishment applies, enabling flexibility in sentencing but raising concerns about selective application.

In the aftermath of the 2009 Green Movement protests, several high-profile detainees were charged with moharebeh. Human rights monitors argued that the charges were used to justify capital punishment for political activism. In recent years, the Iranian judiciary has applied the designation in response to targeted acts of violence, but its broader use as a deterrent against street protests marks a shift toward preemptive suppression.

Why does this escalation matter now, and what is the likely trajectory?

The government’s decision to invoke the “enemy of God” label at this early stage of unrest reflects a broader pattern of shrinking political tolerance. Compared to earlier waves of protest, the authorities are deploying legal deterrents in tandem with communications restrictions and public demonization campaigns.

From a policy perspective, the legal framing of dissent as religiously punishable “corruption on earth” eliminates space for negotiation, political reform, or acknowledgment of public grievance. It signals that the state is viewing these protests not as a political crisis to be managed, but as an existential threat to be crushed.

The protests’ scale and persistence suggest underlying volatility in Iran’s economic and social fabric. However, without independent media access and with judicial frameworks enabling capital punishment for protest-related activity, international institutions will have limited leverage or insight into ongoing state actions.

The inclusion of moharebeh charges also raises the risk of closed-door trials and expedited executions, as seen in past periods of unrest. The precedent set by this legal escalation will be closely watched in future domestic flashpoints, particularly as economic hardship and political dissatisfaction converge.

Key takeaways on what this development means for Iran, international law, and global attention

• Iran’s attorney general has publicly stated that protesters and those supporting demonstrations may be legally classified as “enemies of God,” an offense that under Iran’s Islamic penal code can carry the death penalty.
• Nationwide protests that began over economic grievances in late December 2025 have expanded into broader dissent and are occurring under an imposed internet and communications blackout.
• Iranian state media and officials frame the unrest as driven by saboteurs and foreign influence, while international governments including the United States have expressed support for peaceful protest rights.
• Rights groups report a significant number of deaths and detentions, and have criticized the use of lethal force and legal charges like moharebeh as part of a severe state crackdown.
• Independent verification of events remains difficult due to communications restrictions and state-controlled media reporting.