Australia and Vanuatu sign Nakamal Agreement barring foreign military bases in Pacific

Australia and Vanuatu have signed a legally binding economic and security agreement that prohibits foreign military bases in Vanuatu, requires consultation with Canberra over third-party involvement in critical infrastructure and reinforces Australia’s position as Vanuatu’s primary policing partner.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Vanuatu Prime Minister Jotham Napat signed the Nakamal Agreement in Canberra on Monday, June 29, 2026, after an earlier version was delayed because of concerns within Vanuatu that the pact could restrict infrastructure financing and relationships with other countries.

The agreement does not mention China by name and does not give Australia a formal veto over Vanuatu’s foreign investment decisions. However, the provisions directly address Australian concerns that Chinese-funded ports, telecommunications networks, airports, energy assets or government facilities could eventually acquire strategic or military significance.

Vanuatu has committed not to permit its territory to be used for any foreign military base or military infrastructure. Critical infrastructure must remain free from militarisation, foreign interference and unauthorised access, while Vanuatu must consult Australia before entering proposed third-party arrangements involving ports, telecommunications, digital systems, aviation or energy assets.

The Nakamal Agreement also includes expanded policing cooperation, disaster response, renewable energy investment, cyber resilience, labour mobility, professional training and Australian budget support. The treaty will enter into force only after both governments complete their domestic requirements and formally exchange diplomatic notifications.

Why does the Nakamal Agreement matter for Australia, Vanuatu and Pacific security?

The agreement places Vanuatu more firmly within an Australian-led Pacific security framework at a time when China is expanding diplomatic, economic and policing relationships across the region.

Australia has long regarded the South Pacific as central to its national security. Permanent access by a non-Pacific military power to ports, airfields or communications infrastructure could alter naval operations, intelligence collection and supply routes across the region.

Vanuatu occupies a strategically important position northeast of Australia and west of Fiji. Although the country has a relatively small population, its location, maritime territory and infrastructure make its foreign partnerships relevant to the wider balance of power.

The treaty establishes that Vanuatu will not host any foreign military base or infrastructure. It also requires Vanuatu to prioritise requests for policing assistance from members of the Pacific Islands Forum, with Australia formally recognised as its longstanding primary policing partner.

Australia will expand support for the Vanuatu Police Force through training, equipment, maritime security, cyber security, intelligence cooperation and infrastructure. These commitments strengthen Vanuatu’s domestic capabilities while reducing the likelihood that Port Vila will seek routine security assistance from actors outside the Pacific regional system.

The provision does not completely exclude China. Chinese police officers could still visit or participate in limited activities if Vanuatu determines that such cooperation does not breach the agreement. The treaty instead gives formal priority to Pacific Islands Forum countries and blocks any foreign military presence.

Does the agreement give Australia control over Chinese investment in Vanuatu?

Australia does not receive a legal veto over investment from China or any other country. Vanuatu remains entitled to select infrastructure investors, development partners and contractors under its own sovereign processes.

The agreement requires consultation rather than Australian approval. When Vanuatu considers third-party involvement in designated critical infrastructure, it must discuss the proposal with Australia. Canberra must then provide technical advice and practical assistance.

This structure is weaker than an arrangement allowing Australia to reject a project. However, it gives Canberra early visibility into proposals involving ports, telecommunications, digital networks, aviation and energy infrastructure before those projects become difficult to reverse.

The consultation process may allow Australia to identify cyber risks, ownership concerns, financing vulnerabilities, dual-use technologies or contractual provisions that could expose infrastructure to foreign control.

Vanuatu must also ensure that its critical infrastructure remains free from militarisation, foreign interference and unauthorised access. That obligation applies regardless of whether the third-party investor is Chinese, American, European or associated with another government.

Anthony Albanese presented the arrangement as a balance between Vanuatu’s sovereignty and Australia’s security interests. The final agreement recognises Vanuatu’s right to engage with foreign partners while giving Australia greater certainty that those partnerships will not produce a foreign military base or strategic infrastructure access.

Why did negotiations take months longer than Australia and Vanuatu originally expected?

Australia and Vanuatu had expected to sign an earlier version of the agreement in September 2025. That plan was postponed after members of Vanuatu’s governing coalition raised concerns that the proposed provisions could limit access to infrastructure financing from other countries.

Vanuatu depends heavily on international partners to finance roads, government buildings, ports, telecommunications and disaster recovery. A provision perceived as giving Australia excessive influence over investment decisions could therefore have restricted Port Vila’s negotiating options.

China is Vanuatu’s largest external creditor. Chinese banks and contractors have financed or constructed important assets, including roads, public buildings and government infrastructure. Vanuatu was unwilling to accept an agreement that could be interpreted as requiring it to reject Chinese development assistance automatically.

The revised treaty replaced the reported push for stronger Australian control with a consultation mechanism. Australia will be informed about relevant third-party proposals and can provide advice, but Vanuatu retains the final decision.

The nine-month delay also reflected domestic political realities. Jotham Napat had to secure support across Vanuatu’s governing coalition and demonstrate that the final pact did not compromise national sovereignty.

The completed text repeatedly emphasises equality, political independence, territorial integrity and mutual respect. Its name refers to a nakamal, a traditional meeting place where leaders and community members discuss issues, make decisions and resolve disagreements.

That language is not merely symbolic. The agreement establishes a bilateral Nakamal Committee that must operate through consensus rather than unilateral Australian direction.

How will the Nakamal Committee manage disputes and sensitive foreign partnerships?

Australia and Vanuatu will create a Nakamal Committee to oversee implementation, resolve differences and discuss matters affecting sovereignty, peace and regional stability.

The committee must meet at least once every six months. Either government can request an additional meeting, and the committee must convene within two weeks when one party submits written notice concerning an obligation or implementation dispute.

Decisions will be made by consensus. Australia cannot use its larger economy or security capacity to impose a formal committee decision without Vanuatu’s agreement.

The treaty also prevents disputes from being referred to a national court, international tribunal or external third party. Disagreements must instead be settled through bilateral consultation and negotiation.

Either country can temporarily suspend compliance with particular obligations while a dispute remains unresolved. The arrangement therefore relies heavily on continued political trust and diplomatic engagement rather than external enforcement.

The agreement has no fixed expiry date. Either country may terminate it by giving written notice, but termination would take effect only after 24 months. That waiting period is designed to prevent an immediate change of government or diplomatic dispute from abruptly ending security arrangements.

The committee could become especially important if Vanuatu advances an infrastructure project with a state-owned foreign company, enters a policing arrangement outside the Pacific Islands Forum or disagrees with Australia over whether a facility has potential military uses.

What is Vanuatu’s separate Namele Agreement with China and does it conflict with Nakamal?

Vanuatu is separately negotiating a proposed Namele Agreement with China. Jotham Napat has described that arrangement as a development cooperation agreement rather than a security pact.

The Namele Agreement had not been signed as of June 29. It was awaiting approval from Beijing, and the Vanuatu government said it intended to publish or share the agreement once that process was completed.

Jotham Napat also indicated that Vanuatu would share the Nakamal Agreement with China and provide Australia with the completed Chinese agreement. This transparency is intended to reassure both partners that the separate arrangements do not contain hidden military commitments.

China expressed concern that Pacific agreements should not target another country or become instruments of geopolitical rivalry. Beijing said it would continue economic and development cooperation based on Vanuatu’s stated needs.

The two agreements could coexist if the Namele arrangement remains limited to economic development and complies with Nakamal’s restrictions. Chinese investment in roads, buildings or commercial infrastructure is not prohibited merely because the financing or contractor is Chinese.

A conflict could emerge if a Chinese-funded project involved military access, foreign control over critical systems, unauthorised data access or infrastructure capable of supporting a permanent security presence.

The consultation clause gives Australia an opportunity to raise those concerns before a project proceeds. It does not guarantee that Canberra and Port Vila will interpret every proposal in the same way.

How does the agreement expand economic support beyond military and policing issues?

The Nakamal Agreement is broader than a traditional security treaty. It links national security with economic stability, digital infrastructure, climate resilience, employment and disaster response.

Australia will support an accredited traineeship programme intended to build skills for Vanuatu’s domestic labour market. The programme is designed to provide Australian-recognised qualifications while responding to shortages in priority sectors.

Australia will also assist Vanuatu’s transition towards a cloud-based digital economy. The commitment includes digital infrastructure, software and cyber resilience, which could improve government services while reducing the vulnerability of small island systems to cyberattacks and natural disasters.

Budget support is included to strengthen Vanuatu’s fiscal and economic certainty. The final financial value has not yet been publicly confirmed, although Australia previously proposed approximately A$500 million over 10 years. Anthony Albanese said updated financial details would be disclosed through Australia’s budget reporting later in 2026.

Enhanced mobility arrangements will make it easier for eligible Vanuatu citizens to visit Australia. Vanuatu must improve systems that distinguish citizenship obtained through investment programmes from other forms of citizenship, reflecting longstanding Australian concerns over identity verification and passport integrity.

These economic provisions are strategically important. Australia’s Pacific policy increasingly recognises that security partnerships cannot remain credible when island governments face high debt, limited employment, infrastructure shortages and repeated climate disasters.

Why are climate change and disaster response treated as national security commitments?

Vanuatu is highly exposed to cyclones, earthquakes, volcanic activity, sea-level rise and other climate-related risks. A major disaster can damage a large share of the country’s infrastructure and overwhelm domestic emergency capacity.

Under the Nakamal Agreement, Australia will provide assistance after a request from Vanuatu following a major natural or humanitarian disaster. Vanuatu must first prioritise assistance through the FRANZ partnership involving France, Australia and New Zealand.

Vanuatu may approach another third party if the FRANZ partners formally indicate that they cannot provide the requested assistance. This structure gives established regional partners the first opportunity to respond without preventing Vanuatu from seeking help elsewhere when necessary.

The two countries have also committed to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 and meeting their renewable energy targets. Australia will support both grid-connected and off-grid renewable energy systems in Vanuatu.

Reducing dependence on imported diesel is presented as an economic and security priority as well as a climate measure. Fuel price spikes, shipping interruptions or conflict affecting major maritime routes can rapidly increase electricity and transportation costs in Pacific island economies.

The agreement also supports continued recognition of maritime zones, sovereignty and statehood despite climate-related sea-level rise. This matters because rising seas could otherwise create future disputes over exclusive economic zones and the legal status of low-lying states.

Does the Nakamal Agreement represent an Australian victory over China in the Pacific?

The agreement is a significant Australian diplomatic success because it creates a binding prohibition on foreign military bases and formalises consultation over strategic infrastructure.

It strengthens Canberra’s objective of remaining the preferred security partner for Pacific island countries while limiting opportunities for China to translate economic involvement into permanent military access.

However, describing the agreement as a complete defeat for China would overstate its effect. Vanuatu continues to seek Chinese financing and development cooperation, and the treaty does not prohibit Chinese companies from building civilian infrastructure.

China will remain an important economic partner and creditor. Vanuatu is unlikely to abandon relationships that provide access to roads, buildings, equipment and financing unavailable from domestic resources.

The final agreement also reflects concessions by Australia. Canberra did not obtain a formal veto over third-party investment, and the amount of Australian financial support has not yet been finalised publicly.

The deeper significance lies in the model being created. Australia has accepted that Pacific governments want multiple economic partners, while Vanuatu has accepted that foreign infrastructure relationships can have regional security consequences.

The success of the treaty will depend less on the signing ceremony than on whether Australia delivers economic benefits quickly, whether consultation remains respectful and whether Vanuatu’s future foreign projects remain genuinely civilian.

What are the key takeaways from the Australia-Vanuatu Nakamal Agreement?

• Australia and Vanuatu signed the legally binding Nakamal Agreement in Canberra on June 29, 2026, after months of negotiations over sovereignty, infrastructure investment, policing cooperation and the strategic implications of foreign involvement in the Pacific.
• Vanuatu has committed not to permit its territory to host any foreign military base or military infrastructure, although the agreement does not identify China or any other individual country as the prohibited security actor.
• Australia does not receive a formal veto over Chinese or other foreign investments, but Vanuatu must consult Canberra before proposed third-party involvement in ports, telecommunications, digital networks, aviation and energy infrastructure.
• Vanuatu’s critical infrastructure must remain free from militarisation, foreign interference and unauthorised access, while Australia must provide technical advice and practical support during consultations involving sensitive projects.
• The agreement reinforces Australia as Vanuatu’s primary policing partner and expands cooperation covering police training, equipment, maritime security, cyber security, intelligence sharing and security infrastructure.
• Economic commitments include professional traineeships, digital infrastructure, cyber resilience, budget support, renewable energy investment and enhanced mobility arrangements for Vanuatu citizens travelling to Australia.
• Vanuatu is separately negotiating the Namele Agreement with China, which Jotham Napat has described as a development arrangement without security provisions and has promised to share once it receives approval from Beijing.
• The treaty will enter into force after both governments complete their domestic processes, and either party may terminate it through written notice that becomes effective only after a 24-month waiting period.