Mali’s mining reset: Why Barrick Gold stayed out as rivals signed seven fresh deals

Mali has approved seven new mining agreements under its 2023 mining code, a sweeping policy that expands the state’s financial stake in natural resources and codifies non-reducible public ownership. According to Reuters, Mali’s Council of Ministers approved the agreements under the revised 2023 mining code, which increases state royalties and ownership stakes. The move underscores the country’s push toward resource nationalism while still attempting to court foreign capital. The agreements span a range of assets, including flagship gold mines and lithium projects, and were finalized with companies such as B2Gold Corp. (NYSE American: BTG; TSX: BTO), Resolute Mining Limited (ASX: RSG), Allied Gold Corporation (TSX: AAUC), Ganfeng Lithium Group Co., Ltd. (SEHK: 1772; SZSE: 002460) and Kodal Minerals plc (AIM: KOD). However, Barrick Gold Corporation (NYSE: GOLD; TSX: ABX), one of the largest operators in Mali, remains conspicuously absent, locked in a prolonged dispute with the government over its Loulo–Gounkoto complex.

Why did Mali sign seven new mining deals and what changed in the revised mining code?

The central driver of these new agreements is the 2023 mining code, which represents a dramatic rebalancing of power between the state and foreign operators. Authorities raised royalties from 6.5 percent to 10 percent, while simultaneously increasing aggregate state and local ownership to at least 35 percent. This ownership structure includes a free-carry component alongside options for the government to purchase additional stakes, ensuring a non-reducible participation in mining ventures. The state also secured priority access to dividends, guaranteeing that cash flows are directed toward national revenue before distribution to private shareholders.

These measures were designed to strengthen fiscal stability, reduce the uncertainty of ad hoc renegotiations, and provide a consistent framework for investors. At the same time, they reflect Mali’s broader embrace of resource nationalism, a trend seen across multiple African jurisdictions. By embedding these terms into law, Mali is signaling to international operators that there will be no special exemptions and that the government is determined to assert sovereignty over its mineral wealth while still offering clear, codified rules of engagement.

Which mines and minerals were included in the new agreements, and why does this matter for Mali’s diversification strategy?

The approvals cover a diverse set of assets, balancing Mali’s historic dependence on gold with new opportunities in the global energy transition. Allied Gold’s Sadiola gold operation, B2Gold’s Fekola mine and Resolute’s Syama project are all established gold assets with long life cycles and substantial export potential. Aligning these operations under the revised code ensures immediate fiscal benefits through royalties, dividends and employment contributions, even as sponsors adjust to slimmer margins.

Lithium has emerged as the second pillar of Mali’s resource portfolio. Ganfeng Lithium’s Goulamina project has already begun its first production phase and aims to double output in the medium term. Kodal Minerals’ Bougouni project is progressing toward commercial exports, adding further diversity to Mali’s mining economy. These projects align Mali with the surging global demand for battery materials, positioning the country as a potential hub in the energy transition supply chain. By locking in contracts under the new fiscal framework, Mali is ensuring that both gold and lithium revenues contribute more predictably to state coffers.

Why has Barrick Gold remained absent from the new wave of approvals?

The exclusion of Barrick Gold highlights the tensions that arise when resource nationalism collides with entrenched legacy operators. The company’s Loulo–Gounkoto complex, one of Mali’s most significant gold mines, has been at the center of a dispute that escalated from contested tax claims into a broader legal and operational standoff. The government seized several tonnes of gold, blocked exports and sought provisional control of the mine. Courts later appointed an administrator to oversee the complex on a temporary basis, and despite reports of a framework agreement earlier in 2025, Barrick has yet to resume normal operations.

The government’s actions reflect a hard line against companies that resist the revised code. By contrast, firms that accepted the new terms, such as B2Gold and Resolute, have avoided severe disruptions. For Barrick, the impasse has already had financial consequences. The company was forced to remove Loulo–Gounkoto from its 2025 production guidance, a move that rattled investors and drew attention to the risks of operating in jurisdictions with shifting legal frameworks. Analysts interpret Mali’s stance as a signal that all miners, regardless of size or legacy status, must conform to the new rules or face the consequences.

How does the revised code compare with previous frameworks, and what are the implications for fiscal stability and investor risk?

Prior to 2023, Mali’s mining code allowed state ownership levels of around 20 percent, often accompanied by generous tax exemptions. The revised framework hardens these requirements, mandating at least 35 percent combined state and local ownership, eliminating select tax holidays and raising royalties to 10 percent. The state’s long-term cash take has increased significantly, and the codification of these terms reduces the scope for arbitrary negotiations.

For the treasury, this promises smoother and more predictable revenue streams, critical for a country where mining represents a major portion of export income. For investors, however, the new rules shift the balance of risk. Margins are compressed by higher royalties and state ownership, and operators must contend with increased oversight. Yet, the predictability of codified rules may also lower long-term uncertainty, particularly for new entrants who value a level playing field.

What does the market sentiment look like for the companies involved, and how have their stocks responded?

Equity markets have responded differently to companies operating under Mali’s revised framework. B2Gold, which quickly adapted to the new code at its Fekola mine, has been rewarded with relative stability in its stock performance. Investors view the company’s alignment with government policy as a hedge against disruption, even if near-term profits are thinner. Allied Gold, with its Sadiola project, is considered a speculative beneficiary of the new regime, while Resolute is being closely watched for its ability to execute at Syama under the revised ownership structure.

Barrick Gold has suffered the sharpest reputational hit. The company’s removal of Loulo–Gounkoto from its 2025 guidance has weighed on sentiment, with investors treating its Mali exposure as a valuation overhang. The stock has experienced volatility, reflecting both the potential upside if a resolution is achieved and the downside risks of prolonged paralysis. Analysts suggest a hold stance on Barrick until export resumption and legal clarity emerge. Meanwhile, B2Gold has drawn buy-side interest as a safer Mali exposure, with Allied Gold attracting speculative buyers looking for leverage to Mali’s new fiscal model.

On the lithium front, Ganfeng Lithium and Kodal Minerals remain more influenced by global market dynamics than Malian politics. Ganfeng’s valuation in Hong Kong and Shenzhen is driven largely by Chinese EV sentiment and spodumene pricing, while Kodal’s performance on London’s AIM market depends on project milestones and offtake execution. Nonetheless, Mali’s codified rules provide a governance overlay that institutional investors will continue to track closely.

How does Mali’s approach fit into the wider trend of resource nationalism in West Africa?

Mali’s assertive posture is part of a broader wave across West Africa, where governments are seeking larger slices of mining revenues as commodity prices rise. Military-led administrations in particular have turned to resource nationalism as a means of bolstering fiscal capacity and political legitimacy. The difference in Mali’s case is that, alongside enforcement actions and disputes with legacy players, it has successfully negotiated and formalized agreements with a diverse slate of operators under uniform terms.

This dual strategy—tougher fiscal demands coupled with transparent codification—creates a framework that, while less favorable for operators, may be more investable in the long run. For resource funds accustomed to navigating political risk, Mali offers a calculable discount factor rather than an outright deterrent. The real challenge lies in execution: whether the government can consistently enforce its new rules without creating operational instability or deterring new investment.

What are the next steps, and what should investors and operators watch for?

Over the next two quarters, two developments will be decisive. First, the implementation of the new agreements will be closely scrutinized. Investors will watch how dividend priority mechanisms function, how quickly the state exercises its paid-in stake options, and how audits are conducted. Any delays or inconsistencies could undermine the credibility of the framework.

Second, the resolution of the Barrick impasse will be pivotal. If a legally robust settlement restores exports and ends provisional administration of Loulo–Gounkoto, investor sentiment toward Mali could improve significantly. Cargo movements, court rulings and company guidance will be the key indicators of progress. A constructive outcome would reposition Mali as a case study in codified resource nationalism rather than a cautionary tale of investor hostility.

Mali’s approval of seven new mining deals is therefore less a rejection of Barrick Gold than a declaration that its revised code is non-negotiable. Companies that have accepted the tougher terms—B2Gold, Resolute, Allied Gold, Ganfeng and Kodal—are trading margin for contractual certainty and continued access. Barrick’s path back will depend on its willingness to settle disputes, unlock exports and integrate Loulo–Gounkoto into the new framework. Until then, the “Mali premium” remains a headwind for the company’s earnings and market valuation.