China uses water cannon against Philippine vessels for second day near Scarborough Shoal

Chinese coast guard ships used water cannon against two Philippine government vessels near Scarborough Shoal on July 24, 2026, marking the second consecutive day of confrontations at the disputed feature and the third serious China-Philippines maritime incident within one week.

The Philippine Coast Guard said one Chinese ship approached within approximately seven metres of a fisheries vessel, creating what Manila described as a grave collision risk. The boats were supporting Philippine fishermen operating around the shoal, which lies inside the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone but has been controlled by China since 2012.

China said the Philippine vessels had entered waters around Huangyan Island, Beijing’s name for Scarborough Shoal, without permission. The China Coast Guard said it issued warnings, blocked the boats and deployed water cannon as lawful control measures after the Philippine vessels refused to leave.

The confrontation occurred as senior diplomats concluded Association of Southeast Asian Nations meetings in Manila, where South China Sea tensions and negotiations for a regional code of conduct were major agenda items.

United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio described China’s recent actions as disturbing and reaffirmed Washington’s support for its treaty ally. The latest incident does not automatically activate the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, but repeated close encounters involving coast guard and government vessels are narrowing the space between coercion and an incident capable of producing a wider security crisis.

What happened during the second consecutive confrontation near Scarborough Shoal?

Philippine fisheries vessels were operating near Scarborough Shoal when Chinese coast guard ships moved to intercept them on July 24.

The Philippine Coast Guard said the Chinese vessels used water cannon against two government boats and carried out dangerous manoeuvres designed to force them away from the area.

One Chinese ship reportedly passed within about seven metres of a Philippine fisheries vessel. At sea, such a distance provides little margin for navigational error, mechanical failure or sudden changes in speed and direction.

Water cannon are generally described as non-lethal equipment, but powerful jets can damage windows, communications systems, engines and exposed equipment. Personnel standing on open decks can also be injured or thrown overboard.

The July 24 incident followed another water cannon confrontation near Scarborough Shoal on July 23.

China said its coast guard had acted professionally and lawfully against vessels that had entered Chinese waters and ignored repeated instructions to leave.

The Philippines rejected that position, maintaining that its vessels were operating within waters where Filipinos possess lawful fishing and maritime rights.

The immediate dispute therefore concerns both conduct and jurisdiction. Manila accuses China of using force inside the Philippine exclusive economic zone, while Beijing treats the area as sovereign Chinese territory subject to Chinese law enforcement.

Why has Scarborough Shoal become one of the South China Sea’s most dangerous flashpoints?

Scarborough Shoal is a triangular chain of reefs and rocks located approximately 200 kilometres west of the Philippine island of Luzon.

The feature has no permanent civilian population, but its surrounding waters are rich fishing grounds traditionally used by fishermen from the Philippines, China and other parts of the region.

China and the Philippines entered a prolonged standoff at the shoal in 2012. Philippine vessels eventually withdrew, while China maintained a continuing coast guard presence that effectively gave Beijing control over access.

The Philippines calls the feature Bajo de Masinloc. China calls it Huangyan Island.

Its strategic importance is greater than its physical size.

Control of the shoal allows China to project law-enforcement and surveillance power close to Luzon, the Philippines’ largest and most politically important island.

The area also sits near important shipping routes and could provide a useful location for monitoring naval and air activity in the northern South China Sea.

Philippine officials have repeatedly expressed concern that China could construct facilities or create a more permanent presence at the shoal, as it has done at other disputed features.

China has not established a large artificial island there, but its coast guard presence restricts Manila’s practical ability to exercise rights it claims under international maritime law.

What did the 2016 South China Sea arbitration decide about Scarborough Shoal?

The Philippines initiated arbitration against China under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

A tribunal issued its final award on July 12, 2016.

The tribunal did not determine which country possesses sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal because territorial sovereignty was outside the scope of the case.

It did rule that Scarborough Shoal is a rock rather than an island capable of generating a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone.

The tribunal also rejected the legal basis for China’s claim to historic rights across most of the South China Sea where those claims exceeded the maritime entitlements permitted by the convention.

Regarding Scarborough Shoal, the tribunal found that fishermen from several countries had traditionally used the area. It concluded that China had unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from accessing the traditional fishing grounds after taking control in 2012.

China rejected the arbitration from the beginning and does not recognise the award.

The Philippines considers the decision legally binding and a central foundation of its maritime policy.

The disagreement has created a persistent enforcement problem. International law may clarify maritime rights, but the Philippines lacks the physical capability to compel the much larger Chinese coast guard to leave the area.

Why did this confrontation become more serious after the clash at Second Thomas Shoal?

The Scarborough incidents followed a separate physical confrontation at Second Thomas Shoal earlier in the week.

The Philippines maintains an outpost there aboard the BRP Sierra Madre, a Second World War-era landing ship deliberately grounded in 1999.

Philippine forces periodically deliver food, water and other supplies to personnel stationed aboard the vessel.

During the latest encounter, Manila accused Chinese coast guard personnel of striking a Filipino sailor on the head with a wooden baton and damaging a Philippine rubber boat.

China gave a different account, saying Philippine personnel rammed a Chinese patrol craft and attacked Chinese officers using oars and sticks.

The opposing accounts have not been independently reconciled.

What is clear is that the confrontation moved beyond water cannon and blocking manoeuvres into direct physical contact between personnel.

The later incidents at Scarborough Shoal showed that tensions were not confined to a single location or resupply mission.

Three confrontations within one week indicate a broader pattern of competing maritime operations rather than an isolated misunderstanding.

They also increase the likelihood of miscalculation. Crews operating after repeated confrontations may be more defensive, more fatigued and more likely to interpret another vessel’s movement as hostile.

Could the United States-Philippines defence treaty be activated by a coast guard confrontation?

The United States and the Philippines are bound by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.

Washington has repeatedly stated that the agreement applies to armed attacks against Philippine armed forces, aircraft and public vessels, including coast guard vessels, anywhere in the South China Sea.

That clarification is intended to deter China from using military or coast guard force while assuming that the treaty applies only to attacks on Philippine territory.

The July 24 water cannon incident does not automatically constitute an armed attack under the treaty.

No deaths were reported, and the available accounts did not indicate that firearms, missiles or other conventional weapons were used.

However, the treaty question becomes more difficult when coercive tactics cause serious injury, loss of life or the destruction of a government vessel.

The danger lies in gradual escalation.

A Chinese vessel could collide with and sink a Philippine boat. Personnel could be killed during a boarding attempt or physical confrontation. A Philippine escort could respond with force to protect its crew.

Washington and Manila would then need to determine whether the event crossed the threshold from maritime law enforcement into an armed attack.

The alliance can deter escalation, but it can also raise the stakes of every encounter because a local incident may create pressure for an American response.

Why did the confrontation undermine the ASEAN meetings taking place in Manila?

The incidents occurred while foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and major external powers were meeting in the Philippine capital.

The South China Sea was already a central issue in the discussions.

ASEAN members and China have spent more than two decades negotiating a code of conduct intended to reduce the danger of clashes in disputed waters.

The latest confrontation demonstrated the gap between diplomatic discussions and behaviour at sea.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attended the Manila meetings, as did Marco Rubio and representatives from other major regional partners.

The Philippines used the gathering to raise concerns over Chinese coast guard conduct and seek wider support for international maritime law.

China maintained that the disputes should be handled directly between the countries concerned and accused Manila of organising provocative operations around the shoal.

ASEAN statements generally call for restraint, peaceful dispute resolution and respect for international law without assigning direct responsibility to one government.

That consensus-based approach preserves unity among members with different relationships with China.

It also limits ASEAN’s ability to respond decisively when confrontations occur.

The Manila meeting therefore highlighted a central weakness in the regional security system. ASEAN can bring rival powers into the same room, but it cannot easily prevent their vessels from engaging in dangerous operations at sea.

Can a South China Sea code of conduct prevent water cannon attacks and physical clashes?

A credible code of conduct could establish clearer rules for communication, separation distances, manoeuvring and the treatment of fishermen and government vessels.

It could require coast guard ships to avoid water cannon, ramming, lasers and dangerous blocking manoeuvres under specified circumstances.

The agreement could also create emergency communication channels and procedures for investigating incidents.

Its effectiveness would depend on several unresolved issues.

The first is whether the code will be legally binding or primarily political.

The second is whether it will apply consistently across all disputed waters, including Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal.

The third is whether the agreement will respect existing international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2016 arbitration award.

China is unlikely to accept language that appears to recognise the arbitration decision it rejects.

The Philippines is unlikely to support a code that weakens rights confirmed by the tribunal.

Enforcement is another problem. A code without independent monitoring or consequences could produce diplomatic language without changing coast guard behaviour.

The current negotiations may reduce some risk, but they cannot resolve the underlying sovereignty and maritime-entitlement disputes unless the participating governments accept meaningful operational constraints.

Why does China increasingly use its coast guard instead of its navy in disputed waters?

Coast guard operations allow China to enforce territorial claims while limiting the appearance of direct military escalation.

A naval deployment can be interpreted as preparation for armed conflict. A coast guard operation can be presented as routine law enforcement.

China possesses the world’s largest coast guard and deploys large vessels capable of remaining at sea for extended periods.

Some ships have size, endurance and equipment comparable to naval vessels.

The coast guard can block access, escort Chinese fishing boats, challenge foreign vessels and maintain a continuous presence without firing conventional weapons.

This approach creates what is often called a gray-zone challenge.

The actions remain below the threshold of open war but gradually change conditions on the water.

Repeated patrols can normalise Chinese authority, discourage fishermen and require smaller neighbouring countries to spend more money maintaining their own presence.

The strategy places the Philippines in a difficult position.

Failing to respond may allow China’s control to become more entrenched. Responding with naval forces could be portrayed as military escalation.

Manila has therefore expanded coast guard and fisheries missions while publicising encounters through photographs and video.

The contest is partly physical and partly informational. Both governments seek to show that their vessels are lawfully present and that the other side initiated the confrontation.

What economic and civilian risks arise from repeated clashes around fishing grounds?

Scarborough Shoal is not only a strategic feature. It supports the livelihoods of fishermen who depend on access to the surrounding waters.

Repeated confrontations can discourage civilian boats from entering productive fishing grounds.

Fishermen operating near large coast guard ships face risks that go beyond geopolitical disputes. Their vessels are smaller, less durable and less capable of surviving collisions or powerful water cannon.

Restrictions on fishing can affect household income and food supply in coastal Philippine communities.

The dispute also has wider commercial implications.

The South China Sea is one of the world’s most important maritime trading routes. A major confrontation could affect insurance costs, shipping plans and investor perceptions across Southeast Asia.

Most commercial vessels do not operate directly inside the contested shoals, but an armed crisis would influence routes across a much larger area.

Governments also incur rising costs as coast guard ships, naval vessels and surveillance aircraft conduct more frequent patrols.

Resources used to maintain a maritime presence cannot be spent on other public priorities.

The cumulative economic burden therefore extends well beyond the individual boats involved in each confrontation.

What options does the Philippines have without creating a larger military crisis?

The Philippines can continue regular coast guard and fisheries missions to demonstrate that it has not abandoned its maritime claims.

It can document encounters and release evidence intended to build international support.

Manila can also file diplomatic protests, strengthen coordination with ASEAN partners and pursue joint patrols or exercises with allies.

The United States, Japan and Australia have expanded maritime security cooperation with the Philippines through training, equipment and patrol activities.

These partnerships improve Philippine capacity but may also reinforce China’s belief that Manila is helping external powers contain Beijing.

The Philippines can seek practical arrangements governing fishing access and vessel conduct without surrendering its legal position.

A temporary operational understanding could reduce confrontations even if sovereignty remains unresolved.

The challenge is ensuring that an agreement does not legitimise China’s control or require the Philippines to request permission for activities it considers lawful.

Manila must also balance deterrence with restraint.

Sending larger or more heavily armed ships could protect personnel but increase the probability that a collision or boarding attempt becomes an exchange of gunfire.

The safest path involves sustained presence, clear communication, international documentation and firm rules preventing crews from using physical force.

The events of July 2026 show that none of those safeguards is currently sufficient.

What would turn the current South China Sea standoff into a wider regional emergency?

The most immediate danger is a collision causing deaths or the loss of a government vessel.

A second risk is the use of firearms during a confrontation involving boarding parties, rubber boats or personnel operating at close range.

A third possibility is an attack on a Philippine military resupply mission at Second Thomas Shoal.

Any of these events could trigger consultations under the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and create pressure for a visible American military response.

China could then deploy additional coast guard or naval forces, while the Philippines might request allied escorts.

The presence of several armed forces in a confined maritime area would magnify the risk of further miscalculation.

A permanent Chinese installation at Scarborough Shoal could also produce a larger strategic crisis because it would significantly expand Beijing’s ability to monitor and control waters close to Luzon.

The July 24 confrontation did not reach those thresholds.

Its importance lies in how closely routine operations are approaching them.

What are the key takeaways from China’s water cannon attacks near Scarborough Shoal?

• Chinese coast guard ships used water cannon against two Philippine government fisheries vessels near Scarborough Shoal on July 24, marking the second consecutive day of confrontations at the disputed feature.
• The Philippine Coast Guard said one Chinese vessel approached within approximately seven metres of a fisheries boat, creating a serious collision risk during an operation supporting Filipino fishermen.
• China said the Philippine vessels entered waters around Huangyan Island illegally and maintained that warnings, blocking manoeuvres and water cannon were lawful measures used to enforce Chinese jurisdiction.
• The incidents were the second and third major China-Philippines confrontations during the week, following a physical clash at Second Thomas Shoal in which Manila said a Filipino sailor was struck with a baton.
• The 2016 South China Sea arbitration rejected the legal basis of China’s expansive historic-rights claim and found that Beijing had unlawfully prevented Filipino fishermen from accessing traditional fishing grounds around Scarborough Shoal.
• China rejects the arbitration ruling, continues to control access to the shoal and argues that Philippine government vessels require Chinese permission to operate in the surrounding waters.
• Washington has confirmed that its defence treaty with Manila covers armed attacks on Philippine public vessels, including coast guard ships, although the latest water cannon incident does not automatically meet that threshold.
• The confrontation occurred during ASEAN meetings in Manila, exposing the continuing gap between diplomatic negotiations for a South China Sea code of conduct and increasingly dangerous conduct on the water.