Can the IAEA still monitor Iran’s nuclear program after Trump’s Fordow strike? Global trust at risk

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed that there has been no radiation release from Iran’s bombed nuclear facilities, but access to key sites may be under serious threat following U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan. As the inspection regime faces physical, political, and security hurdles, global concern is rising over the viability of nuclear safeguards and the potential collapse of diplomacy.

U.S. President Donald Trump announced the strikes on June 21, calling the military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure a “very successful” mission. He claimed the Fordow site, buried near Qom, had been “obliterated” and stated that “Iran must now agree to end this war.” But while the Pentagon has not publicly confirmed the full extent of the strike damage, the IAEA has acknowledged on-the-ground degradation that could significantly affect monitoring activities.

How has the IAEA assessed safety and continued access following strikes on nuclear infrastructure in Iran?

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi told the UN Security Council that while the airstrikes compromised nuclear site integrity, “no radiological release” had occurred. The agency confirmed that some cascade halls at Natanz had suffered visible damage, although radiation levels remained within safe limits. Inspectors remain stationed in Iran but are now operating under revised protocols due to heightened security concerns.

In his most recent remarks, Grossi stated the agency is “ready to continue its safeguards mission” and is working with Iranian authorities to resume physical inspections once site safety is reestablished. However, full access to the bombed facilities—especially the underground Fordow enrichment site—remains uncertain.

Why could the IAEA’s reduced access jeopardize nuclear safeguards and diplomacy in Iran?

Iran’s cooperation with IAEA inspections has historically fluctuated with the political climate. The Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan facilities were under regular IAEA monitoring as part of Iran’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations and the JCPOA framework. With the physical integrity of some sites compromised and possible constraints on inspector movement, continuity of knowledge—critical for verifying peaceful use—is at risk.

Experts warn that if inspectors are unable to enter affected zones, Iran could use the opacity to resume higher-grade enrichment or expand infrastructure undetected. The damage to safeguards access could also weaken the EU’s position in any upcoming nuclear talks and may reduce the credibility of the entire global verification regime.

What international backlash could arise from a weakened IAEA presence in Iran after these airstrikes?

The United Nations has already registered alarm. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on all parties to de-escalate and reaffirmed that nuclear facilities should not become military targets. Grossi echoed this concern, warning that such actions set a “dangerous precedent” and risk damaging both environmental safety and political stability.

European diplomats, particularly from France and Germany, were reportedly preparing a restart of nuclear negotiations with Iran just days before the strikes occurred. With IAEA access now uncertain, those discussions may stall, if not collapse entirely. Russia and China have also issued statements accusing the U.S. of violating the UN Charter by launching unilateral military action.

How might Iran leverage reduced IAEA access to expand nuclear enrichment underground?

Iran has already publicly claimed that enrichment activities at Fordow were continuing at 60%, near-weapons-grade, prior to the strikes. With the site now damaged and inspectors unable to assess the current status, Tehran may exploit the ambiguity to further increase enrichment levels, deploy new centrifuge arrays, or shift operations to covert locations.

Analysts have warned that the Islamic Republic could use the bombing as justification to withdraw cooperation with the IAEA altogether, or to accelerate technical milestones without external visibility. This could collapse what remains of the JCPOA framework and prompt retaliatory or preventive measures from Israel or the U.S.

What are the IAEA’s options for restoring safety and verification in Iran after the attacks?

Grossi stated that the agency remains ready to increase its presence “wherever necessary,” and may deploy safety teams to assess damage once Iranian authorities allow reentry. However, any on-ground return would likely require a trilateral negotiation between Iran, the IAEA, and either the EU or Russia to guarantee safe operating conditions for inspectors.

The agency could also expand its use of remote sensing, satellite surveillance, and automated environmental sampling devices at sites with reduced physical access. However, without boots-on-the-ground verification, the precision and legality of such monitoring remain contentious.

What could derail nuclear diplomacy even further if IAEA access is diminished?

If the IAEA cannot maintain full oversight, the EU’s leverage in upcoming Geneva talks could evaporate. Already struggling with a divided negotiating table, Europe may find itself sidelined entirely if Tehran leverages the attack to discredit Western credibility.

Moreover, IAEA inspectors have historically served as neutral arbiters in disputed nuclear cases. A break in access could lead to mistrust between signatories, undermine future treaties, and incentivize Iran or others to walk away from the NPT framework. In short, the safeguards gap created by military escalation risks turning a technical regime into a geopolitical fault line.

Can the IAEA preserve its safeguards mission amid escalating tensions and site damage?

Nuclear governance specialists argue that the IAEA is now navigating its most difficult operational environment in decades. While the agency has endured regional conflicts before—including in Iraq, North Korea, and Syria—it has never had to maintain trust after coordinated bombings of active, monitored nuclear facilities.

Rafael Grossi’s next steps will be critical: re-establishing inspection routines, securing cooperation from Iran, and restoring international consensus around impartial verification. If the agency fails, the world may enter a phase where nuclear transparency is no longer enforced, but merely negotiated.