EU-Western Balkans summit puts enlargement back at the centre of Europe’s security strategy

The European Union has used the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tivat, Montenegro, to frame enlargement as a strategic investment in Europe’s peace, stability and security rather than a distant diplomatic promise. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President António Costa and European Parliament President Roberta Metsola joined leaders from European Union member states and the six Western Balkan partners to review accession progress and the next phase of integration. The summit focused on Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, all of which remain at different stages on the European Union path. The meeting comes as Russia’s war against Ukraine, Chinese influence, regional political tensions and Europe’s own institutional hesitation have made enlargement policy a live security question again.

Why has the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Montenegro made enlargement a strategic security issue?

The EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tivat matters because European Union enlargement is no longer being treated only as a legal and administrative process. The summit framed enlargement as a strategic security issue, linking the Western Balkans directly to Europe’s geopolitical stability. That framing reflects a major shift in tone. For years, enlargement often sounded like a slow procedural file handled through chapters, benchmarks and reforms. In 2026, it is increasingly being discussed as a security necessity.

The European Union’s argument is that the Western Balkans are geographically, economically and politically tied to the future of Europe. If the region remains outside the European Union for too long, rival powers can exploit frustration, institutional weakness and unresolved disputes. Russia, China and other external actors have all sought influence in the region through energy, infrastructure, media, finance, diplomacy or political relationships. Brussels now appears more willing to say plainly that delayed enlargement carries strategic costs.

The summit also came at a time when the European Union is trying to show that it can act with urgency after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reshaped the continent’s security architecture. Ukraine and Moldova have moved quickly into the enlargement conversation, but the Western Balkans have been waiting for much longer. The challenge for Brussels is to convince Western Balkan governments and citizens that renewed enlargement language will translate into practical progress, not another round of elegant promises served with diplomatic coffee.

How are Albania, Montenegro and other Western Balkan partners positioned in the EU accession race?

The six Western Balkan partners are not moving at the same speed. Montenegro is widely viewed as the frontrunner in the accession process, with a stated ambition to join the European Union by 2028 if reforms are completed and political momentum holds. Albania is also seen as making progress, while North Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo face more complex political, legal or diplomatic barriers.

Montenegro’s advantage is partly institutional and partly political. As a smaller country with a clearer accession pathway, Montenegro has a more manageable reform agenda compared with larger or more politically divided states. However, Montenegro still faces serious requirements around rule of law, anti-corruption reform and judicial credibility. The European Union’s message is that momentum is possible, but accession will remain merit-based.

Albania’s progress has also strengthened the idea that enlargement can move forward when reforms are sustained. However, the wider region remains uneven. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to face deep governance challenges linked to its complex political structure. Serbia’s accession path is complicated by its relationship with Kosovo, its foreign policy alignment and domestic political concerns. Kosovo faces recognition issues because not all European Union member states recognise its independence. North Macedonia has faced repeated political and identity-related obstacles despite earlier reform commitments. The result is a region where the European Union wants movement, but every file carries its own knot.

Why is gradual integration becoming central to the European Union’s Western Balkans strategy?

Gradual integration is becoming central because full European Union membership can take years, and candidate countries need visible benefits before formal accession. The European Union and key member states are increasingly discussing ways to give Western Balkan partners earlier access to parts of the European Union single market, European Union programmes, student exchanges, research cooperation, energy systems and payments infrastructure once they meet specific standards.

This approach is meant to solve a credibility problem. If citizens in the Western Balkans hear only that membership is possible one day, but see few practical changes now, enthusiasm can weaken. Gradual integration offers a middle path. It gives candidate countries tangible benefits while keeping full membership conditional on reforms. It also allows the European Union to test alignment before granting full institutional rights.

The risk is that gradual integration could be seen as a substitute for membership rather than a bridge to membership. Western Balkan leaders are sensitive to any model that looks like second-class Europe. Brussels must therefore make clear that gradual integration is not a waiting room with better furniture. It must be a real pathway that rewards reform and leads toward full accession if conditions are met.

How does the Western Balkans Growth Plan fit into the European Union’s enlargement push?

The Western Balkans Growth Plan is one of the key tools designed to turn enlargement from a political message into an economic incentive. The plan aims to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the European Union by supporting reforms, regional cooperation and gradual access to parts of the single market. It is also intended to encourage the Western Balkans to deepen the Common Regional Market, which can improve trade, investment and business links across the region.

This matters because the Western Balkans cannot be integrated only through diplomatic declarations. The region needs infrastructure, investment, energy resilience, digitalisation, administrative reform and stronger institutions. The Growth Plan gives the European Union a financial and policy instrument to support that process. By linking funding to reforms, the European Union is trying to reward practical delivery rather than symbolic alignment.

For businesses, the Growth Plan could eventually improve the investment environment by reducing fragmentation, strengthening standards and improving regional market access. However, the effect will depend on execution. Investors will look for rule-of-law progress, contract certainty, regulatory predictability and infrastructure readiness. The European Union can offer incentives, but domestic governments must still do the hard work of reform. Brussels can open doors, but it cannot walk every ministry through them.

Why do Russia, China and regional instability make Western Balkans enlargement more urgent?

The Western Balkans occupy a strategic position between the European Union, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea region and wider southeast Europe. That geography makes the region important for security, energy routes, migration management, infrastructure connectivity and geopolitical influence. When the European Union leaves uncertainty in the region, other powers can step into the space.

Russia has long used political, cultural, energy and media influence in parts of the Western Balkans, particularly where historical or religious ties create openings. China has built influence through infrastructure lending, investment and economic engagement. Turkey and Gulf states also have cultural, religious and investment links in parts of the region. This does not mean every external engagement is hostile, but it does mean the European Union cannot assume that the Western Balkans will naturally remain aligned with Brussels if accession remains stalled.

Regional instability also remains a concern. Tensions around Serbia and Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s internal political structure, ethnic divisions, disinformation risks and weak institutions all create vulnerabilities. The European Union’s strategic argument is that enlargement can anchor the region more firmly inside European democratic, legal and economic structures. The harder question is whether the European Union can move fast enough without diluting the standards that make membership meaningful.

What institutional challenges does the European Union face before taking in new members?

The European Union’s enlargement challenge is not only about candidate countries. It is also about whether the European Union itself is ready to expand. Adding new members affects voting power, budget distribution, agricultural funding, cohesion policy, institutional balance and the ability of the bloc to make decisions. Several European leaders have argued that the European Union must prove it is capable and willing to take in new members.

This is where enlargement becomes politically difficult inside the European Union. Some member states strongly support faster expansion for strategic reasons. Others worry that admitting new members before institutional reform could make decision-making harder. The European Union already struggles at times with unanimity requirements, veto politics and budget disputes. Adding more members without adapting governance could make those problems worse.

There is also the question of public trust. Citizens in existing European Union member states may support enlargement in principle, but they may question the financial cost, migration effects or governance implications. Candidate countries, meanwhile, may lose faith if the European Union keeps moving the target. The Tivat summit therefore exposed a double test: Western Balkan partners must reform, and the European Union must show that enlargement is not an endlessly moving finish line.

How could Western Balkan businesses benefit from closer European Union integration?

Western Balkan businesses could benefit from closer European Union integration through improved access to markets, capital, standards, infrastructure and supply chains. Earlier participation in parts of the single market could help companies in the region scale more effectively and attract investment from European partners. Improved alignment with European Union rules could also reduce friction for exporters and investors.

The regional economic opportunity is significant. The Western Balkans have lower labour costs than many European Union member states, geographic proximity to major European markets and potential in sectors such as manufacturing, energy, agriculture, tourism, logistics, information technology and services. If reforms improve regulatory stability and regional cooperation, the region could become more attractive for companies seeking nearshore production and supply chain diversification.

The challenge is that integration benefits do not arrive automatically. Businesses need functioning courts, predictable taxes, transparent procurement, reliable infrastructure and corruption controls. The European Union can support convergence, but local governments must create operating environments where companies can grow without political interference or administrative drag. Otherwise, integration risks becoming a nice slogan pasted onto a slow permit office.

What are the risks if the EU-Western Balkans enlargement push loses momentum again?

If enlargement loses momentum again, the European Union risks deepening frustration in the Western Balkans and weakening its own credibility as a geopolitical actor. Candidate countries have already waited many years, and public support for European Union accession can erode when the process appears endless. That creates openings for nationalist politics, external influence and anti-European narratives.

The security risk is equally serious. A region that remains politically uncertain and economically under-integrated can become more vulnerable to instability, disinformation, organised crime and external pressure. European Union leaders increasingly recognise that the cost of delay may be higher than the cost of enlargement. The Western Balkans are not a remote foreign policy theatre. They are part of Europe’s immediate neighbourhood.

The institutional risk for the European Union is that enlargement rhetoric without delivery damages trust. If Brussels repeatedly says that the Western Balkans belong in the European Union but fails to create a credible pathway, the phrase loses meaning. The Tivat summit has therefore raised expectations. The next test is whether the European Union and Western Balkan partners can convert summit language into measurable progress.

What are the key takeaways from the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tivat?

• The EU-Western Balkans Summit in Tivat placed enlargement at the centre of Europe’s security agenda, with European Union leaders presenting accession as a strategic investment in peace, stability and security across the continent.
• The summit brought together European Union leaders, member states and the six Western Balkan partners: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, all of which remain at different stages of the accession process.
• Montenegro is widely viewed as the most advanced candidate in the Western Balkans, while Albania has also gained momentum, but other partners continue to face complex political, institutional and diplomatic obstacles.
• Gradual integration has become a key part of the European Union strategy, offering earlier access to selected European Union programmes and market benefits while keeping full membership dependent on reform progress.
• The Western Balkans Growth Plan is intended to support socio-economic convergence, regional cooperation and reform-linked investment, giving the European Union a practical tool beyond summit declarations.
• Russia’s war against Ukraine, Chinese influence and unresolved regional tensions have made the Western Balkans more strategically important for the European Union’s security and foreign policy agenda.
• The enlargement challenge is two-sided because Western Balkan partners must complete reforms, while the European Union must prove that it is institutionally and politically prepared to accept new members.
• The summit has raised expectations for faster progress, but the credibility of the process will depend on whether Brussels and Western Balkan governments can translate political statements into measurable reforms and integration benefits.