Australia doubles social media ban fines to A$99m as teenagers bypass age checks

Australia will seek to double the maximum penalty for systematic breaches of its under-16 social media law to A$99 million after early evidence showed that large numbers of teenagers were continuing to access restricted platforms.

The Australian government announced the proposed changes on Sunday, June 28, 2026, six months after the country’s social media minimum-age restrictions took effect. The legislation will also expand the information-gathering powers of the eSafety Commissioner, allowing the regulator to compel technology companies and third-party service providers to produce evidence about how age restrictions are being enforced.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Minister for Communications Anika Wells said social media companies had not done enough to prevent children from maintaining or creating accounts. The government said more than five million accounts belonging to users under 16 had been removed, deactivated or restricted since December 10, 2025, but acknowledged that too many children remained active on social media.

The eSafety Commissioner is currently investigating potential non-compliance involving Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube. The investigations do not establish that any of the platforms has broken Australian law, and no final enforcement findings have been announced.

The enforcement announcement followed University of Newcastle research involving 408 adolescents aged between 12 and 17. More than 85 percent of participants under 16 reported that they were still using at least one restricted social media platform three months after the law began, often through their own accounts, false age declarations or accounts belonging to relatives and friends.

Why is Australia doubling social media penalties only six months after the ban began?

Australia’s social media minimum-age law requires covered platforms to take reasonable steps to prevent children under 16 from holding accounts. The legal responsibility rests with the platform rather than children or their parents, meaning underage users are not fined for accessing social media and families are not required to police the law on behalf of the government.

The existing maximum penalty for systematic non-compliance is A$49.5 million. The proposed legislation would increase that amount to A$99 million, bringing penalties closer to those available under Australian competition and consumer law. Penalties for failing to comply with formal information notices from the eSafety Commissioner would also be increased.

The Australian government has presented the higher maximum as a response to the financial size and global influence of major technology companies. A penalty that appears substantial in isolation may represent only a limited portion of the annual revenue generated by the largest social media businesses, reducing its potential deterrent effect unless enforcement is credible and repeated breaches carry meaningful consequences.

The announcement does not immediately change the penalty because Parliament must first pass the proposed legislation. The government had not confirmed an exact introduction date in its initial announcement, although Australian Broadcasting Corporation reporting indicated that the measures could be brought before Parliament before the winter recess scheduled to begin after July 2.

The enforcement challenge is therefore entering a new phase. The first six months focused on removing known underage accounts and requiring platforms to introduce age-assurance systems. The next phase will examine whether those systems are sufficiently reliable and whether platforms can demonstrate that they are taking reasonable rather than merely symbolic steps.

How did a world-first under-16 social media restriction produce five million blocked accounts?

Australia’s social media age restrictions took effect on December 10, 2025, following the passage of amendments to the Online Safety Act. The framework requires designated age-restricted social media services to prevent Australian children under 16 from holding accounts.

By mid-December 2025, platforms had removed access to approximately 4.7 million accounts identified as belonging to children under 16. The government subsequently placed the wider number of removed, deactivated or restricted accounts at more than five million.

That figure demonstrates the scale of children’s previous participation but does not prove that five million individual children permanently left social media. A single person may have held accounts across several services, while some removed accounts may later have been replaced with new profiles using different birth dates, devices, email addresses or identity signals.

The law also does not require one universal age-verification method. Platforms can use a combination of account information, behavioural indicators, facial-age estimation, identity documents and other age-assurance tools. Government identification cannot be the only verification method offered because adults and children must have alternative ways to establish their age.

The flexible framework was intended to avoid prescribing technology that could rapidly become outdated. It also allowed platforms to select verification systems proportionate to their services and risks. The drawback is that different services may apply very different levels of scrutiny, leaving gaps that children can exploit.

The eSafety Commissioner’s early role has included publishing regulatory guidance, assessing which services fall within the law and requesting information about compliance. The proposed amendments indicate that the government believes the regulator’s original evidence-gathering powers were not strong enough to test platform claims effectively.

Why does research showing 85 percent teen access challenge the government’s enforcement claims?

The University of Newcastle study followed 408 adolescents before the restrictions began and again three months after implementation. Researchers found little overall change in social media access among children covered by the law.

Approximately 86 percent of participants under 16 reported using at least one restricted platform during the week before the follow-up survey. Most continued to access services through their own accounts, while others used false profiles, shared accounts or accounts belonging to family members and friends.

Around two-thirds of adolescents encountered some form of age verification. Self-declaration was among the most frequently reported methods, meaning users were asked to provide or confirm a date of birth. Photo-based estimation was also used, but relatively few participants reported undergoing more demanding verification.

Between 15 percent and 19 percent of participants said they had used a false account, while between 9 percent and 29 percent had accessed platforms through another person’s account. Up to 11 percent reported using private browser functions as part of efforts to bypass restrictions.

The findings do not prove that the national law has failed permanently. The study involved a relatively small group, relied on self-reported behaviour and examined only the first three months of implementation. Platform controls, user behaviour and regulatory enforcement may change over a longer period.

The research nevertheless creates a clear contradiction between account-removal totals and continued user access. Millions of accounts can be closed while children remain able to create replacements, misstate their age or use another person’s credentials.

The findings also suggest that effectiveness differs by age. Daily social media use remained broadly stable among children aged 12 and 13, while it declined among those aged 14 and 15. Researchers did not identify a substantial overall change in daily use or time spent online across the under-16 group.

What additional powers will the eSafety Commissioner receive under the proposed legislation?

The proposed amendments will allow the eSafety Commissioner to demand more detailed information and documents from covered social media platforms. The regulator will be able to require evidence showing what a company has done to identify underage users, stop new registrations and remove existing accounts.

The powers will extend beyond information supplied directly by platforms. The eSafety Commissioner will also be able to obtain records from third parties such as app stores and age-assurance providers, allowing the regulator to compare a platform’s claims with independent technical or commercial evidence.

This is important because a company may report how its age-verification system is designed without revealing how consistently it is applied. Third-party data could show how many users underwent verification, what methods were used, how many checks failed and whether a platform continued allowing access after uncertainty about a user’s age.

The enhanced powers could also help the regulator distinguish between isolated circumvention and a systematic failure. Australian law requires platforms to take reasonable steps, not to guarantee that no child will ever bypass a control. Enforcement will therefore depend on evidence showing whether companies selected credible systems, monitored weaknesses and responded when evasion became widespread.

Julie Inman Grant remains Australia’s eSafety Commissioner and leads the regulator responsible for enforcing the online age restrictions. The proposed legislation would strengthen the tools available to the office rather than transferring responsibility to a different agency.

Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube are under active investigation for potential non-compliance. Reddit, Twitch and other services are also covered by the broader age-restriction framework, but the government did not identify them among the five platforms currently under investigation in the June 28 announcement.

How are privacy, free speech and age-verification disputes complicating enforcement?

Preventing children from using social media requires platforms to estimate or verify the age of every user, including adults. That creates a privacy dilemma because stronger verification may require more personal information, while weaker verification can be easily bypassed.

Facial-age estimation can produce an approximate age from a photograph or video, but its accuracy can vary. Identity-document checks may be more definitive, but they require users to share sensitive information with a platform or verification provider. Behavioural analysis can operate without formal identification, but users may not understand which personal signals are being examined.

The Australian framework attempts to reduce this tension by preventing platforms from relying exclusively on government identification. Services must offer alternative options, but those alternatives must still be robust enough to identify children with reasonable accuracy.

Reddit has separately challenged the legislation in Australia’s highest court. The company has argued that the restrictions affect political communication and could require intrusive verification of adult users. The Australian government has said it will defend the law. No final decision had been issued in the Reddit proceedings at the time of the latest enforcement announcement.

Critics also argue that an account ban may remove children from moderated or supportive online communities without addressing harmful recommendation systems, private messaging, addictive design or content available without an account.

Supporters contend that limiting accounts reduces exposure to personalised algorithms, direct contact from strangers and repeated engagement features. The dispute is therefore not simply about whether social media can harm children. It concerns whether an age ban is the most effective and proportionate regulatory response.

Why are other countries watching Australia as they design their own social media restrictions?

Australia was the first country to impose a national social media account restriction covering users under 16. Its implementation has consequently become a real-world test for governments considering similar measures.

The United Kingdom announced in June 2026 that it intends to prohibit social media access for children under 16 from spring 2027. The British approach is expected to extend beyond traditional social media by restricting features such as livestreaming and communication with strangers on other online services.

France, Germany, Norway, Malaysia, Indonesia and other jurisdictions have also debated or introduced age-based protections. A German government-appointed panel recently recommended prohibiting social media accounts for children under 13, with different safeguards proposed for older teenagers.

Australia’s experience provides both encouragement and a warning. The removal of more than five million accounts shows that legislation can force global companies to act on a large scale. The continued access reported by teenagers shows that account-removal totals alone cannot demonstrate that a ban is working.

Other governments will also study the effect on privacy, vulnerable children and digital exclusion. Age verification must be accurate enough to enforce restrictions without creating a system in which every adult internet user must disclose excessive personal information.

The global policy debate is therefore moving from whether governments should intervene to how intervention can be enforced. Australia’s decision to double penalties suggests that passing an age limit is easier than ensuring that platforms apply it consistently.

What happens next for Meta Platforms, Alphabet, Snap, TikTok and other covered services?

The immediate next step is the introduction and passage of the Australian government’s amendments. Until Parliament approves the legislation, the maximum systematic penalty remains A$49.5 million and the regulator continues operating under its existing statutory powers.

The eSafety Commissioner’s investigations into Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube will continue separately. Those investigations may result in no action, formal notices, negotiated compliance measures or enforcement proceedings, depending on the evidence collected.

Meta Platforms operates Facebook and Instagram, Alphabet owns YouTube, Snap operates Snapchat and ByteDance owns TikTok. Each company may use different combinations of age declarations, facial estimation, account history and identity checks, meaning enforcement findings could differ between platforms.

The regulator must also determine what constitutes reasonable compliance when determined teenagers deliberately evade controls. A company may argue that no verification system can prevent every false declaration, while the government may respond that predictable and widespread circumvention requires stronger intervention.

The University of Newcastle research gives the government evidence that continued access remains common, but it does not establish individual corporate liability. Enforcement decisions will require platform-specific information showing how each system operated and whether companies corrected known weaknesses.

The wider test will be behavioural rather than statistical. Australia will need to determine whether the law reduces harmful exposure, unwanted contact, compulsive use and mental-health risks, rather than judging success solely by the number of accounts removed.

What are the key takeaways from Australia’s tougher under-16 social media enforcement plan?

• Australia announced on June 28, 2026, that it will seek to double the maximum penalty for systematic breaches of its social media minimum-age law from A$49.5 million to A$99 million.
• The proposed legislation will expand the eSafety Commissioner’s authority to compel social media companies, app stores and age-assurance providers to produce documents and evidence concerning their under-16 enforcement systems.
• More than five million accounts associated with users under 16 have been removed, deactivated or restricted since the national social media age restrictions took effect on December 10, 2025.
• The eSafety Commissioner is actively investigating potential non-compliance involving Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, TikTok and YouTube, but the investigations have not yet produced a final finding that any platform violated the law.
• University of Newcastle research involving 408 adolescents found that more than 85 percent of participants under 16 continued accessing at least one restricted social media platform three months after implementation.
• Young users reported bypassing restrictions through false birth dates, selfies accepted as proof of age, alternative profiles, accounts belonging to friends or relatives and private browser functions.
• The proposed A$99 million maximum penalty has not yet become law, and the Australian Parliament must approve the amendments before the expanded sanctions and evidence-gathering powers can take effect.
• Australia’s results are being watched internationally because the United Kingdom and several other countries are developing similar restrictions and need evidence about enforcement, privacy and unintended consequences.