Google’s €4.1bn Android fine likely to stand as EU Advocate General rejects appeal

Why is Google facing a €4.124 billion fine over Android and what did the latest EU legal opinion conclude?

Alphabet Inc. (NASDAQ: GOOGL) and its subsidiary Google LLC are once again under scrutiny as a European legal adviser has recommended the upholding of a landmark €4.124 billion antitrust fine. On June 19, 2025, Advocate General Juliane Kokott of the Court of Justice of the European Union proposed that Google’s appeal be dismissed in full, siding with a 2022 General Court ruling that found the tech conglomerate had abused its dominance within the Android ecosystem through anticompetitive licensing practices. The Advocate General’s Opinion, while not binding, typically guides the Court’s final decision.

The case dates back to a July 2018 decision by the European Commission, which originally imposed a €4.343 billion penalty—then the largest ever handed down by a European competition authority. Google had been accused of deploying a multi-layered contractual strategy to cement its dominance in mobile search and browser markets by tying access to its proprietary app store, Play Store, to the mandatory pre-installation of Google Search and Google Chrome.

The General Court partially upheld this view in September 2022 but annulled a portion of the decision relating to revenue-sharing agreements. Consequently, the fine was slightly reduced to €4.124 billion. Google and Alphabet remained jointly and severally liable, with Alphabet’s share estimated at €1.521 billion. The latest legal development suggests that amount may now be definitively enforced.

What specific practices within the Android ecosystem were considered anticompetitive under EU law?

The Commission’s original 2018 ruling against Google centered on three key business practices. First, manufacturers of Android-based smartphones could only license the Play Store if they agreed to pre-install both Google Search and the Chrome browser—a tactic the Commission described as bundling. Second, these licensing deals came with a requirement not to sell devices running Android forks or versions not explicitly approved by Google, a condition referred to as “anti-fragmentation.” Third, Google made payments to manufacturers and network operators conditional upon exclusivity clauses that restricted pre-installation of rival search apps, known as “revenue-sharing.”

Taken together, these practices were deemed to represent a single and continuous infringement aimed at shielding Google’s core search advertising business from emerging threats during a crucial period of mobile internet growth across Europe. Regulators argued that Google leveraged its dominant market position to block rivals and secure long-term revenue dominance in mobile advertising, which is tightly integrated with user data and search functionality.

Why did the Advocate General reject Google’s argument regarding competitive impact and counterfactual scenarios?

In its appeal, Google asserted that the Commission and the General Court failed to provide sufficient economic analysis—especially a so-called “counterfactual analysis” assessing what competition would have looked like in the absence of the contested practices. The American technology conglomerate also claimed that the decision lacked adequate evidence demonstrating that its actions foreclosed competitors who were as efficient.

Advocate General Kokott dismissed both arguments. In her view, the General Court was under no obligation to evaluate hypothetical market outcomes. Instead, it was entitled to determine whether the practices in question had the capacity to restrict competition by establishing a “status quo bias,” whereby consumers were more likely to stick with pre-installed applications. This dynamic was sufficient to conclude that rivals were disadvantaged by not having the same privileged access to users.

On the question of market efficiency, the Advocate General stated that it was unrealistic to expect the Court to compare Google’s conduct with that of a hypothetical competitor, particularly given Google’s entrenched dominance, network effects, and unique access to data. She argued that the market conditions simply did not permit a meaningful “as-efficient competitor” test, reinforcing the broader legal principle that abuse of dominance need not hinge on proof of absolute exclusion but on the capacity to distort competitive conditions.

How does the Opinion interpret the notion of a “single and continuous infringement” despite partial annulments?

One of the more significant aspects of the case involves the European Commission’s characterization of Google’s behavior as a “single and continuous infringement.” Although the General Court struck down the revenue-sharing component of the original decision, it maintained that the bundling and anti-fragmentation clauses alone constituted a cohesive strategy aimed at protecting Google’s advertising-driven ecosystem.

Advocate General Kokott endorsed this approach, arguing that Google’s conduct—while multilayered—shared a unifying objective: to safeguard search dominance during the rapid rise of mobile platforms. Even after removing the revenue-sharing agreements from the infringement record, she concluded that the structural coherence of Google’s strategy justified the single-infringement classification, which underpins the legal basis for calculating the fine.

This continuity principle is particularly relevant in digital competition law, where platform businesses often orchestrate multifaceted approaches to entrench market power. The Advocate General’s affirmation of this concept signals to regulators that partial flaws in enforcement cases do not necessarily invalidate the broader legal structure of abuse findings.

What are institutional investors and legal observers saying about the implications for Google and Big Tech?

Institutional investors appear to be bracing for the Court of Justice to align with the Advocate General’s opinion, given the high rate of concurrence in past cases. Analysts have noted that the judgment, if finalized, will not only impose financial liability on Alphabet but also strengthen the Commission’s ability to regulate digital ecosystems under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Legal observers have emphasized that the case reaffirms the EU’s expansive interpretation of competition law in digital markets—especially in scenarios involving pre-installation, data lock-in, and cross-service leverage. The Court’s final ruling is expected to carry significant weight in the implementation of the Digital Markets Act, where ex-ante obligations may draw upon this legal foundation to prevent similar behaviors proactively.

What is the expected timeline for the final ruling and what might it mean for digital platform regulation in Europe?

Although the Advocate General’s Opinion is non-binding, it marks a critical step toward the final judgment. The judges of the Court of Justice will now deliberate internally, with a decision expected in the coming months. Should the Court follow the recommendation—as it often does—Google will face immediate liability for the €4.124 billion fine, including any accrued interest since the original 2018 decision.

Beyond its financial implications, the ruling is likely to shape the enforcement environment for other digital platforms operating in Europe. It will bolster the legal rationale for intervening against vertically integrated ecosystems that use technical and contractual tools to crowd out rivals. Furthermore, it may pave the way for more aggressive antitrust actions at both EU and member state levels against digital gatekeepers.

In light of this, the American technology giant may increasingly turn toward settlement strategies or structural adjustments in its business model to avoid future penalties under the stricter regulatory landscape that is emerging across Europe.