Ethiopia’s Tigray peace collapses as renewed fighting raises fears of another major war

Ethiopia’s fragile peace has entered its most dangerous phase in years after renewed fighting erupted across the northern Tigray region on September 23, 2026, effectively shattering the agreement that ended one of the world’s deadliest recent conflicts. Tigrayan forces have seized three airports, fighting has spread into neighboring Amhara and Afar, and telecommunications disruptions are raising fears that civilians could again become isolated from food, medicine and outside information.

The conflict has also produced a remarkable reversal of alliances. Armed groups that fought one another during the 2020-2022 Tigray war, including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and factions associated with the Amhara Fano movement, are now part of a broader alliance opposing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s federal government. The coalition brings together seven armed organizations from across Ethiopia, although major political, territorial and strategic disagreements remain between some of its members.

The risk extends well beyond Tigray. Renewed war could destabilize a Horn of Africa already dealing with Sudan’s civil war, worsening relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea, disputes over Red Sea access and the economic consequences of wider Middle Eastern conflicts. International organizations are urging both sides to return to negotiations before the current fighting expands into another prolonged national war.

Tigrayan forces seize three airports as Ethiopia’s northern conflict rapidly escalates

Tigrayan forces captured airports in Mekelle, Aksum and Shire as part of their latest military offensive, while clashes simultaneously developed beyond Tigray’s boundaries. Ethiopian Airlines suspended flights into the region following the airport seizures, and flights to Lalibela, the historic town famous for its rock-hewn churches, were also halted as fighting approached surrounding areas.

Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigrayan leadership have offered sharply different accounts of how the escalation began. The regional government in Tigray has characterized its campaign as defensive and accused federal forces of attacking with drones, artillery and ground troops, while officials aligned with Abiy’s government have accused the Tigray People’s Liberation Front of launching a large-scale offensive into Amhara and Afar. Independent verification remains difficult because access to active combat areas is limited.

The Ethiopian military said it had inflicted heavy losses on opposing forces, claiming hundreds of fighters had been killed, wounded or captured. Those battlefield claims have not been independently verified, illustrating one of the recurring difficulties surrounding the conflict as both sides use competing narratives to justify military operations.

Tensions had been rising for months before the latest offensive. Conflict-monitoring organization ACLED recorded renewed fighting between federal and Tigrayan forces near Ethiopia’s border with Sudan beginning in August, followed by federal drone attacks and movements of tanks, artillery and troops.

The speed of the latest escalation suggests those earlier clashes were not isolated incidents. Instead, they appear to have been warning signs that the political settlement created after the previous war was losing its ability to restrain either side.

Former enemies are joining forces against Abiy Ahmed despite unresolved rivalries

One of the most consequential developments is the creation of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, a coalition of seven armed organizations that says it wants to remove Abiy’s government. The alliance includes the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the Amhara Fano National Movement, forces that previously fought on opposing sides during the Tigray war.

Fano groups supported federal forces against Tigrayan fighters during the earlier conflict and were involved in some of its fiercest battles. Their relationship with Addis Ababa later deteriorated, however, and armed conflict between Fano factions and federal forces has continued in Amhara since 2023.

The new coalition also includes organizations from Oromia, Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and other regions. Many accuse Abiy’s administration of centralizing political authority and failing to address regional grievances, while the federal government argues that it has established a national dialogue process intended to resolve Ethiopia’s longstanding political and ethnic divisions.

The alliance should not necessarily be interpreted as a unified political movement. Some of its members retain competing territorial claims and profound mistrust stemming from previous conflicts, while their forces are geographically dispersed across a vast country.

International Crisis Group analyst Magnus Taylor told Reuters in substance that those weaknesses could limit the coalition’s effectiveness, particularly because some organizations remain divided by political differences and geographic distance.

The unusual alliance nevertheless demonstrates how dramatically Ethiopia’s internal political relationships have shifted. Groups once mobilized against one another increasingly share a common opponent in the federal government, creating a potentially wider challenge than the one Abiy faced during the original Tigray conflict.

Communications blackout revives memories of Tigray’s devastating previous war

Internet and telephone services across parts of Tigray were disrupted as fighting intensified, immediately raising fears among residents and humanitarian observers because communications blackouts became one of the defining features of the previous war. Calls over state-owned Ethio telecom networks were largely failing, while connectivity through private operator Safaricom remained limited.

Sources cited by Reuters said the Tigray People’s Liberation Front had ordered telecommunications companies to shut networks, possibly in an effort to reduce the federal military’s ability to use mobile infrastructure to support drone operations. A source close to the Tigrayan group rejected that allegation and blamed the federal government, leaving responsibility disputed.

The immediate concern is what a prolonged blackout could mean for civilians. During the 2020-2022 conflict, Tigray was extensively cut off from telecommunications, banking, humanitarian supplies and outside monitoring, making it difficult to assess casualties and worsening shortages of food and medicine.

Residents in Mekelle and other communities are already withdrawing money and purchasing food in anticipation of further disruption. In Adigrat, near the Eritrean border, residents reported worsening food shortages and increasingly expensive medicines as fears of another siege spread.

The African Union estimates that the previous Tigray war caused around 600,000 deaths from combat, famine and the collapse of healthcare services, although casualty estimates vary because reliable data were exceptionally difficult to obtain. The scale of that catastrophe explains why even relatively short telecommunications disruptions are generating intense concern.

Civilian conditions could deteriorate quickly if roads become inaccessible, banking systems stop functioning or humanitarian agencies lose the ability to operate safely. The United Nations and European Union have therefore urged restraint and called for a return to the African Union-led peace process before the fighting again becomes entrenched.

The Pretoria peace agreement had been unraveling long before the latest fighting

The current crisis reflects the gradual breakdown of the Pretoria Agreement signed in November 2022. That accord formally ended the war between the Ethiopian federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, leading to the disarmament of some Tigrayan forces, restoration of federal services and establishment of an interim regional administration.

However, several of the agreement’s most difficult questions were never fully resolved. Territorial disputes remained active, particularly involving areas claimed by both Tigrayans and Amharas, while Tigrayan officials repeatedly accused Addis Ababa of failing to implement important provisions of the peace settlement.

Internal divisions within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front further weakened the arrangement. A harder-line faction eventually reasserted control over Tigray’s regional political administration and removed the interim government established under the peace agreement, a move federal authorities viewed as a violation of the Pretoria framework.

The renewed formation of armed alliances now makes returning to the original agreement considerably more complicated. The conflict is no longer simply a confrontation between the same two actors that signed the 2022 deal, because armed groups from several Ethiopian regions have become involved.

That shift could require a broader political negotiation capable of addressing national grievances rather than merely reconstructing the previous Tigray settlement. Without such a process, even another ceasefire in the north may fail to address the forces driving armed opposition elsewhere in the country.

Eritrea and Red Sea tensions could turn Ethiopia’s crisis into a wider regional confrontation

Eritrea represents one of the biggest unknowns surrounding the renewed conflict. Eritrean forces fought alongside Ethiopia’s federal military against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front during the previous war, but relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have deteriorated substantially since then.

Abiy initially won international praise and the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize after ending years of hostility with Eritrea. Yet disputes surrounding the Pretoria agreement and Ethiopia’s renewed focus on securing access to the Red Sea have damaged that relationship.

Landlocked Ethiopia has increasingly argued that reliable access to a seaport is essential for its long-term economic and national-security interests. Eritrea controls the port of Assab, while Eritrean officials have expressed concerns that Addis Ababa could eventually attempt to gain access through coercion or force.

The Ethiopian government has accused Eritrea of financially supporting armed groups within the new anti-government coalition. Eritrea has repeatedly denied allegations that it is backing Ethiopian rebels, and publicly available evidence has not independently established the extent of any assistance.

Any direct Eritrean involvement would significantly increase the danger of regional escalation. Sudan is already consumed by its own civil war to Ethiopia’s west, while competition over ports and trade routes has made the Red Sea increasingly important to governments across the Horn of Africa and Middle East.

The geographic setting means another prolonged Ethiopian conflict would not remain an exclusively domestic issue. Refugee movements, disrupted trade, armed-group alliances and cross-border military involvement could place further pressure on neighboring countries already dealing with considerable instability.

Ethiopia now faces the danger that a regional rebellion could become a national war

The most important question is whether the renewed fighting remains concentrated in northern Ethiopia or expands through the broader coalition of armed organizations challenging Abiy’s government. The seizure of airports and spread of fighting into Amhara and Afar indicate that the conflict has already moved beyond localized clashes inside Tigray. At the same time, the new anti-government alliance could potentially open additional fronts if its members coordinate military activity across different regions.

Coordination remains a major uncertainty because Ethiopia’s armed groups have different histories, objectives and territorial interests. Former enemies may cooperate tactically against Addis Ababa while continuing to disagree over what political system should replace the current arrangement or who should control disputed areas.

For the federal government, the challenge is similarly complex. Military superiority in drones and other advanced weapons could provide significant battlefield advantages, but Ethiopia’s size and the number of armed regional movements make defeating multiple insurgencies simultaneously difficult.

The humanitarian stakes are even greater. Civilians in Tigray experienced famine-like conditions, mass displacement, healthcare collapse and extensive allegations of atrocities during the previous war, making the prospect of renewed large-scale conflict particularly dangerous.

The return of fighting does not guarantee that Ethiopia will experience another war on the scale of 2020-2022. Diplomatic pressure, battlefield calculations and internal divisions among the armed groups could still limit escalation.

However, the foundations that sustained nearly four years of uneasy peace are clearly weakening. With airports seized, telecommunications disrupted and former enemies forming new alliances, Ethiopia is again confronting the possibility that a conflict beginning in Tigray could reshape the stability of the entire country and the wider Horn of Africa.

Key takeaways from the renewed war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region

• Major fighting returned to northern Ethiopia as Tigrayan forces seized three airports and clashes spread into neighboring Amhara and Afar.
• The escalation has effectively shattered the Pretoria Agreement that ended the devastating 2020-2022 Tigray war.
• Former enemies including the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and Amhara Fano factions have joined a seven-group alliance opposing Abiy Ahmed’s government.
• The new coalition remains internally divided over politics and territory, creating uncertainty over how effectively its members can coordinate.
• Internet and phone disruptions across Tigray are reviving fears of the communications blackout and isolation civilians experienced during the previous conflict.
• Residents are already withdrawing cash and stockpiling food and medicine as concerns grow about shortages and another prolonged siege.
• Ethiopia’s government and Tigrayan leaders accuse each other of starting the latest fighting, and battlefield casualty claims remain difficult to verify independently.
• Deteriorating Ethiopia-Eritrea relations, Sudan’s civil war and disputes over Red Sea access increase the risk that renewed conflict could destabilize the wider Horn of Africa.